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Abstract
Cloud computing provides scalable processing and storage resources that are hosted on
a third-party provider to permit clients to economically meet real-time service demands.
The confidentiality of client data outsourced to the cloud is a paramount concern since
the provider cannot necessarily be trusted with read access to voluminous sensitive client
data. A particular challenge of mobile cloud computing is that a cloud application may be
accessed by a very large and dynamically changing population of mobile devices requiring
access control. The thesis addresses the problems of achieving efficient and highly scalable
key management for resource-constrained users of an untrusted cloud, and also of preserving
the privacy of users. Computation and wireless communication is minimized for mobile
users while preserving the confidentiality of cloud data and of users retrieving it.
A model for key distribution is first proposed that is based on dynamic proxy re-
encryption of data. Keys are managed inside the client domain for trust reasons,
computationally-intensive re-encryption is performed by the cloud provider, and key dis-
tribution is minimized to conserve communication. A mechanism manages key evolution
for a continuously changing user population.
Next, a novel form of attribute-based encryption is proposed that authorizes users
based on the satisfaction of required attributes. The greater computational load from
cryptographic operations is performed by the cloud provider and a trusted manager rather
than the mobile data owner. Furthermore, data re-encryption may be optionally performed
by the cloud provider to reduce the expense of user revocation.
Another key management scheme based on threshold cryptography is proposed where
encrypted key shares are stored in the cloud, taking advantage of the scalability of storage
in the cloud. The key share material erodes over time to allow user revocation to occur
efficiently without additional coordination by the data owner; multiple classes of user
privileges are also supported.
Lastly, an alternative exists where cloud data is considered public knowledge, but the
specific information queried by a user must be kept private. A technique is presented
utilizing private information retrieval, where the query is performed in a computationally
efficient manner without requiring a trusted third-party component. A cloaking mechanism
increases the privacy of a mobile user while maintaining constant traffic cost.
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All proposed algorithms and protocols have been implemented on popular commercial
mobile and cloud computing platforms to demonstrate feasibility and provide real-world
performance benchmarks. The scalability potential of the various schemes is also shown
through simulations. Options are presented throughout for adapting the techniques to the
unique requirements of various types of cloud systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Cloud Computing Services
Cloud computing has garnered much interest in recent years in the computing in-dustry, the media, and academia. It is a form of pay-per-use distributed computing
consisting of data centres providing commodity resources for massively scalable units of
computing and storage for commercial enterprise applications as well as scientific com-
puting; these facilities are delivered as a service to a global population of users over the
Internet and wireless data networks.
Cloud computing promises many benefits to the IT profession: the ability to scale
resources to meet varying customer demand in real-time, to deliver new computing services
faster, and to significantly lower capital and operational costs. Because the computing
resources of a cloud are operated by a third-party, clients are relieved from the burdens of
hardware ownership, maintenance, and administration of the underlying services. Clients
are only responsible for deploying the applications executed in the cloud and paying for
the actual consumption of network and computing resources; they need not incur the
capital expenditure of hardware with excess capacity to guarantee performance during
peak demand. Additionally, they need not incur the costs of maintenance, data backup,
and security. Suitable applications for cloud computing include financial market modelling,
scientific applications, speech recognition and synthesis, and social networks.
Due to the highly accessible nature of cloud servers, the ever-increasing capabilities
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of mobile device hardware, and the availability of faster wireless networks, many cloud
applications today are accessed by users of mobile devices such as smartphones. The
evolution into Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) has further broadened the usefulness of
cloud applications, which can deliver services at any time and to any location.
In this chapter, various facets of cloud computing are introduced. In this section,
cloud services are classified and their commercial advantages are summarized. Security
issues that stem from cloud feature characteristics are stated in Section 1.2. An overview
of contributions made in this thesis appears in Section 1.3. Finally, an outline of the
following chapters of the thesis is given in Section 1.4.
1.1.1 Functional Classification of Cloud Services
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) offer numerous services to clients [69] [68] [70]; the taxon-
omy may be referred to as Everything as a Service (XaaS).
In Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), computational resources such as data storage and
processors are made available on demand. A task may be replicated and distributed across
many processors to accelerate computation. Clients gain access to virtual servers on which
to deploy their own software, and the infrastructure is delivered over the Internet. The
client may have control over the choice of OS, storage, and host firewalls.
In Platform as a Service (PaaS), a cloud provider offers a platform that enables rapid
development and deployment of scalable applications without the need for investment in
an infrastructure. Higher-level services are offered, sometimes in specific domains; these
include application frameworks, developer ecosystems, collaboration tools, and storefronts.
In Software as a Service (SaaS), complete end-user applications are deployed, managed,
and delivered over the Internet in turnkey fashion; this is made possible by dynamic web
applications and standards-compliant browsers that do not require thick clients. As a
result, development costs and deployment lag are reduced. Examples include customer
relationship management middleware, data warehousing, and collaboration tools.
2
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1.1.2 Advantages of Cloud Computing
It is useful to consider the economic drivers behind cloud computing, as they are largely
responsible for its technical evolution and likely future paths of development. The benefits
of cloud computing are numerous, and are summarized below [24] [68]:
• Greater cost efficiencies. A client organization does not need to acquire, provision,
and manage its own computing resources; instead, it can rent the use of these re-
sources from a cloud provider. Worldwide IT cloud services continue to grow at
several times the rate of traditional IT offerings [42]. Small firms in particular can
take advantage of utility pricing, allowing them to meet real-time needs of computa-
tion and storage. The provider undertakes installation, maintenance, and upgrades,
and has expertise in the area; so, there is no need for the client to incur these ex-
penses. Another advantage of outsourcing computation to clouds is the achievement
of green IT, where the total resource consumption footprint is reduced.
• Rapid deployment. Clients are not encumbered by the deployment lag inherent in
an in-house solution. The client typically provisions applications directly using a
management console. Additionally, a number of cloud vendors offer a platform for
the development of distributed applications, and storage solutions that scale well; for
instance, Google has pioneered BigTable, a distributed storage system for managing
structured data that can scale to petabytes of data across thousands of commod-
ity servers [23]. Cloud providers offer automation tools and scripting systems that
simplify the programming effort, and use standard web service protocols.
• On-demand scalability. A client of a cloud provider can address changes in demand
for its processing by replicating applications to many concurrent runtime instances.
Unanticipated burst demands such as flash traffic on a web server may be met au-
tomatically without noticeable delay. Cloud computing is particularly suitable for
non-uniform workloads, where the client would otherwise acquire excess infrastruc-
ture to account for peak usage to avoid outages; this practice can lead to idle cycles.
• Easy connectivity. Cloud applications may be accessed through various convenient
endpoints in the cloud; not all traffic must necessarily be routed to a centralized data
centre. Data partitioning models allow data to be stored as shards in many different
locations to speed up retrieval. Users can access data distribution endpoints that
3
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are created on the edge of the network, especially in highly distributed clouds such
as that of Akamai Technologies, and pay only for the last mile. As well, the data
resident on multiple devices that may be used to connect to a single account in the
cloud may all be automatically and continuously synchronized.
1.2 Security Issues in Clouds
1.2.1 Security Problem Definition
Despite the economic benefits of outsourcing computation and data to the cloud, the
process poses very significant risks to its users. Because user data is stored and executed
on within the cloud domain, and because there is little or no external visibility into how
the cloud infrastructure is implemented and managed by the provider, there is significant
concern over the security and privacy of transactions and long-term storage of sensitive
client data. A client has no assurance of exactly where application data and logic is stored,
whether it is replicated or cached, how long it is kept for, and who exactly has access to it.
Ideally, data ought to be kept confidential not only from other clients sharing the cloud
resources, but also from the cloud provider itself, using suitable data encryption techniques.
Security should be enforced through technical means beyond contractual obligations be-
tween the client and provider. IT executives tend to rate security as their highest, or one
of their highest, concerns in the use of cloud computing services [68]. Clients need assur-
ance of sufficiently robust security and privacy in a cloud system before committing to it
tasks that add core value to an organization and thus cannot be placed at risk. Because
IT organizations are reluctant to devolve responsibility of security to a cloud computing
provider, the provision of an effective security framework within the cloud is essential. “It
is not recommended [for the customer to] entrust a cloud provider to manage [their en-
cryption] keys — at least not the same provider that is handling [their] data [. . . ] Because
key management is complex and difficult for a single customer, it is even more complex
and difficult for [cloud providers] to try to properly manage customers’ keys.” [78].
Simultaneously, cloud applications must remain accessible from a heterogeneous mix of
computing devices efficiently, so that the costs of additional computation and communica-
tion do not significantly degrade the operation of the cloud and the mobile user experience.
The goal of security researchers in this field is to develop techniques to ensure security in
4
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cloud computing systems at reasonable cost. Only by overcoming these challenges, will
enterprise companies increasingly migrate to the cloud to reap its economic benefits as
well as open up new classes of massively scalable and useful applications.
The main scope of this thesis is the proposal of novel key management schemes to
protect communication between the cloud and its users, as well as preserve the confiden-
tiality of data stored in the cloud, in an efficient and highly scalable manner, and to thus
help improve the security of cloud systems and advance their commercial potential. The
proposed solutions are meant to be realistically applicable to commercial systems that are
foreseeable or already in operation today.
1.2.2 Impact of Cloud Features on Security
In order to better understand the security issues present in cloud computing systems, it is
instructive to first examine the high-level feature set of a typical cloud system. A cloud
is essentially a distributed computing platform that can run many computational tasks
in parallel. It is typically hosted in near-centralized fashion on a few large data centres
that that are geographically separated for reasons of redundancy and transport efficiency.
A cloud may also be implemented in a fully decentralized fashion on a large collection
of interconnected peer servers. The platform, including all computational resources, are
owned and operated by a cloud services provider. A number of key characteristics common
and unique to clouds have been recognized [1,79], and are summarized here. The security
concerns associated with each of these features are also provided to show their relevance.
• Virtualization. Cloud computing can be implemented on commodity hardware and
the application that runs is abstracted from the underlying hardware resources via
a process known as virtualization; a system virtual machine allows a single server
to host multiple operating system instances. A hypervisor isolates and protects
individual application instances. Since it is impossible for the client to control what
server a cloud application is assigned to at any given time, all hardware belonging to
the cloud provider must be considered to be a monolithic and untrusted entity.
• Resource pooling. The cloud provider’s computing resources are pooled together to
serve the requests of many clients concurrently, in true multi-tenant fashion. Vir-
tual resources are instantly and dynamically reassigned according to current demand.
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Since data may be replicated for caching and redundancy reasons, to guarantee per-
formance and safety, it may be assumed that data stored in the cloud is untraceable
by the client. There is the potential for unauthorized access to confidential data
that is stored on the cloud provider’s servers, by another client or even the provider
itself. Furthermore, client applications may be subject to interference or side-channel
attack by malicious applications running simultaneously on the same server.
• Broad network access. Cloud application services are accessed over the Internet by
a large and heterogeneous mix of clients that may vary in processing capability and
in the security of the communications medium used. Desktop and server machines
access the cloud through fixed high-bandwidth lines, while mobile devices are limited
to the wireless medium and require greater communication efficiency. A malicious
party can potentially read or manipulate data that is in transit to the cloud; thus,
sensitive data requires protection when it is in-flight.
• Unbounded storage and lifetime. Data may be automatically replicated for relia-
bility reasons and remain in storage in the cloud indefinitely, thus requiring strong
encryption when it is at-rest. If key material required for data encryption is made
accessible to the cloud provider, then it is subject to unauthorized retrieval by an
honest-but-curious administrator, by an attacker, or through a legal court order.
• Elasticity. A central feature of the cloud is that a client may automatically scale
an application to meet real-time demand; the number of running instances may be
adjusted dynamically. Although it may seem that a cloud provider’s resources are
virtually unlimited with respect to supporting data security through cryptographic
computation, this is not truly the case. Such operations are relatively very computa-
tionally expensive; the resources allocated to this overhead are at the cost of useful
client application work.
“As we move to this new era of cloud computing [. . . ] data security needs to be
understood as something new, requiring new and innovative solutions [. . . ] it is incumbent
on us to generate innovations in our concepts of data security and integrity. We need tools
and processes that recognize the ephemeral nature of data and the reality that physical
locational controls simply will not work going forward. With a little hard work, we can
achieve security models that minimize risk and enable this new method of computing. We
don’t need to give up on security; we simply need to abandon some of our metaphors [66].”
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1.3 Overview of Contributions
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the fields of security and privacy in the
context of mobile cloud computing applications; an introductory synopsis appears here:
Three novel techniques are proposed for key management that ensure the confidentiality
of data outsourced to the cloud. Strategies for efficient key generation and distribution
are provided to address the unique challenges of mobile cloud computing. In particular,
cryptographic operations that are relatively slow to process are performed by the cloud
provider without it being able to decode the encrypted data stored on its servers. In
addition, the number of communication sessions required for mobile users to retrieve keys
and data is minimized. A trusted third-party may be utilized to assist with the protocol
if it exists, but is considered optional in most cases. Furthermore, revocation of user
access is carried out in an efficient manner. The first key management scheme relies
upon transformation of the encrypted data by the cloud provider; the mobile data owner
does not need to constantly re-encrypt data to prevent a user that has left the system
from continuing to access it. Unlike other works, users may access data directly from
the cloud without an intermediary. The second scheme grants access to data based on a
recipient holding correct attributes in a way that simplifies key distribution and assigns
most computation to the cloud provider; in addition, it allows for optional access control
through a secret group key. In the third scheme, keys are securely stored in the cloud, but
disappear over time as a form of access control, while utilizing the cloud’s scalable and
economical storage. The proposals in the thesis are distinct from many existing works,
which tend to assume that the user population utilizes powerful desktop computers that
are capable of performing frequent and complex cryptographic tasks. Other works also
assume that users are always connected and available, and so network usage is not of
particular concern. Some works rely upon the presence of a trusted third-party within a
network, which is a possible point of failure and results in added expense. Finally, other
works fail to consider use cases where extremely large and constantly-changing mobile user
populations are present, where the focus on efficiency in this thesis becomes highly relevant.
Additional use contexts relevant to mobile cloud computing are also considered. It is
recognized that the data stored in a cloud may actually be public, or at least is required
to be made readable by a cloud provider; however, it may be important to preserve the
confidentiality of a user query so that the cloud provider does not learn a user’s personal
information based on the data accessed. Hence, a technique is presented where the cloud
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provider retrieves data without essentially knowing exactly what is being retrieved. Unlike
other works, it is designed to conserve the amount of information downloaded by a mobile
user over a wireless network; furthermore, it does not require a trusted intermediary.
With all proposals, the algorithms have been implemented and benchmarked on ac-
tual popular mobile device hardware and a real cloud computing system. In addition,
simulations have been run to assess the scalability of the schemes. The ultimate viability
and performance of a software system, and its cost tradeoffs, normally becomes appar-
ent only through actual implementation and experimentation; this facet is often missing
from existing related work. Furthermore, the techniques proposed are not implementation-
dependent; the algorithms and libraries that they depend on are highly portable or adapt-
able to most of today’s commercial mobile and cloud platforms.
A detailed comparison of related work is found in Chapter 3 on page 30, and a more
detailed list of contributions is found in Section 8.2 in Chapter 8 on page 148.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
The thesis contained herein addresses communication and data security in the context of
mobile cloud computing. In Chapter 2, a model of a cloud computing system and its
mobile users is presented, with a discussion of possible security threats and factors to
consider in securing such a system. Key management techniques that permit secure data
storage in the cloud are then presented. In Chapter 3, related work in academic literature,
as well as in current commercial solutions, is summarized. In Chapter 4, a model for key
management utilizing data re-encryption in the cloud is proposed. In Chapter 5, a hybrid
model for key management combining attribute-based encryption and data re-encryption
in the cloud is proposed. In Chapter 6, a key management model utilizing cloud-hosted key
sharing is presented, which takes advantage of the cloud provider’s scalable storage rather
than computation. Additional complementary aspects of information exchange in mobile
cloud computing systems appear next. In Chapter 7, a technique for private information
retrieval from a cloud is proposed, where the stored data is public but the client’s queries
are kept private. Finally, in Chapter 8, a summary of research contributions from all
chapters is presented and future work is proposed. In Appendix A, projected cryptographic
computation and communication costs for mobile device users and clouds are suggested as
a thought exercise.
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Background
The focus of the thesis is on the area of communications and data security formobile cloud computing systems. Various ways to organize clouds are depicted in
Section 2.1. A discussion of the architecture of a cloud system is presented so that the
components that require protection may be understood. An overview of the internal oper-
ation of a mobile-based cloud and its role within a system and network model appears in
Section 2.2. Typical applications and use cases are suggested in Section 2.3 to show how a
contemporary cloud system is utilized and to aid in identification of features that require
security protection. A threat model is demonstrated in Section 2.4 that captures the po-
tential points of attack in a cloud system. The criteria that an ideal security mechanism
ought to satisfy are elaborated in a list of design considerations in Section 2.5; a comparison
is made against the factors associated with other kinds of systems such as grid computing,
to show the unique constraints of a cloud. In particular, the key management function
is emphasized as being the most relevant to the security problem under study. Finally,
guidelines for assessing the usefulness of a security solution are suggested in Section 2.6.
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2.1 Cloud Organization
2.1.1 Division of Resources
Clouds may be organized in various ways with respect to the division of responsibility
between the client organization and the cloud provider:
• Public cloud. Applications are all hosted on infrastructure controlled by the cloud
provider. The services or computational results provided by these applications are
accessed over the public Internet and optionally over wireless networks. Communi-
cation must be performed over a secure channel to ensure confidentiality.
• Private cloud. The efficiencies of cloud computing are realized on an infrastructure
that is on-premise, or internal to the organization. This option is applicable to an
enterprise with an existing investment in a distributed system that wishes to retain
greater control over its proprietary data and administration. It is particularly suit-
able for mission- and business-critical applications. The client can leverage existing
infrastructure to avoid the cost of migration to a public cloud and its subsequent op-
eration. The underlying rationale is that these customers may also be subject to laws
that restrict the location of data due to its jurisdiction, or may simply be concerned
about running highly sensitive applications on a third party’s servers. This option
limits the potential for runtime scalability, however. In a private cloud, a client may
access the application over a protected intranet or via a secure tunnel.
• Hybrid cloud. The above two approaches may be combined in a hybrid solution that
connects a company’s internal infrastructure to the cloud provider’s, resulting in a
cloud partitioned into private and public components. This is sometimes known as
IT infrastructure bridging. A client’s private network may be shielded from a cloud
service provider’s public cloud network by a firewall. One advantage is flexibility in
the assignment of data collections or tasks between a private domain that is more
secure and a public domain that is more scalable. In terms of network architecture,
hybrid clouds may be decomposed into cluster controllers that manage the network
traffic to individual nodes making up the cloud. Each cluster is considered to be a
private network, and a central cloud controller manages all clusters.
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2.1.2 Network Organization
Cloud architectures can be categorized according to the distribution of back-end resources:
• Centralized cloud. A cloud provider may operate multiple data centres, which are
adequate when application users are within the same geographical region as one of
the host centres. Data centres are generally separated for continuance of operations
in case of natural or man-made disasters. Additionally, the availability of multiple
connected data centres can reduce latencies for a global user population.
• Highly-distributed cloud. A distributed approach entails a great number of servers
being hosted in many locations and on many networks worldwide. Application in-
stances can be automatically created in certain regions based on real-time demand.
The location of an application component depends on its function. Content-serving
application components can be built at the edge of the cloud to reduce latency,
while transaction-oriented components requiring consistency can be run at the origin
infrastructure. Authentication functions may be performed at either end [69].
• Grid computing. Although not strictly a variant of today’s definition of a cloud
system, it is worthwhile to consider a pre-cursor that links disparate computers to
form one large infrastructure. Essentially, a supercomputer is formed from a cluster of
networked, loosely coupled computers working together to perform very large tasks.
The grid infrastructure allows service-oriented, flexible, and seamless sharing of a
heterogeneous network of resources for intensive tasks. The goals are to provide faster
throughput and higher scalability, while keeping costs low [22]; this loose organization
differs from that of cloud computing. Grid computing eventually evolved into cluster
computing, where computing resources are connected together by high-speed inter-
connects; and peer-to-peer networks, in which peers directly share information. In
contrast, the internal organization of a cloud system is opaque to its clients. Cloud
computing further offers virtualization, web service technology, and programmable
interfaces as differentiating technical features.
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2.2 Cloud System Model
2.2.1 Internal Cloud Architecture
Broadly speaking, the chief design goals of a cloud computing system are to provide an
environment to allow scalability of application performance and efficient virtualization.
Key administrative functions that also need to be fulfilled are performance monitoring and
management to reliably allow for various levels of service. The architecture of a cloud
computing system typically contains a set of layers that are common to most providers,
as illustrated in Figure 2.1; the model shown is derived from cloud reference architectures
proposed by IBM and Oracle [2,14]. The following is a functional description of the layers,
from the topmost to the lowermost layer:
• Application services provide business logic, web hosting, and interactive features
delivered over a wired Internet connection.
• A management services layer is responsible for managing the underlying hardware
resources that fulfill application processing and storage demands. It includes appli-
cation template storage and provisioning, application performance monitoring and
dynamic workload management, security policy management, and billing functions.
• A cloud infrastructure fabric includes virtualized physical servers, network connectiv-
ity, and storage. Resources are allocated by the upper layer to execute applications
consistent with service level agreements through optimal workload management.
To deploy a cloud application, a client typically creates an image and uploads it to
the provider. The image is then instantiated and replicated automatically within the
cloud to satisfy the processing demands of users at any given time. This process is called
provisioning ; the provisioning service allocates processes among available data centres and
ensures rapid reconstitution of services if necessary.
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Figure 2.1: The internal architecture of a cloud.
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2.2.2 Network System Model
A complementary external system model of a cloud is illustrated in Figure 2.2. It consists of
multiple data centres that are administered by a central controller, which manages requests
that arrive at external interfaces in the cloud’s firewall. Client administrators have control
over port access for their applications.
Requests are made over the public Internet, which is considered a normally reliable
but insecure medium. Internet traffic is routed through a topology of network switches,
which culminate in individual Internet Service Provider (ISP) network switches connected
by high-capacity optical links such as OC-3; this packet data network may be bridged to a
wireless 3G or 4G infrastructure through a gateway node, allowing smartphones to connect
wirelessly to 3G or 4G towers and switches. Additionally, smartphones may communicate
among themselves using short-range local links such as Bluetooth. Another entry point
into the Internet is via a router and Wi-Fi access point, enabling notebooks and wireless
sensors to connect via some Wi-Fi standard, such as 802.11 or low-cost 802.15.4 as part
of a Personal Area Network. Desktop computers may connect via Ethernet to a router
directly, which typically integrates a firewall function.
2.3 Applications of Mobile Cloud Computing
A security framework incorporating secure data storage within the cloud and secure com-
munication channels has numerous practical applications. If the solution is highly efficient
and scalable, then it may be more readily utilized by resource-constrained devices. These
devices may interact with clouds in a variety of different applications to solve real world
problems, such as document and media storage, user collaboration, and data analytics.
Mobile device industry trends and use cases are captured in the following discussion.
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Figure 2.2: A network system model of mobile cloud computing.
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2.3.1 Use of Resource-Constrained Devices
Mobile- and Sensor-Based Computing
There has been a very evident trend towards the adoption of smartphone and tablet devices
that enable users to run complex applications interacting with cloud services, including me-
dia repositories such as music streaming, and always-on collaborative services such as social
networks [55, 59]. It is reasonable to predict that users will increasingly require persistent
access to cloud applications from a variety of highly mobile machines. Connections are typ-
ically made using standard wireless packet data protocols with TCP/IP as the transport;
their use is relatively expensive. Just as importantly, mobile devices have limited memory,
battery life, processing performance, connectivity, and available bandwidth compared to
their desktop counterparts, all of which complicate protocol design.
Numerous cloud applications exist today, or are being actively researched, that cater to
the resource demands of smartphone users. By oﬄoading computation of complex tasks to
the cloud and storing associated data in the cloud, mobile device users may enjoy numerous
advantages; such a framework serves to extend onboard battery life, conserve local mem-
ory, speed up processing of tasks, and improve reliability by storing data in a centralized
manner. Various application areas and platforms are being investigated by researchers [30],
including in the domain of mobile commerce, mobile learning, collaboration, health care,
gaming, and web searching. Commonly used artifacts such as enterprise and personal e-
mail, movies and music, and various other forms of user data are already outsourced to
the cloud today; reasons for doing so include greater storage capacity, expanded options
for sharing, leveraging network effects, and data safekeeping.
The wireless sensor is another important class of device that is not necessarily mobile,
but may also utilize a cloud and wireless network, and is even more resource-constrained
than the devices already mentioned; hence, it is considered relevant to the discussion. For
instance, Sensing Planet’s cloud-based platform provides real-time online instrumentation,
management, and control of a connected wireless sensor network. It uses the ZigBee
2.4 GHz radio frequency, based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for LRWPANs (Low-Rate
Wireless Personal Area Networks). Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform integrates with Living
PlanIt’s Urban Operating System, a real-time urban control platform converging cloud
computing with the fabric of buildings containing embedded sensors [81].
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Mobile Device Classification
Multiple classes of devices are now identified to define the capabilities of the user class in a
mobile-based cloud system, with typical recent-generation specifications listed in Table 2.1.
In the case of wireless sensors, typical characteristics are assumed [75] of devices with pro-
cessors running wireless data-driven Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) applications
on TinyOS, a prevalent sensor operating system.
Criterion Smartphones Wireless sensors
Processor Single/dual-core, 0.6-1 GHz 12 MHz
Memory 256-512 MB 2 kB
Mobility Highly mobile Fixed (but possibly mobile)
Battery capacity 1200 mAh 240 mAh (per cm3)
Power Up to 1200 mAh per day 8 mAh per day
Wireless connectivity Transient and intermittent Constant and reliable
Wireless data rate 2800 kbps download (3G) 20-250 kbps (IEEE 802.15.4)
Table 2.1: Example specifications of the classes of user devices studied.
2.3.2 Use Cases in Mobile Cloud Computing
Numerous practical use cases may be described where data is securely stored in the cloud
and accessed, which a security framework should be designed to accommodate. The user
base consists of mobile device users that regularly upload content to the cloud that is
then shared with other authorized users. For example, the data may consist of customer
records in the case of an enterprise application, or personal photos and videos in the
case of a consumer-oriented personal productivity and entertainment application. These
applications entail two-way data exchange between users and the cloud. One-way data
exchange may also be envisioned; for instance, data may be stored in a relational database
or in a log-based file format, which may be applicable for analytics purposes.
The user membership may include a workplace department or a collection of social
friends; it is considered to be dynamic and constantly evolving, with users joining and
leaving in a frequent and unpredictable manner. Each member of an authorized user
group is deemed to operate at an equivalent trust level, although each data record may
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require its own unique access permission that may be shared by any set of users. Thus,
there is a many-to-many association between data records and users in terms of access
rights. For instance, a group of senior managers may have access to a collection of records,
a subset of which may also be accessible to the rank and file. In terms of the network
model, each user group will obtain access to a collection of linked and related records [101]
in the cloud called a data partition.
The permanent cloud data store may be accessed through a key-value mechanism, in
which a valid key index must be supplied to retrieve the value stored at the index location.
In each communication session with the cloud, a user may send a data storage or a fetch
request, identifying the data record with a unique numeric record identifier, and similarly,
the partition with which is it associated with. The identifiers, but not the data content,
are deemed to be public knowledge. Repeated access of the same records in the cloud by
the same user is to be anticipated, as local storage on a mobile device is very limited.
Specific security features may be identified to satisfy these use cases:
• Forward secrecy. A previously authorized user that leaves an authorized user set, in
a process known as revocation, should no longer retain access to encrypted data. For
example, a consultant may require only temporary access to company resources for
the duration of a project, or an employee may permanently leave a firm.
• Backward secrecy. A user that joins an authorized user set may also not necessarily
obtain access to resources that were made available before the join occurred. This
rule is of lesser practical value, but may be useful in special cases such as mitigating
the risk of wilful patent infringement by limiting the sphere of known information
related to intellectual property.
• Blind storage. Data stored in the cloud remains encrypted at rest to prevent the
cloud provider from gleaning confidential user information at any time.
These features also serve to limit the amount of useful information that may be gleaned
by an attacker that successfully obtains valid key material in some instance of time.
Note that an underlying assumption of this work is that mobile users are in constant
connectivity with the cloud via a 3G or 4G wireless network or a Wi-Fi access point;
however, this assumption may not hold in the following cases: temporary connection loss
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suffered by a user when indoors, a user being exposed to excessive wireless data usage
fees as a result of international roaming, and the need to transfer an extremely large
amount of data such as an operating system update; in such cases, it is useful to determine
whether direct peer-to-peer links between mobile devices may be exploited to continue
sharing content without direct participation of the cloud provider. Because the devices
must be in very close proximity, data confidentiality is less of a practical concern than
efficient sustained transfer. A high-level framework for peer-to-peer file transfer is proposed
in [112] that specifically addresses the resource constraints of mobile users. A mobile
user with fast connectivity is elected as a super-node, creates an initial seed from data
stored in the cloud, then distributes it to other users that subscribe their interests to
that content. Experiments on smartphones are conducted to determine how throughput is
improved by dynamically controlling variables such as file segment sizes in a communication
protocol utilizing Bluetooth. A parameter such as a target upload-to-download ratio may
be dependent upon the dynamic state of a device, such as its current battery level.
2.4 Cloud Computing Trust Issues and Threats
2.4.1 Adversary and Threat Model
The cloud provider is expected to store and retrieve data, to and from its permanent
data store, upon request by users. The cloud provider is situated in a network domain
outside of that of the users, and its internal operations are opaque. The cloud provider,
including all parties within its scope of operations such as an internal administrator, is
assumed to be an honest-but-curious adversary without malicious intent; it will obey a
communications protocol and application logic deployed by the client, and will not deny
service to any authorized party or cause other interference. Furthermore, it will provide
reliable service to users, including the provision of persistent storage capacity on demand,
and data replication to the extent that it is paid for; it will also honour all data upload
and download requests. At the same time, an administrator of the cloud or any other
party that may gain access to the cloud storage cannot be trusted to not read, copy, and
retain confidential data that is stored within the cloud for nefarious reasons or simply out
of curiosity; such access can occur without the client’s knowledge. If the data is stored in
encrypted form, then any party that gains access to the storage and key material may be
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expected to decrypt and read the confidential data contents.
It is not expected that the cloud provider will attempt to create, modify, or delete
data in a data partition that is understood to belong to an external client or a set of
clients; nor will it serve incorrect or modified data to a user upon request. As a result, no
facility is required to detect that tampering of data has occurred. If the cloud provider
is not trustworthy to the described extent, then additional safeguards would be needed
to verify operations and the integrity of data, and corresponding performance overheads
would also be incurred; such features are outside the scope of the work. Nevertheless, the
honest-but-curious characteristic is deemed reasonable and realistic in view of the degree
of trustworthiness of recognized public clouds currently in operation.
As part of its normal activities, a cloud provider may replicate any encrypted data
with or without the user’s consent, but this should not aid the provider or an external
unauthorized party in gleaning any additional information helpful to decrypting the data
stored in the cloud. It is unlikely but conceivable that a provider may collude with a rogue
user or another provider, if one is available and contains relevant information, to defeat
a security mechanism and satisfy the curiosity of either party as to the contents of cloud
data. Collusion is to be prevented if possible, but is a lesser concern overall. Attacks may
also originate within the cloud itself from other tenant clients of the cloud servers. The goal
of this thesis, however, is to address data and communication security that is external to
the cloud implementation; for instance, hardware security, protection of running instances
and inter-instance communication security is outside its scope.
From the perspective of network security, the cloud itself is accessed over an open In-
ternet infrastructure, which is not considered to be highly secure. It may be bridged to a
wireless infrastructure consisting of an air link that is also considered insecure. This sce-
nario is borne out in practice: for instance, the original GSM telecommunications system
relies upon a very limited 64-bit A5/1 stream cipher; although it has since been replaced by
the 128-bit A5/3 cipher on 3G networks, its effective length is still only 64 bits. The A5/1
encryption has been successfully attacked by creating a rainbow table, in which the encryp-
tion key is reconstructed in a real-time attack [86]. The Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA, standardized as IS-95) system also uses a very limited cipher; its security relies
on a pseudorandom so-called long code that is only 42 bits in length. It has been shown
that an eavesdropper can recover the required code after eavesdropping a transmission on
the traffic channel for about one second [122]. Clearly, some form of strong encryption for
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the communications channel between the mobile device and the cloud system is required
to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive data exchange.
Users, whether connecting from desktop or mobile devices, implicitly trust their local
machine. That is, when data is reliably retrieved from a cloud server in a correct state,
the user’s machine is trusted to perform the necessary cryptographic operations to retrieve
and display the original plaintext. Authorized users with common access to a data share
are considered to belong to the same organization or community, and hence may share
key material without compromising the security of the entire system. If a user chooses to
share key material with an unauthorized user, such an attempt is not prevented, as the
user could simply share the decrypted content with equal ease; the use of digital rights
management, as a remedy, is not contemplated within the scope of this work.
In a variation of the system model, a manager acting as a trusted entity is present within
the logical client domain and maintains a list of authorized users. The manager may be
located behind the organization’s firewall and is inaccessible by the cloud provider. It may
perform some key management duties and enforcement of access rights, and requires high
availability. It may exist within the context of a private cloud and is considered trusted
by the authorized user population. However, as the manager represents a possible point
of attack in itself, it is advantageous to limit sharing of private key material between users
and the manager, unless it is warranted by the scheme. Collusion between the manager as
a trusted third party and any user is not deemed to be a particular threat, as the manager
and all its authorized users are expected to belong to the same client organization.
Once a user’s access rights are revoked, any valid key information in the user’s pos-
session may continue to provide access to encrypted user data. However, this apparent
vulnerability is deemed to be only temporary in nature; in practice, mobile users have lim-
ited storage capacity and are unable to cache copious amounts of data, including numerous
key materials, for extended periods of time. This is especially true of a data storage system
consisting of fine-grained access, where even individual data records may be encrypted with
unique keys, and the storage of key material itself is onerous.
It is assumed that all mobile devices are protected against outside attack through
sufficient computer security and that users cannot become compromised; other techniques
related to computer security are required to ensure that secret information is not divulged
between a mobile user and an outside attacker. Even if such an attack occurs, then the
information illicitly gained is understood to eventually become stale and unusable.
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Vulnerabilities in the cloud may be exploited to access information in the cloud with-
out authorization to do so; typical examples are insufficient access control enforcement,
unencrypted data storage and transmission, and unrestricted modification of security poli-
cies [90]. Cloud providers may not be subject to external audits and security certifica-
tions, so that the onus of keeping data secure is ultimately on the customer; the shared
environment in which data resides means that data must be correctly segregated and en-
crypted [20]. Despite all these risks, any role that the cloud provider plays in executing
a security scheme is assumed to impart the same level of confidence in robustness as its
other services, and does not really constitute a single point of failure. A cloud by design is
typically engineered as a distributed system with data replication, reliable servers, multiple
endpoints, and other safeguards that virtually guarantee its continuous operation.
In certain commercial environments, a single organization may exert control over mul-
tiple entities in the system model. For instance, the Nexus One and Galaxy Note II
smartphones used in the experiments in this thesis run the Android Linux-based operating
system developed by Google. The same corporation develops and operates the App Engine
PaaS cloud platform, also part of the experiments. It is assumed that Google, or any other
entity under similar circumstances, will not embed any logic in the smartphone software to
defeat the proposed security mechanisms, such as sharing key material or plaintext with
the cloud provider. Likewise, it is also assumed that a telecommunications carrier that
provisions the mobile device or allows it to operate on its network will not install any
software to compromise the security of the system, such as intercepting message traffic.
In summary, the parties contributing to an attack may include an eavesdropper located
along the open Internet path to the cloud, a user whose access has been revoked yet retains
key information, a user belonging to the client organization but of insufficient clearance to
access all of the data belonging to the client, and the administrator of the cloud system
with unrestricted access to cloud resources. To minimize the privacy risk for content, it
is evident that data must be encrypted in-transit to and from the cloud, and at-rest in
the cloud. The fact that the shared environment of a cloud has intrinsic vulnerabilities
and limited oversight suggests that many of the concerns may be alleviated by assigning
management of security keys to a client or a trusted third-party, outside of the domain
of a cloud provider. If the client controls most aspects of security, the risk and impact of
third-party negligence is mitigated.
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2.4.2 Security Issues in Grid Computing
It is instructive to examine the security issues inherent in grid computing [32], as a relevant
pre-cursor to cloud computing:
1. Protection from external threats must allow the sharing of resources across organi-
zational boundaries, for which traditional firewalls are unsuitable.
2. Trust relations are agreed upon at the organizational level rather than the user level.
3. Grid nodes are dynamic and unpredictable in nature. The efficient updating of group
keys is a particular problem.
4. Grid computing systems are distributed and heterogeneous. Centralized authentica-
tion is generally unavailable.
From a cloud perspective, the implication is that authentication should occur at the
client’s organizational level, and that it must be efficient for dynamically changing groups.
Although a cloud system can offer centralized authentication, its high scalability does result
in challenges in implementing efficienct key management, as it does in grid computing.
Some of the stated concerns originally found in grid computing can be addressed by
group keying. Grid computers may involve resources that are shared across the Internet,
and point-to-point communication using cryptographic schemes is inefficient; broadcasting
a group key may be an accepted alternative. Groups may be dynamic and can be organized
in real-time according to available resources. Broadcasting is of limited value in a cloud
application, however; due to the majority of network communication being over the Internet
and wireless network, it could become prohibitively expensive, especially for mobile users;
the cloud provider typically bills the client for such downloads, and wireless transmission
incurs its own usage and energy costs.
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2.5 Design Factors for Cloud Security
The lack of direct control over cloud resources forces clients to either fully trust the cloud
provider, or adopt cryptographic protocols to ensure the confidentiality of stored data. The
use cases discussed above exert influence on the appropriate design of a secure solution.
The following general guidelines are identified, the focus being on communication security
and encrypted file storage in particular:
2.5.1 General Security Features
1. Encryption. The fact that the shared environment of a cloud has intrinsic vulnera-
bilities and limited oversight suggests that data must be permanently stored within
the cloud in encrypted form, with keys being controlled by the client or a trusted
third-party. End-to-end encryption must be offered for all data communication, as
it traverses the open Internet. Users typically interact with cloud applications via
sessions, and perform regular updates to data, suggesting the need for session man-
agement and data versioning. The multi-tenant nature of cloud computing requires
isolation between the individual users of a cloud application.
2. Scalability. Many devices may be connected to a cloud application simultaneously,
and all sessions must be individually protected. The multi-user environment may
potentially scale to many thousands or even millions of users. In an extreme example,
the social network Facebook has over 400 million active users, half of whom log into
the system in any given day and spend about an hour on the site, on average [40].
In an enterprise system, users may be created or removed at great frequency, and
communication costs related to key management must scale accordingly.
3. Access control. Using appropriate credentials, the user must authenticate with the
cloud network before being granted access to key material. Users of different class
privileges may exist, and so it is advantageous to provide prioritized or hierarchical
access control in some cases. Furthermore, the data owner may be mobile and not
always available to fulfill the administration duties of these functions.
4. Data partitioning. Members belonging to a subpopulation of all users will typically
require access to a common data partition resident in the cloud storage system.
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Thus, it is desirable for data permanently stored inside the cloud to be segmented
into addressable data partitions, such that appropriate access rights are enforced on
each. Clients may even require fine-grained security controls on the record-level.
5. Data lifetime. User data stored inside the cloud is typically replicated and archived;
it may exist for an indefinite time. If key material accessible by the cloud provider is
not destroyed once the data is no longer needed, it may be retrieved in the future by
a malicious party or through legal means such as a court order. Some data, however,
requires confidentiality protection for only a limited amount of time, after which the
security of the data, or the data itself, becomes irrelevant; an example is a financial
market transaction.
6. User diversity. A contemporary user may connect with the cloud from any one of
a heterogeneous mix of user devices. In some cases, authorized access may need to
be associated with a particular user, rather than a particular device. This concept
may involve a reunion of user information across multiple device accounts in a single
identity management system.
7. Mobile access. Mobile devices are exposed to a number of resource challenges, net-
work rate limitations, and intermittent connectivity. Communication and processing
requirements of a secure protocol must be as limited as possible, without significantly
compromising its performance and efficacy.
8. Efficient server transactions. Any cryptographic protocol must be lightweight in
computation and key updates must be relatively small and infrequent; otherwise, a
cloud provider may be ill-equipped to handle this traffic, leading to an outage [105].
9. Hybrid architectures. A scheme for communication security must be compatible with
popular computing models. Cloud computing is evolving to support hybrid systems
where secure communication between a private and public cloud is assured, and where
computation may be distributed between private and public realms.
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2.5.2 Key Management Functions
From a functional point of view, a candidate key management solution for a cloud comput-
ing system will encompass most of the following operations and properties, some of which
are referred to in [80] [92]:
1. Trust. The user must obtain trusted credentials that permit access to the cloud. The
cloud must recognize the user as belonging to a trusted Access Control List (ACL),
or the user must be found to be trusted by the other members of the group.
2. Authentication. Using appropriate credentials, a user will authenticate with the cloud
network before being granted access to key material. The user must be provisioned
with a secret key from the cloud itself, a trusted third-party entity, or other trusted
users. Key material can be confirmed to be valid for a particular user, and it must
be kept confidential and secure from attack.
3. Encryption. The user must utilize a key to secure communication with the cloud, and
to secure the data that is stored within the cloud and accessed by other users. Due
to the longevity of cloud data, appropriate key sizes must be chosen. NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) recommendations [13] for comparable security
strengths beyond the year 2030 include: 128 bits for symmetric algorithms (e.g. AES),
3072 bits for asymmetric algorithms (e.g. RSA), key and group sizes of 256 and
3072 bits, respectively, for discrete logarithm algorithms (e.g. Diffie-Hellman), and
256 bits for elliptical curve cryptography (e.g. ECDSA).
4. Refresh. The key that the user holds must be updated periodically to limit the
opportunity window for an attacker to decrypt communication with the cloud, and
to minimize the useful information obtained if the attack is successful.
5. Revocation. The user, upon leaving the cloud network, must not continue to retain a
valid key that can be used to access the cloud or decrypt the communication of other
users. The key must be destroyed or become obsolete. If access rights are revoked,
then the user can no longer remain authenticated with the network.
6. Availability. Key management services must always be available to users to ensure
uninterrupted communication and continuity of cloud services.
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7. Scalability. Key management services must efficiently consume, directly or indirectly,
scarce resources such as wireless bandwidth and energy. In so doing, they must
support high scalability of the user base without degrading the level of service.
2.5.3 Comparison to Other Systems
The security issues noted here are fairly unique to the problem of mobile cloud computing.
They differ from more traditional key distribution schemes found in grid computing, client-
server computing, and peer-to-peer networks in the following ways:
1. Most cloud systems consist of centralized data centres that users must access directly.
The existence of an infrastructure can be relied upon, for centralized key management
or other purposes. Peer-to-peer communication over a wireless network is possible
but it may be difficult to find available peers and in close proximity if required.
2. The user base consists of a heterogeneous mix of devices, many of which are mobile
devices with tight resource constraints. They may include devices ranging from multi-
core tablets to RF sensors. In contrast, desktop users have significantly greater
computational power and storage capacity. For instance, an SSL handshake on a
notebook (with a Pentium M 1.86 GB CPU) was found to take only 31% of the time
that a smartphone (with a 624 MHz PXA270 CPU) took to finish it [100]. Therefore,
a cryptographic scheme that is asymmetric in nature may be appropriate in mobile
cloud computing: the amount of cryptographic computation on the mobile device is
minimized to improve responsiveness of the user interface and to limit battery drain,
while a cloud server can take advantage of its inherent scaling property to carry out
cryptographic work by commissioning additional application instances as needed.
3. The cloud provider must be considered to be a non-trusted entity. Any key material
stored in the cloud must be protected not only from outside access, but also from
cloud administrators, to ensure maximum data confidentiality. Alternatively, keys
may need to be stored outside of the untrusted cloud domain. Note that a key
management server, whether it is located in the cloud or off-site, may store various
kinds of keys, including authentication keys, authorization tokens, file encryption
keys, hardware storage keys, and certificates.
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4. Within an enterprise network, the user can rely on multiple layers of authentication
including password-protected logins. In a cloud system, users may not be verifiable
against a corporate directory, as it is normally located behind the client’s own firewall.
Users may be widely distributed and not utilize Virtual Private Network (VPN)
tunnels, complicating access management.
The stated requirements address the unique properties of cloud computing systems;
they do not necessarily pertain to general-purpose web servers which are more fixed in
resources. For instance, a web server may not be able to seamlessly and quickly scale in
terms of its processes, memory, and network bandwidth, which affects both application
operation and key management. A standard web server will also typically be physically
located in one place, whereas cloud systems typically operate multiple data centres to
reduce latency for global services, and thus network topology is less relevant. Finally,
few web servers are equipped to handle the scale of users being examined in this work.
For those enterprise servers that do, their back-end typically mirrors the characteristics of
private cloud systems such as blade system hardware setups, application template creation
and provisioning layers, and distributed workload management.
2.6 Performance Assessment Criteria
Key management systems may be evaluated not only in terms of compliance with the
security features already outlined, but also in terms of their performance in various areas
such as resource usage. Although some schemes may perform well even on resource-limited
mobile devices in small numbers, it may be impossible to attain extreme scalability in a
cloud computing scenario. Some of the following quantitative performance aspects will aid
in evaluating various approaches to key management:
• The amount of storage required for key material on the server and on mobile devices;
the latter is especially restricted due to limited onboard flash memory.
• The amount of data that must be exchanged between parties to carry out crypto-
graphic transactions. A wireless communications medium has limited capacity and
carries with it a high usage cost; it should therefore be minimized.
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• The amount of computation required, particularly on the mobile device, to carry out
the encryption and decryption operations.
• The amount of energy consumption on the mobile device due to wireless data being
transmitted and received, or due to prolonged computation occurring.
• The operational memory footprint required on the mobile device; this includes dy-
namic RAM (Random-Access Memory) used for temporary storage and flash memory
used for permanent storage.
• The economic cost for the client of the cloud service, based on the total amount of
cloud computation required, and the amount of Internet communication consumed
by the cloud application and charged to the user.
The following commentary is useful for motivating the study of performance: “We’re
in great need of secure computation outsourcing mechanisms to protect sensitive workload
information [. . . ] This task is difficult, however, due to several challenges [. . . ] First, such a
mechanism must be practically feasible in terms of computational complexity. Otherwise,
either the user’s cost can become prohibitively huge, or the cloud might not be able to
complete the outsourced computations in a reasonable amount of time. Second, it must
provide sound security guarantees without restricting system assumptions [including] prac-
tical performance. Third, this mechanism must enable substantial computational savings
at the user side compared to the amount of effort required to solve a problem locally.
Otherwise, users have no reason to outsource computation to the cloud. [94].”
In Appendix A on Page 152, sample calculations are provided of the kind of energy
consumption on mobile devices and cryptographic workloads on cloud computing servers
that may be expected from a key management solution; the discussion provides insight
into the significance of these costs in a real system.
29
Chapter 3
Related Work on Key Management
Recent research literature on key management techniques with relevance tocloud computing systems is surveyed in Section 3.1. Included are generic central-
ized and decentralized techniques for key control, as well as solutions specific to encrypted
storage based on proxy re-encryption, encrypted network file systems, and more recent
work on secure cloud storage. Analyses of strengths and weaknesses are provided, and
opportunities for improvement as dictated by the demands of a scalable cloud system are
highlighted. The related work in this chapter covers only a common baseline; it forms a
starting point for the proposals in subsequent chapters, where additional related work is
presented where appropriate based on the specific techniques used. As a reference point,
features of the rapidly evolving commercial cloud systems of today are also presented in
Section 3.2. Concluding remarks are made in Section 3.3.
3.1 Body of Academic Literature
3.1.1 Public Key Encryption
Numerous solutions may be envisaged to exchange encrypted data with a cloud provider in
a secure manner such that the cloud provider is not directly entrusted with key material,
but na¨ıve schemes often prove difficult to scale. In the classic centralized model, a single
authority present within the cloud computing infrastructure is responsible for access con-
trol; this notion seems consistent with the centralized nature of cloud servers. Public key
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encryption (PKE) may be employed, in which the authority generates private keys and
distributes them to individual users through secure means. The corresponding public key
of a data partition is freely made available for download by the cloud provider. The un-
derlying cryptographic method may be RSA, for instance. Digital certificate management
can be used to verify the identity of the originator of the ciphertext. Communication is
necessarily one-to-one; the originating user encrypts data with the recipient user’s public
key, uploads it to the cloud, and the recipient retrieves it and decodes the plaintext using
his or her own private key. This general scenario of solely using PKE, however, is unrealis-
tic when a very large user population is present; it requires that the data owner provide an
encrypted version of data for each recipient that may access it, and furthermore, it requires
constant availability of the owner. Likewise, a straightforward approach employing PGP
encryption [125] would encounter challenges with scalability; the symmetric key used for
encryption of user data would need to be encoded with the public key of each recipient.
Rather, it is preferable for a data owner to perform a one-time encryption. Alternatively,
if all user data is encrypted with a single key, then that key must be shared with all autho-
rized users, which carries a high traffic cost especially if this obligation rests on a mobile
data owner. Revocation would require some form of authentication to prevent access; the
enforcement of it would require trust in the provider or further burden the data owner.
A remedy is to encrypt data with a group key, instead, and share it among a population
of authorized users; the main challenge relates to distributing the keys in a secure and
scalable manner without requiring the cloud provider to be trusted to manage and deploy
all private user keys itself. Another important problem lies with user revocation; if a
user leaves the authorized user set, the group key must be replaced and redeployed, a
process known as re-keying, which scales in cost with the number of users. Also, public-
key certificates must be generated by the cloud authority and deployed to all users before
communication can occur. The authorization server in the cloud may become overloaded
as a result of this responsibility, and potentially stop operation of the cloud. Furthermore,
users may join and leave the authorized user set frequently, leading to constant key re-
generation and re-distribution through additional communication sessions to handle user
revocation; in a highly scalable system composed of thousands of users, such events may
occur at relatively high frequency. Wireless communication, however, is expensive and
results in rapid battery drain, particularly when transmitting from a mobile device [11].
Security enforcement based on the monitoring of user behaviour can mitigate these
performance concerns, at the cost of reduced security. For instance, in TrustCube, a
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star-shaped, or centralized, authentication system is used [30]; it provides implicit authen-
tication by monitoring user behaviour, and it falls back to another authentication method
such as OpenID if a user violates policy norms. In this case, however, the cloud provider
must be entrusted with all aspects of this system, including the use of aggregated data on
user contexts and activities, thus relaxing the trust model to an even greater extent.
One variant of centralized key management is baseline broadcast encryption, in which
the key manager generates symmetric keys for multiple users. Each time that new en-
crypted data becomes available in the cloud, it may be broadcasted in encrypted form
to all interested users, with each outgoing message being encrypted with a different key
corresponding to the recipient. If the user membership changes, then new keys must be
broadcast to all users, which is an unrealistic proposition in a highly scalable system. Also,
the broadcast itself is an expensive use of bandwidth. To reduce the cost, a stateful scheme
such as Logical Key Hierarchy [116] may be employed, in which a directed acyclic graph
of encryption keys is constructed, and each user is associated with a leaf node. Whenever
a user joins or leaves, rekeying messages are transmitted along the path from the root
node to the user’s leaf node location. In such a rekeying strategy, the “processing time per
request [scales] linearly with the logarithm of group size.” Unfortunately, the “signing [of]
rekey messages increases the server processing time by an order of magnitude.”
The high communication and processing costs incurred in key management, and the
implicit trust of the cloud provider required, cast doubt on a classic centralized solution
as a viable candidate for a mobile cloud computing system.
3.1.2 Identity-Based Encryption
One general problem with PKE that needs to be addressed is that a mechanism is needed for
users to find and obtain the public keys required for encryption, whether keys correspond
to individual users, to a data partition accessed by a set of users, or to individual records.
To simplify certificate management, Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was invented, based
on BDH (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) [9, 19]. The public key used in this scheme is derived
from an arbitrary string such as an e-mail address that can uniquely identify a party;
it dispenses with the need to query a key authority; this concept is used to reduce the
communication overhead of requesting encryption keys from the cloud provider, and has
the added benefit of enabling multi-user access to shared data. Thus, querying a certificate
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authority for public encryption keys on demand, as with RSA, is not required, reducing
the cost of communication. An expensive pre-distribution of authenticated keys is also
unnecessary, unlike in a traditional public-key infrastructure. It has been demonstrated
that an IBE technique can be faster than one based on RSA. One protocol called Identity-
Based Hierarchical Model for Cloud Computing (IBHMCC) has been proposed with faster
authentication and less communication cost than the SSL Authentication Protocol (SAP)
used on many web servers [71]; it provides encryption by generating and storing secret
keys at two different levels: the cloud data centre and the users. The encryption key is
derived from the public keys of the data centre, the originating user, and the target user;
unfortunately, this method restricts data exchange to occurring between two individual
parties without consideration of a multi-user setting. Although IBE generally helps reduce
the communication cost entailed with key distribution by allowing users to generate keys
themselves, it is lacking in that it still requires trust in the cloud provider.
To address the issue of trust, Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CLPKC) may
be utilized [3]. A Key Generation Centre (KGC) resides in the cloud but “[it] does not have
access to users’ private keys.” The KGC supplies each user with a partial private key PSK
which the KGC computes from an identifier for the entity and a master key. The user then
combines his or her PSK with some secret information to generate a full private key SK.
In this way, the user’s final private key is not made available to the KGC. The user also
combines his or her secret information with the KGC’s public parameters to compute his
public key PK. In fact, the user need not be in possession of SK before generating PK:
“all that is needed to generate both is the same secret information.” The advantage of this
scheme is that it prevents the KGC from being able to decrypt all data and communications
directly. One problem, however, is that “the system is [no longer strictly] identity-based,
because the public key is no longer computable from an [identifier].” Also, “the KGC needs
to ensure that the partial private keys are delivered securely” to users using some available
secure or out-of-band transport.
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3.1.3 Hierarchical Access Control
As described in the use cases for mobile cloud computing, it is useful to control permis-
sions for users at different levels within an organization. Traditionally, the management
of keys to provide hierarchical access control has assumed the presence of a trusted Cen-
tral Authority (CA) that maintains the keys. Many such solutions rely on a tree-based
structure of nodes, where any node can derive keys for its descendants. Major challenges
include the rekeying operations that must occur whenever nodes are added or deleted in
the tree. One scheme strives for efficiency by utilizing less expensive hash operations to
avoid expensive re-keying and allow for efficient key derivation for nodes that are lower in
the access hierarchy [7]. In another scheme, for the purpose of securing access to clouds, it
is suggested that identity-based encryption be combined with a hierarchical access control
scheme, such that every Private Key Generator (PKG) maintains the private keys of all
users in its own domain [118]. A root PKG generates private keys for lower-level PKGs.
The presence of multiple PKGs in a cloud system suggests an inefficiency, however.
3.1.4 Distributed Key Management
To transfer key management duties and associated trust from the cloud provider to users,
a distributed key model may be used in place of a centralized one. Shares of a private key
are distributed among a number of trusted users. Any authorized member of a group can
request sufficient shares of the private key associated with a single identity and reconstruct
the entire private key; this objective may be accomplished using the concept of partial
keys. On the basis of IBE, it has been “suggested that distributed PKGs [can] function as
decryption servers [to implement] threshold decryption;” [10] each PKG holds a share of
the master key, and a sufficient number of these shares must be assembled by a user [19].
This arrangement requires each PKG to be involved in communication with users at all
times, because the key share needs to be re-distributed for each new ciphertext; this is
inefficient in a large user set. It has been proposed that a private key received from a
PKG, rather than the master key, can be distributed among several users in portions such
that a sufficient number of portions are required to decrypt a message, thus removing the
requirement for central key storage and constant involvement from the PKGs [10]. Any
authorized member of a group can request sufficient portions of the private key associated
with a single identity, reconstruct the entire private key, and distribute it within its domain.
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The problem remains that a single mediator is still responsible for assembling a key from
multiple sources, such as decryption servers, and distributing it for each decryption; the
danger is that this can result in a bottleneck in a cloud system; furthermore, key revocation
is expensive.
The threshold decryption approach may be refined to manage sessions. By using IBE,
it is possible for a public key to be constructed using the recipient’s public identity joined
with a timestamp; the encrypted message can only be decoded by obtaining the private key
from the PKG generated using that timestamp [19]. Once access is revoked, the PKG stops
generating new private keys; although this effectively enforces a time limit for keys and
limits the danger of compromised keys, the constant key updates imply that this approach
is impractical for cloud applications, however.
A comparison of the key management approaches discussed appears in Table 3.1.
Responsibility for stor-
age of key material
Advantages Disadvantages
Centralized in the cloud
provider.
Utilizes the scalable computa-
tional and network resources of
the cloud. Relies upon the di-
rect user-to-cloud link.
Requires trust in the cloud
provider to not decode en-
crypted user data stored on its
servers.
Centralized in a trusted au-
thority that is outside of
the cloud domain.
Does not require trust in the
cloud provider. May control
access to cloud data through
an intermediary node.
Requires maintenance of a
scalable authority server by the
client, or trust in a third-party
guardian as a paid service.
Fully decentralized among
users.
Requires no additional network
elements. Key sharing may
utilize cheap local links such as
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.
Obtaining keys may require
arbitration by an authority
which entails additional traffic.
Revocation is inefficient.
Table 3.1: A comparison of approaches to key management in mobile cloud computing.
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3.1.5 Proxy Re-Encryption
The shortcomings of traditional key management are increasingly being addressed by recent
ideas in secure cloud storage. The goal is for data stored in the cloud to be encrypted to
maintain its confidentiality from the provider. One option is to utilize a trusted authority
administered by the client to retain secret key material; the challenge is that it must
be sufficiently scalable to perform key distribution duties for a large population, which
is expensive to engineer. Also, an inherent risk of the authority is that it constitutes a
single point of failure. The main difficulty, however, arises when new mobile users join
the system, and existing ones leave, at a great frequency; this necessitates re-generating
keys and making cloud data inaccessible to those who have left. Having an authority fetch
data from the cloud, decrypt it, and then re-encrypt it with a new key is unrealistic from
a performance standpoint, especially in a highly scaleable system.
The dilemma is that the cloud provider has nearly unbounded computational resources
to perform cryptographic operations, but it cannot be trusted with key material, while an
external trusted agent suffers from scalability potential. One solution entails cloud data
being transformed such that it may be unlocked only with newly generated keys, without
needing an intermediate decryption step; this is possible by having the cloud provider
perform a re-encryption operation without having access to the actual decryption keys. An
active area of research, it is a form of proxy cryptography, where a third-party such as the
cloud re-encrypts content for a user. One possibility is to utilize unique content decryption
keys that are further locked so that they cannot be accessed by a cloud provider [8]. Users
download encrypted user content, then request that a trusted access control server provide
them with the appropriate content decryption keys, by performing re-encryption. In such
schemes, the content owner typically decides which users should have access to cloud data
and allows re-encryption to be carried out accordingly. If a user’s access rights are revoked,
then no re-encryption will occur for that user.
The challenge in a mobile cloud computing context is that the content owner, which
is a mobile device, manages access control for all other users; it can become an excessive
communications burden if it requires constant activity by the data owner such as generation
and distribution of new versions of keys. Also, the appropriate timing of re-encryption
tasks, which are very computationally-intensive, remains an open problem; in some cases,
they may be performed only when needed, or at cheaper off-peak times, resulting in lazy
revocation.
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Another area of research that is correlated is attribute-based encryption [50], where a
recipient may be able to read an encrypted message based on the satisfaction of certain
attributes, rather than possession of a valid key, at the cost of additional complexity;
examples include membership in a particular department or authority level within the
organization. Regardless of the re-encryption mechanism used, data stored in the cloud
should remain encrypted in some form at all times, and any required transformation of it
should not reveal the plaintext in the process; such an agenda is in keeping with the threat
model identifying the cloud provider as being honest-but-curious.
Re-Encryption System Model
A system model for proxy re-encryption is now presented, which is a variant of the general
mobile cloud computing system envisioned in Section 2.2.2 on page 14. Figure 3.1 illustrates
a typical proxy re-encryption scenario. The manager is a trusted self-supporting network
component that may be situated behind an organization’s firewall and form part of a private
cloud belonging to the client. It is normally administered under the domain of the users in
question and is completely independent of the CSP. It may maintain a database of private
key information relating to a set of authorized mobile users. The manager is sufficiently
trusted to authorize access to the cloud and to contain key material as necessary; however,
to minimize the risk of it being compromised, a user will only share as much of its own key
material with the manager as is necessary in the security scheme utilized. Furthermore,
the manager will not be as inherently scalable as a cloud provider.
Inside the cloud, the controller maintains a complementary public key information
database, and stores and reads user data on behalf of clients to and from the permanent
replicated data store. The user data may periodically undergo cryptographic transfor-
mation, such as re-encryption from one version of ciphertext to another; such activities
are dispatched on-the-fly or alternatively at off-peak times by eligible worker processes
instantiated and initiated by the controller.
A mobile user may act as a data owner and decide what access privileges are appropriate
for the data that it uploads to the cloud and retains control over; a specific subset of
the user population may be identified as having sufficient permission based on unique
identities, or users may be assigned various distinguishing attributes that inherently grant
permission regardless of the specific identity that assumes them. A highly scalable system
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is envisioned where users may potentially number in the many thousands or millions.
Continuous arbitration by a single data owner during all transactions is impractical, as
a mobile user is subject to a limited battery and transient connectivity. The data owner
uploads encrypted content to the cloud data store using a shared public key; another user
requests it, and the manager invokes a re-encryption process either within the cloud or
inside itself; the content is then downloaded directly from the cloud or via the manager,
and read by the recipient using his or her own private key. If the recipient’s access rights
are revoked, then content will not be re-encrypted to a readable form for him or her.
3.1.6 Encrypted File Storage
Various network file systems have been proposed to provide encrypted file storage capability
for users. Although these systems were not specifically designed for use in cloud computing,
it is instructive to examine the approaches taken to solve the problem of scalable security.
An oft-cited system is SiRiUS, which essentially adds a security mechanism on top
of an existing networked file system [58]. It supports granting read-only or read-and-
write access to files by providing file encryption and signature keys that can access a
data block; these are stored as metadata along with the data block, and are encrypted
using the data owner’s master encryption and signature keys. When sharing, an encrypted
data block is created consisting of these access keys encrypted using the intended reader’s
public key. Unauthorized modifications to files, such as attempts to reverse an occurrence
of revocation, are detected by storing a hash tree of the metadata, and comparing it
against newly modified metadata by users. SiRiUS supports only end-to-end security; all
cryptographic operations must be performed on the client, which may be unrealistic in the
case of a mobile device. The system relies upon an existing key distribution system using
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or IBE. In particular, SiRiUS employs an encryption
key permitting read access to a data block, and a signature key permitting write access.
Scalability is a major issue with this system. A user wishing to share data with another user
must encrypt the file encryption key using the public key of the target user; repeating this
process for a large target population of users, some of which may be unknown at the time
of data creation, is problematic. Key management is simple, however, as a user only needs
to retain a master key pair, and out-of-band communication is not needed if an IBE scheme
is utilized for public key retrieval. To address the problem of allowing a large number of
users to access the same data block in SiRiUS, the Naor-Naor-Lotspeich (NNL) subset-sum
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Figure 3.1: A system model of proxy-based data re-encryption.
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framework may be utilized. Here, the potential recipients are grouped into subsets, and the
encryption key is encrypted using the key belonging to a whole user subset, and not just
an individual user. To reduce the cost of revocation, “each subset is a complete subtree
rooted at some node in a tree. A user is given keys corresponding to those subtrees rooted
at nodes along the path from [his or] her leaf to the root.” To support this scheme, the
expanded key blocks in the file metadata require significantly more data storage, however,
which is a tradeoff in achieving scalability. Ultimately, this cryptographic file system relies
on the client performing all cryptographic operations, which is a significant disadvantage.
Plutus is another secure file storage system with encrypt-on-disk capability that oﬄoads
all key management and distribution to the client [60]. The motivation behind its design
is that the cost of encryption and decryption is distributed among all users without server
involvement. This approach is not very feasible in a cloud-based system consisting of
clients with resource-constrained devices, however, where all wireless communication and
processor-intensive cryptographic operations should be kept to a minimum, and a secure
out-of-band channel is generally unavailable. One of the defining features of Plutus is that it
offers lazy revocation. Following a revocation, a revoked reader may still read unmodified or
cached files; it cannot, however, read updated files or modify them itself. A major limitation
is that users must exchange keys securely between themselves; no such mechanism to
accomplish this feat is proposed. In addition, readers must contact the file owner to
obtain the necessary keys for decryption, which further increases the communication cost.
Scalability in Plutus is achieved through filegroups, which are essentially aggregations of
files shared by multiple users that have a single RSA key pair associated with them. The
vulnerability of the file system is reduced through the use of lockboxes. Lockboxes contain
the keys for individual files, and the lockboxes are themselves encrypted with an RSA
key. Enforcement of read versus write access is achieved through cryptographic means, as
opposed to relying upon the server. Writers receive file-sign keys while readers receive file-
verify keys. Readers verify the integrity of data downloaded from the server by checking
the signature of each block. To address the problem of an increase in the number of keys
due to revocation, a technique called key rotation is utilized. Files are re-encrypted with
the latest keys, and users can derive earlier keys if needed, as all keys are related to each
other. However, only the owner can generate the next version of the key; this prevents a
revocation from being undone by a reinstatement of an older key, but it requires availability
of the original owner of a file. In a large-scale multi-user cloud application, the required
availability of the data owner may be infeasible. Indeed, necessarily identifying a single
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user as a permanent owner is also unrealistic. Key rotation is done by exponentiating the
current key with the owner’s private key, which is a relatively expensive operation. Another
feature of Plutus is that the server can validate writers of files based on their supply of a
write token issued by the file owner; the hash of this write token is stored on the server
for verification. This is not a significant improvement over a traditional access control list
securely maintained on the server, however, and the issuance of a large number of write
tokens by a mobile user is unrealistic.
Tahoe is a storage grid designed to provide secure, long-term distributed storage [115].
It is especially useful for backup applications and can be used in a RAID-like manner. It
is designed to remain operable even if some servers across which a file is shared become
unavailable. The motivation behind Tahoe is the Principle of Least Authority, where cryp-
tographic capabilities grant the minimal set of privileges necessary to accomplish a task.
The cryptography employed by Tahoe ensures that servers cannot violate confidentiality
by reading the original plaintext, nor can they violate integrity by forging file contents. It
utilizes a capabilities-as-keys access control scheme, which enables a client to gain access to
an object based on knowledge of an identifier. Capabilities for reading from, writing to, and
verifying the integrity of files are provided. The client chooses a symmetric encryption key,
encrypts the file, creates multiple shares encoded with erasure codes for integrity verifica-
tion and file reconstruction, and then uploads the shares to different servers. This approach
does not fit with a cloud computing system, where the client expects a single upload to a
cloud provider to occur, and has no knowledge about multiple servers contained within the
cloud; the cloud provider itself is responsible for replication if necessary. Tahoe requires
the use of public-key encryption such as RSA for key generation, but does not provide a
facility for key distribution between users, nor a mechanism for revocation. Freshness of
mutable files is handled by having the client request metadata about a data share from
a sufficient number of servers, identify the highest-numbered version, and confirm that
enough shares of that version exist. Again, this solution is not a close fit to mobile cloud
computing; having a mobile user communicate with multiple servers is infeasible.
CryptDB [93] is a system that allows execution of SQL queries over encrypted data;
it also ensures that curious database administrators do not gain access to encrypted data.
“Each data item in the database can be decrypted only through a chain of keys rooted
in the password of one of the users with access to that data. As a result, if the user is
not logged into the application, and the adversary does not know the user’s password, the
adversary cannot decrypt the user’s data.” The main difficulty with this approach is that
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CryptDB assigns and manages keys for principals (physical users) itself; keys for use in a
session are obtained from a user that is logged-in, and the data belonging to that user can
be compromised while accessed. The trust model is relaxed; the server must be trusted
to restrict permissions for the administrator, and to delete the user’s key on log-out; such
compromises are made to permit queries to be efficiently executed on unencrypted data.
Furthermore, the server performs no re-encryption function itself when a user is off-line.
Clearly, the designs of encrypted file storage systems are rooted in a traditional client-
server setting that does not impose the steep scalability and efficiency requirements of a
mobile cloud system. Cryptographic operations and key distribution tasks are typically
outsourced to the clients, rather than the network storage system, which is opposite to
what is desired in a cloud accessed by resource-limited mobile devices. High availability
of data owners is also required, but mobile devices suffer from transient connectivity and
provision of such an assurance is unrealistic. Furthermore, encrypted file storage systems
may be implemented on remote machines that do not guarantee a particular level of service,
whereas a cloud system is a tightly-controlled collection of nodes under single ownership
that exists on the basis of delivering a service under contract with high guarantees.
3.1.7 Secure Cloud Storage
Recently, secure storage system design has migrated from the network file system domain to
that of cloud computing with more tailored solutions, yet work in this area is still nascent.
CloudProof is a secure storage system designed for the cloud [92]; “[clients of this system]
can not only detect violations of integrity, write-serializability, and freshness, [but] they
can also prove the occurrence of these violations to a third-party.” The system does not
deal with confidentiality, however. It presents an auditing protocol that uses attestations,
or proofs, “which are signed messages that bind the clients to the requests they make and
the cloud to a certain state of the data;” this allows violations to be proved. CloudProof
manages access control by grouping data blocks into a family, such that each block in the
family is managed by a single ACL that dictates what group of users should have access
to the block family. All of the key information is stored in the family key block. The
read access key pertaining to a block family is distributed to all users using broadcast
encryption. The main challenge lies with revocation of user access. Immediate revocation
would entail simply re-encrypting all blocks managed by ACLs that include the affected
group, which would be expensive. Instead, CloudProof performs lazy revocation. Using
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key rotation as in Plutus, the data owner rolls keys forward to a new version for each of
the affected families. The new key information is sent to all current authorized users via
broadcast encryption, which has complexity equal to the root of the membership in the
ACL. Upon data access, a client checks the version of the read access key; if it is out of date,
then the client re-encrypts the data. Thus, the revocation burden is borne by users; a data
write always requires re-encryption, anyway. This scheme seems unworkable in the context
of mobile users: they cannot be expected to perform re-encryption operations themselves
given their limited computational capacity. The cloud provider does not assist with the
expensive re-encryption activity, and the data owner is responsible for performing the key
rotation. In practice, a mobile user would not be expected to be available and connected
at all times to perform such activity, nor could it endure the communication cost of it.
DepSky is a cloud storage system that addresses secure storage on multiple clouds;
it permits “encryption, encoding, and replication of data on diverse clouds that form a
cloud-of-clouds” [16]. “All writers of a data unit share a common private key used to sign
some of the data written on the data unit, while readers have access to the corresponding
public key to verify these signatures.” It is assumed that the system has some sort of
access control, but it is left unspecified. Confidentiality of data stored in the clouds is
ensured without the use of a key distribution service, by employing Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme [98], where a “dealer distributes a secret to [all] players, but each player gets only
a share of the secret;” a sufficient number of shares are needed to recover the secret key.
In the case of the basic variation of DepSky, the players are the participating clouds,
not the users. An erasure code algorithm is employed that reduces the size of each share,
such that “data is encrypted with a random secret key, [it is then] encoded, [and] the key
is divided using secret sharing; each server receives a block of the [same] encrypted data
and a share of the key.” “No individual cloud has access to the data stored, but clients
that have authorization to access the data” must communicate with a sufficient share of
different other clouds to obtain all key components and rebuild the original data. This
communication cost is excessive for a mobile user, and it also requires full data replication
on all clouds. There is also the practical difficulty of finding sufficient non-collaborating
cloud providers to implement the proposed system. In another variation of DepSky, to
reduce cloud storage demands, the data itself is partitioned into a set of blocks such that
a sufficient share of blocks is necessary to recover the original data. Each reader requires
multiple replies to a read request, and a data writer is required to generate and store a
message digest for each cloud; these features also entail a high communication cost.
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The CS2 cloud storage system [61] provides facilities to conduct symmetric search of
large volumes of encrypted data with provision of data confidentiality and global integrity;
however, it does not address issues of key management and end-to-end security as it con-
siders itself to be of a different purpose than a cryptographic file system for the cloud.
The secure cloud storage systems detailed here impose substantial communication and
processing costs on users, such as on-the-fly data re-encryption or constant communica-
tion with multiple clouds, as described. These demands would prove insurmountable for
resource-constrained mobile device users. Clearly, new solutions must be designed such
that mobile users are accommodated without compromising data privacy and integrity.
3.2 Security Features in Commercial Clouds
Inroads have been made in standardizing key management for commercial cloud use.
OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) has
proposed KMIP (Key Management Interoperability Protocol) for unified cloud manage-
ment [87], which addresses interoperability of key management services in use in the in-
dustry; it defines a single low-level standardization protocol for communication between
key management systems and applications within an enterprise system, but it arguably
falls short of addressing the unique scalability problems inherent in cloud computing. It
has been observed that KMIP has a limited focus on enterprise key management and lacks
applicability towards cloud computing; there is agreement over the need for a scalable key
management model applicable to today’s cloud systems [77].
Authentication is an important aspect closely related to key management; it determines
whether a user can gain entry to a cloud. This function may be accomplished through the
use of SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language), permitting an organization to man-
age authentication for its own users, as well as between other sites using trust relationships.
It provides Single Sign-On (SSO) capability, which is seamless authentication on multiple
cloud providers; a user may log into multiple sites using a common identity authorized
by an identity provider. Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing platform [24] provides access
control by having each user supply a token that contains claims, which is more efficient
than individual access control. An identity federation scheme permits claims created in
one identity scope to be accepted in another. Amazon’s EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud) [5]
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requires multi-factor authentication; customers must not only supply their standard cre-
dentials, but also supply a single-use code from an authentication device in possession.
Network security on a commercial cloud systems is largely handled by a firewall that
protects a running virtual instance from attack by allowing only certain ports to be accessed
from outside by legitimate clients. In EC2, a mandatory inbound firewall is configured in
deny mode by default; customers must explicitly open all ports to allow inbound traffic.
Communication may be restricted by protocol, service port, and source IP address.
Other security mechanisms relate to the inner workings of the cloud. One example is
process isolation, where a sandbox provides a controlled set of resources for programs to
run in, while restricting communication access; it permits untrusted programs to co-exist
safely in the cloud. In the secure sandbox environment of Google’s App Engine (GAE)
platform [49], each cloud application runs in a separate process, and the data store prevents
an app from accessing data belonging to other applications. A cloud application is forced
to access external computers solely through a provided URL fetch service, and inbound
traffic occurs on standard HTTP ports. An application is prevented from writing to the
file system directly, and must return a response to a web request within a specified time.
In the case of an untrusted cloud provider, key management services are sometimes
handled by a third-party guardian. For example, the security provider enStratus enforces
a separation of roles [39]; it acts as a custodian of the client’s security keys and credentials.
It maintains the key store outside of the cloud but has no access to client data, while the
cloud provider is the opposite: it holds the encrypted data, but not the keys. The security of
this approach lies in the difficulty of successfully attacking two independent and encrypted
systems. However, the client credentials are stored on one of enStratus’s own servers, and
although it is allegedly not externally accessible, it could still be compromised; clients may
also be unwilling to trust a third-party provider with their keys any more so than the CSP.
Generally, commercial cloud providers are innovating security features, but solutions
tend to be fragmented and proprietary, and tailored for specific types of applications; in
particular, for web server traffic. Evidently, there is no readily available and efficient key
distribution scheme to provide fine-grained access control to encrypted storage in the cloud.
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3.3 Summary
The lack of direct control over the resources of a cloud computing system require clients
to either fully trust the cloud provider, or adopt cryptographic protocols to ensure the
security of data that is transferred to and stored in the cloud. The increasing popularity
of cloud applications that service mobile users implies that these protocols must be made
efficient. To provide trusted, encrypted communication with a cloud application, a highly
scalable key management system is needed. Data confidentiality must be preserved through
in-transit data encryption as well as encrypted data storage. One important feature in
particular is efficient key revocation, due to the frequent changes in membership that can
occur in a large multi-user cloud application. Furthermore, key management solutions in
use by commercial cloud systems today are largely insufficient from a scalability point of
view. Security technologies adopted by general-purpose web servers and networked file
systems also do not fully address these needs. In the following chapters, a number of novel
key management techniques to achieve scalable and secure mobile cloud computing will be
proposed and analyzed.
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Re-Encryption-Based
Key Management
4.1 Introduction
Key management techniques are proposed in this chapter which minimize com-munication sessions for users and avoid expensive client-side calculations; they take
advantage of an asymmetric computing model in which the cloud server has much greater
computational ability than a mobile client to process cryptographic functions of a security
protocol. The re-encryption system model described in Section 3.1.5 on page 37 and the
adversary and threat model described in Section 2.4.1 on page 19 are assumed.
First, related work is presented on proxy re-encryption in Section 4.2, beyond what
is described in Chapter 3 on page 30. Two key management schemes based on data
re-encryption are then presented: a conventional one entailing a re-encryption workload
processed by a trusted client-controlled party, with novel improvements suggested, in Sec-
tion 4.3; and the other entailing a workload processed by the cloud provider as an untrusted
entity that offers greater scalability in the mobile cloud computing context, in Section 4.4.
Implementation results on popular smartphone and cloud platforms are provided that val-
idate the assumptions made, in Section 4.5. Finally, concluding remarks on the efficiency
and scalability of the proposed schemes are made in Section 4.6.
The content of this chapter is based on work that has been published [108,109].
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4.2 Related Work on Proxy Re-Encryption
Data stored in the cloud should ideally be stored in encrypted form so that the cloud
provider cannot access it. This notion is dependent on the keys being securely managed by
an entity outside of the provider’s domain. The difficulty arises when new users join the
system, and existing ones leave, necessitating new keys to be generated. The encrypted
data should ideally be transformed such that it may be unlocked with new keys, without
an intermediate decryption step that would allow the cloud provider to read the plaintext.
One possible method is to re-encrypt the stored content during retrieval. Such a tech-
nique has been applied to an encrypted file storage system using proxy cryptography and
the Chefs file system, where a “[content] owner encrypts blocks of content with unique,
symmetric content keys [(symmetric keys presumably being preferred for performance rea-
sons); these keys] are then encrypted with an asymmetric master key to form a lockbox” [8].
“Users download the encrypted content from the block store, then communicate with an
access control server to decrypt the lockboxes protecting the content. [Critically,] the con-
tent owner selects which users should have access to the content and gives the appropriate
delegation rights to the access control server.” To accomplish this, the content owner re-
tains a master key that is used to compute a re-encryption key; this re-encryption key
is used by the “access control server to re-encrypt the lockbox [to that of the intended
reader’s] public key.” The problem with this approach is that the content owner manages
access control for all other users, which is a great burden on communications if the owner
is a mobile device user. In addition, it requires dynamic re-encryption of the same data
whenever multiple users want to access it. In the novel model proposed later in this the-
sis, one-time re-encryption only occurs whenever membership changes, presumably a less
frequent occurrence than that of data access. Also, access rights need not be enforced by
individual users, and it is not possible for a single user to divulge the keys of all other users
to the cloud provider, as they are not known. Other approaches exist [57] that also require
a trusted proxy for each decryption, which increases the communication cost.
A related work proposes the merging of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) with proxy
re-encryption in a cloud computing application, allowing fine-grained access control of
resources while attempting to oﬄoad re-encryption activity to the cloud provider [119].
This scheme has numerous differences to the cloud-based re-encryption scheme that will
be proposed; these differences prove to be disadvantageous in a mobile-based environment.
The data owner, or originator, is involved in generating a key for each new user that joins
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or leaves the system, rather than oﬄoading this task to a trusted key authority under the
client’s control. This is not only a prohibitive cost for a mobile user, but also impractical
due to the user’s mobility and hence occasional unavailability. Another difference is that a
secret key must be regenerated and re-distributed for each user, in lazy fashion, whenever
user revocation occurs, rather than allowing users to upgrade a common partition key based
on public parameters which would reduce communication and result in higher efficiency.
Also, the data re-encryption activity is aggregated in lazy fashion, whereas in this proposal,
re-encryption occurs dynamically on an as-needed basis, greatly reducing server workload
for data primarily accessed by approximately the same set of users over time. The re-
encryption occurs due to attribute re-definition, unlike the proposal. There is also no
facility for exchanging key material in peer-to-peer fashion, which would be useful among
mobile users utilizing cheap local wireless links such as Bluetooth. Finally, the scheme is
based on KP-ABE (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption), not CP-ABE.
Similar observations are made with respect to another related approach that combines
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (CP-ABE), which uses hierarchical domain masters to distribute user keys and
the cloud provider to re-encrypt data on user revocation depending on the attribute keys
held by the revoked user [113]; this is done at the cost of increased storage requirements for
key material held by users and a greater amount of processing when generating ciphertext,
which are problematic for mobile device users. Another method of trusted data sharing
over untrusted cloud providers has been proposed that uses a progressive elliptic curve
encryption scheme [123]. However, it relies upon a writer uploading encrypted data to the
cloud, then distributing credentials to the cloud to perform re-encryption, and also to the
reader on each data access attempt; this is clearly impractical when applied to resource-
constrained devices and networks. The inefficiency of peer-to-peer key distribution in this
manner is best avoided.
Although data re-encryption appears to be a promising technique in managing en-
crypted data as access rights evolve over time, current solutions in the literature do not
address the issue of high scalability to a sufficient and satisfactory degree.
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4.3 Manager-Based Re-Encryption
4.3.1 Introduction
The overall goal of this chapter is to explore, adapt, and evaluate system security engi-
neering techniques to achieve a high level of communication security for cloud computing
systems. In particular, the emphasis will be on the scenario of a mass multi-user services
application running in the cloud and interacting with a high population of active mobile
device users. A key management scheme is described in this section that is based on
the proxy re-encryption cryptography suggested in [8]; however, it has been mapped to
a cloud computing system with significant modifications. Its primary involvement here is
to demonstrate a technique that will serve as a foundation and point of comparison for
the novel scheme proposed in the following Section 4.4 that offers much greater scalability.
Some additional novel variations are still suggested at the end of this section, however,
which provide limited but substantive improvements to performance, scalability, and secu-
rity. The contributions of this chapter include the adaptation of proxy cryptography to a
cloud computing system such that the communication cost for mobile users is reduced, as
compared to the encrypted file system application in [8] that is less practical in the mobile
usage context studied here, as will be explained.
The scheme described in this section permits access to a common data partition in
the cloud among multiple users, ensures confidential data storage to which even the cloud
provider is not privy, and offers greater data access efficiency in a mobile-based cloud
system at lower overall communication and processing cost than traditional centralized
solutions; all of these features are accomplished through the process of data re-encryption.
Table 4.1 summarizes the notation used throughout.
A manager, or trusted proxy node, controls the access of its users to the cloud. This
manager is typically under the control of the client organization, and ensures that key
management functions need not be outsourced to an untrusted cloud provider. The man-
ager may comprise a server situated behind the firewall of the client organization that is
securely accessed by a mobile user population. At the same time, the cloud stores user
data in encrypted form such that it is accessible to all authorized users at any time; it does
so by regularly performing one-way re-encryption of the data in the cloud as it is being
accessed, so that a reader in the authorized group can decode it using the reader’s own
decryption key.
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Symbol Description
P Cloud data partition.
P Set of all partitions.
UP User group with authorized access to P .
M Manager or trusted proxy.
A,B,C Users Alice, Bob, Charlie.
m Plaintext message.
Ex(m) Ciphertext of message m encrypted using secret key x.
PKXv Public key of entity X (with version v optionally specified).
SKXv Decryption key of entity X (with version v optionally specified).
RKX→Y Re-encryption key for converting from content unlocked by SKX to that unlocked
by SKY .
Table 4.1: A legend for the symbolic notation used in the re-encryption models.
4.3.2 System Operation
Key Generation and Encryption
Consider modifications and improvements to a proxy re-encryption scheme [8], based on
the BBS encryption method [18] and the El Gamal crypto-system [38]. The proof of the
underlying encryption technique is presented in [8], and is relied upon here.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the manager generates public and private decryption keys (PKX
and SKX) for each user X belonging to the system, and is responsible for maintaining an
access control list for enforcing the authorized user set. A data partition P in the cloud
is accessible by a user group UP and belongs to the entire set of partitions P . In this
example, Manager M manages the access of user group UP to data partition P . Note that
a single user may belong to multiple groups.
Let G1, G2 be groups of prime order q with a bilinear map such that: e : G1×G1 → G2.
The system parameters are the random generator g ∈ G1 and Z = e(g, g) ∈ G2. A secret
decryption key SKX is randomly selected by M for each user X ∈ UP and distributed to
the users through a secure (possibly out-of-band) channel. Let: SKX = x ∈ Z∗q. A public
key PKX is also chosen for user X as follows: PKX = g
x. Similarly, the manager M also
creates a private key SKP = p ∈ Z∗q and public key PKP = gp for data partition P in the
cloud that it manages. The public partition key may reside in a directory inside the cloud
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Figure 4.1: A model of key management using manager-based re-encryption.
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that is accessible by all users in the system, or be distributed to all users in UP by the
manager; it is considered public information. The manager, however, retains the private
decryption key SKP required to read the cloud data; the cloud provider and other users
cannot decode the data even if they download it directly from the cloud, with or without
authentication. A unique property of this model is that all read requests initiated by users
are normally serviced through the manager.
User A, or Alice, encrypts a message m and creates a ciphertext using the public key
PKP of the data partition where it is to be stored, and uploads the cipher-text Ep(m) to
the cloud, so that it is stored in encrypted form in partition P .
Given m ∈ G2, random r ∈ Z∗q
Ep(m) = (Z
r ·m, gpr)
The cloud provider will be unable to extract the original content m. If m exceeds the
maximum possible block length, then the message may be segmented, and each segment
encrypted using the same key PKP . Alternatively, a symmetric cipher such as AES-256
may be applied to the entire message, and the cipher key itself encrypted using the proposed
scheme, as opposed to the entire message. Irrespective of the approach taken, the number
of required encryption keys in the proposed scheme will not increase, as the same pre-
computed public partition key is applied in all encryptions relating to the same message.
Re-Encryption
Suppose that a user B, or Bob, belonging to the same group, makes a request to the cloud
provider for the same message m stored earlier by Alice. The cloud provider does not
send it to B directly; instead, it sends it to M , which decides whether that data should
be accessible by B based on its ACL. If so, then the manager creates a re-encryption key
RKP→B using the private key of the partition. The manager then fetches the encrypted
message Ep(m) from the cloud, and computes a re-encryption key using B’s decryption key
SKB, which was initially generated by the manager and shared with B. Note that SKB
is equal to b ∈ Z∗q, chosen randomly by M . In general, the re-encryption key computed for
user X in UP is:
RKP→X = g
SKX
SKP = gx·p
−1(mod q)
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For user B, as in this example, the re-encryption key computed is RKP→B = g
b
p . Using
this key, M re-encrypts the ciphertext Ep(m) as Eb(m) and sends it to B directly.
From Ep(m) = (Z
r ·m, gpr),
Compute: e(gpr, RKP→B) = e(gpr, g
b
p ) = Zbr
Publish: Eb(m) = (Z
r ·m,Zbr)
The justification for re-encrypting data before delivery to B is as follows:
1. A secure channel between M and B may not exist, and hence encryption is required.
2. M may perform a re-encryption without possession of the private key of B, and
is unable to read the ciphertext during the process; this possibility is explored in a
variation presented later in Section 4.3.4, and is not possible if M was to follow a two-
step process and simply decrypt then encrypt the data with the recipient’s private
key. Thus, the security of the proposed scheme may be enhanced with re-encryption,
at the cost of a simpler and faster scheme using symmetric keys.
Decryption
The recipient B can then decode the ciphertext Eb(m) using his own decryption key SKB:
m =
Zr ·m
(Zbr)
1
b
If the original user Alice wished to decrypt the message, then a similar process would
unfold; the manager would create a re-encryption key RKP→A and Alice would decrypt her
ciphertext Ea(m) using her decryption key SKA. Thus, the manager can allow any user
within the group to access the encrypted data stored within the cloud. Here, first-level
encryption is demonstrated [8], where the content Eb(m) available from the manager may
be decrypted only by the holder of SKB; the content may not be re-encrypted a second
time and read by a third party such as user C in UP . If C requires access, then the use of
RKP→C to carry out a re-encryption of Ep(m) to Ec(m) is required.
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Data Flow
To summarize, the flow of ciphertext in the system between two users is as follows:
A Ep(m)−−−−→ P Ep(m)−−−−→ M Eb(m)−−−−→ B
The cryptographic operations explained in this section are shown visually in Table 4.2.
Step Alice (A) Cloud (P ) Manager (M) Bob (B)
1 Computes
PKp = g
p and
SKp = p, and
shares PKp with
cloud. Similarly,
computes SKB = b
and sends it to B.
2 Obtains PKp from
cloud, picks ran-
dom r, encrypts m
as Ep(m) = (Z
r ·
m, gpr), and sends
it to the cloud.
3 Stores Ep(m), and
sends a copy of it to
M on request.
4 Computes
RKP→B = g
b
p .
Re-encrypts
Ep(m) as Eb(m) =
(Zr ·m,Zbr).
5 Downloads Eb(m)
from M and de-
codes m = Z
r·m
(Zbr)
1
b
using SKB.
Table 4.2: A summary of operations in manager-based re-encryption.
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Key Re-generation
If a new user Charlie, or C, joins the group, then he registers with the manager which
grants authorization, and is given a decryption key SKC . C will be able to receive and
decrypt only the content that the manager is willing to re-encrypt for him, as ciphertext
Ec(m). If Charlie leaves the group, then the manager removes him from its access list; it
will no longer re-encrypt data for C on retrieval attempts.
4.3.3 Discussion
An important advantage of this model lies in is its elimination of expensive key re-
generation and re-distribution for all users whenever group membership changes. It pre-
serves data confidentiality for the client; data in the cloud remains encrypted and unread-
able in its original form by the provider at all times. For a new user that joins the group,
the manager can choose to decrypt data stored only after a certain time, hence providing
backward secrecy. For a user that leaves the group, and whose access is revoked, none of the
stored data can be decoded independently by that user, hence providing forward secrecy.
Unlike the encrypted file storage mechanism described in [8], the proposed proxy re-
encryption is applied to the ciphertext itself rather than a container (i.e. lockbox) for
decryption (i.e. content) keys, so that decryption keys are not shared by multiple users
which carries a risk of compromise or collusion; additionally, the container itself is not
required to be downloaded by users as extra overhead. Additionally, unlike in the related
work, the client does not need to make a separate request against an access control server
for every single data fetch in order to request a re-encryption, and then make a second
request to actually download the data of interest. Conservation of communication in this
manner is important for mobile device users.
Some opportunities arise for increasing performance. The manager may cache the most
recently re-encrypted content for each user so that multiple accesses of the same data
by the same user may be serviced more quickly. A replacement strategy such as least-
recently-used may be employed; if the same user requests the same records repeatedly,
then re-encryption would not need to be re-done on a cache hit. In all cases, the recipient
completes only a single decryption operation, which is suitable for a resource-constrained
user. Additionally, the manager can take on additional responsibilities if allowed by the
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system model. If there is a secure link between the users and their manager (through a
VPN connection for instance, or if all user entities are connected on an intra-net behind
a secure firewall), then users may communicate freely with the manager without the need
for additional data encryption in transit in the final leg. In this case, the authority can
manage all of the encryption and decryption needs of its members, thereby unloading that
processing burden from lightweight mobile device users.
A very significant disadvantage of this approach, however, is that for each retrieval
attempt of a new data block or record, the manager must perform re-encryption using an
asymmetric key. A bilinear pairing operation based on a Weil and Tate pairing is several
times more costly than a scalar multiplication [64]. Although it is an expensive operation, it
can be accomplished in the private portion of a hybrid cloud if the manager is a component
of it, thus taking advantage of its scalability. A mechanism for using the public portion of
a cloud, which would typically scale much more easily for this purpose, will be described
in the following section. Another disadvantage is that, because the manager stores all
decryption keys, it must be fully trusted; hence, it is a point of vulnerability. Furthermore,
it requires full trust by the client which may be unrealistic in some systems.
The proposed scheme is presented in this chapter as a plausible and straightforward
adaptation of the concept of re-encryption cryptography to a cloud computing context.
However, its stated disadvantages render it a non-optimal key management scheme for
mobile cloud computing. A more practical scheme is presented in the following Section 4.4.
4.3.4 Novel Variants
Notwithstanding the fundamental scalability problem of the manager, additional optional
variants are presented to improve the security or performance of the original scheme:
Encryption Using an Owner Key
In order to reduce the cost of re-encryption for all requests, the protocol may be modified
so that rather than using the partition key PKP for encryption, user A would use her
own public key PKA, and upload ciphertext Ea(m) to the cloud. Upon data retrieval, the
manager would be required to perform re-encryption for another user, such as B, using
re-encryption key RKA→B supplied by M :
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RKA→B = g
SKB
SKA = g
b
a
This technique would allow Alice to retrieve data directly from the cloud that she could
then decrypt without the aid of the manager, which has good practical application; in many
conceivable use cases, it would be expected that the same user that uploaded data would
be the one that would most frequently access it. The trade-off is that in case A was to
leave the group, the manager would need to invalidate all data uploaded by A; one option
would be for the cloud provider to re-encrypt it to the partition key, and then control all
access to it from that point going forward; even so, no key re-distribution would occur.
Optimized Manager-Based Re-Encryption
If the manager introduces too much latency into the system due to its workload, it is
possible to substantially reduce its communication and processing burden by transferring
some of it to the users; this is particularly effective if system usage typically entails repeated
fetches of the same data, as is generally the case. The manager’s critical role in the protocol
described thus far is to perform the re-encryption task for every fetch of ciphertext by the
same user. However, observe that the Zr · m subcomponent of the encrypted ciphertext
Ep(m) stored in the cloud is not directly involved in this operation; it may be directly
downloaded from the cloud by the recipient B, who will then await the second component
Zbr from M . In this way, M avoids the overhead of fetching Ep(m) in its entirety from
the cloud. Furthermore, M will reduce the number of pairing operations that it needs to
perform in the original re-encryption scheme in order to compute the Zbr component, and
will thus significantly improve its scalability. The modified scheme proceeds as follows:
The data owner first uploads Ep(m) to the cloud, which stores it, as before. When
the recipient B first makes a request of the ciphertext Ep(m) = (Z
r ·m, gpr), it contacts
the cloud and manager jointly to receive the ciphertext components that it needs for the
decryption. The provider first provides the component Zr ·m to B to fulfill its obligation
in the client request. As part of the transaction, the provider also sends the component gpr
to the manager, which performs a single pairing operation on it, utilizing SKP , as follows:
Zr = e(gpr, g
1
SKP ) = e(gpr, g
1
p )
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The manager stores the result Zr for future use in re-encryptions for any user. Note that
this operation by the manager occurs the first time that the ciphertext in question is
accessed by any user, and the same component can be re-used for any user in the future.
Next, to process the current outstanding request from B in particular, it exponentiates the
result Zr using a copy of B’s decryption key SKB, to obtain the result Z
br:
Zbr = (Zr)SKB = (Zr)b
The manager then sends the result Zbr as the second required component of the ciphertext
to B, so that B now possesses Eb(m) in its entirety and can perform the decryption, as
described previously. The cryptographic operations explained in this variant are shown
visually in Table 4.3.
These modifications to the manager-based re-encryption scheme significantly improve
the performance of the manager, which now only carries out a single pairing operation
for each ciphertext and user. Repeated subsequent requests of the same data result in a
single exponentiation by the manager, instead of an expensive pairing operation as in the
original scheme. The only added cost is an additional component Zr to be retained for each
ciphertext, but it is applicable to all users. Furthermore, to reduce the communication
cost for the mobile user to a single request, it is possible for the manager to fetch the
Zr · m component from the cloud and provide it directly to the user; the cost is added
communication for the manager itself, but it is no worse than in the original protocol.
An undesirable side effect is that if B leaves the group, he can continue to download
and access encrypted data in the cloud. This issue is solved in the model presented in
the next section, in which the cloud data undergoes a transformation that prevents this
possibility. Also, B must initiate download requests to both the cloud provider and the
manager; in the next model, downloads only involve the cloud provider.
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Table 4.3: A summary of operations in a variant of
manager-based re-encryption.
Step Alice (A) Cloud (P ) Manager (M) Bob (B)
1 Computes PKp =
gp and SKp = p,
and shares PKp
with cloud. Sim-
ilarly, computes
SKB = b and
sends it to B.
2 Obtains PKp
from cloud,
picks random
r, encrypts m
as Ep(m) =
(Zr · m, gpr), and
sends it to the
cloud.
3 Stores Ep(m),
and sends the gpr
component of it
to M on request.
4 On the first (and
only) request for
Ep(m) from any
user, and from
the component
gpr, computes
e(gpr, g
1
p ) = Zr,
and stores it.
Requests the ci-
phertext compo-
nents from P and
M .
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Table 4.3: (continued)
Step Alice (A) Cloud (P ) Manager (M) Bob (B)
5 Sends the Zr ·
m component of
Ep(m) to B on re-
quest.
On the first and
all subsequent
requests by B
in particular,
and using SKB,
computes Zbr =
(Zr)SKB = (Zr)b
and sends it to B.
6 Downloads all
components
of Eb(m) =
(Zr · m,Zbr)
jointly from the
cloud and M ,
and decodes
m = Z
r·m
(Zbr)
1
b
using
SKB.
Limited Trust of the Manager and Data Owner
In the scheme presented, the manager retains the decryption keys of all users, as well as
the partition secret key, and is assumed to be wholly trusted by the entire user population.
This assignment of trust has utility in regenerating and redistributing a decryption key in
the case where a mobile user loses it due to a device loss or erasure, or in automatically
regenerating a key due to time expiry in compliance with an IT security policy.
However, to restrict access to data of the most sensitive nature, and mitigate the
consequences of an attack on the manager, it may be desirable for a user to generate his
or her own decryption key, instead, and not share it with the manager; fortunately, the
re-encryption task performed by the manager is not hampered as a result of this restriction.
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During the key generation phase, Alice (A) may randomly select a secret key SKA =
a ∈ Z∗q and compute a public key PKA = gSKA = ga, to be used for encryption; the
public key is uploaded to the manager; it does not necessarily require an out-of-band
transport for security. The secret decryption key SKB = b ∈ Z∗q for recipient Bob (B) is
independently generated by Bob himself, and the public key PKB = g
b is shared with the
data owner A for re-encryption purposes. Similarly to the cloud provider, at no time can
the manager decrypt any user data stored in the cloud, as it has no access to either private
key. Furthermore, Bob does not share his private key with Alice.
Later, during a re-encryption operation, the data owner exponentiates the public key
PKB with the inverse of SKA to calculate the re-encryption key RKA→B, achieving the
same result as before, where the ciphertext is transformed to a version that can be decoded
by B:
RKA→B = (PKB)
1
SKA = (gSKB)
1
SKA = g
SKB
SKA = g
b
a
The manager still computes the expensive pairing operation entailed in the re-
encryption task. In this way, highly sensitive data cannot be read by a compromised
manager, unlike in [8], where the access control server must be fully trusted. The cost is
additional key generation and distribution demands placed on the data owner.
4.4 Cloud-Based Re-Encryption
4.4.1 Introduction
A potential problem with the manager-based encryption scheme is that the manager is
allocated all re-encryption tasks, and its ability to scale may be limited. An alternative
and novel model is now presented, where the cloud provider is delegated the responsibility of
re-encryption, in order to leverage its advantages in computational capacity. The manager
still exists in this scenario, playing the role of key coordinator; however, it is no longer a
bottleneck for re-encryption operations in the system. All data re-encryption operations
are handled by the cloud provider, which is highly scalable.
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4.4.2 System Operation
Key Generation and Encryption
Refer to Figure 4.2. As before, in the setup phase, the manager M generates version 0 of a
public and private key pair, PKP0 and SKP0 for the data partition P , in a similar manner
to what was described in Section 4.3; it then distributes a copy of PKP0 to all current
authorized users in the user group UP , including A and B. Alternatively, PKP0 may be
stored in the public key directory accessible to all users. The secret partition key is never
shared with the cloud provider. M directly distributes SKP0 to all of its current users who
are entrusted with the safekeeping of it.
Once again, user A, or Alice, wishes to store encrypted data in the cloud. A encrypts a
message m with PKP0 . A then uploads the ciphertext Ep0(m), and any optional associated
policy settings, to the cloud provider:
Ep0(m) = (Z
r ·m, gp0r)
The data is stored in P , in encrypted form.
Decryption
User B, or Bob, is another user in the same group as A, and requests the data Ep0(m)
that A has uploaded to partition P . Since B has a copy of the secret partition key SKP0 ,
he can decrypt the data:
m =
Zr ·m
(Zp0r)
1
p0
Both A and B receive SKP0 during the set-up phase from the cloud provider. A may
also provide it directly to B in peer-to-peer fashion, over a secured Bluetooth channel, for
instance; a local link such as this would not incur the same high transmission cost as a 3G
or 4G wireless channel. All users in UP may retrieve the message uploaded by A to the
cloud, by directly obtaining Ep0(m) from the cloud provider, and using the same shared
decryption key SKP0 . Thus, in this model, second-level encryption is demonstrated [8]; as
applied here, the ciphertext published by the cloud may be decrypted by a recipient who
holds the original secret partition key; additionally, a re-encryption round on the ciphertext
is possible by the provider acting as a delegate, which will transform it into a first-level
ciphertext so that it may be decrypted only by the holder of a newer partition key.
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Manager M
User 
A
User 
B
User 
C... ...
Data partition 1
Controller
Cloud
cP0
cP1
cP1
Key hash 
directory
h1,h2
h1 h2
PKP0
User group UP
SKP0
SKP1
SKP1
cP0
cP1
cP2
h1SKP0→ SKP1 → SKP2
h2
SKP0
, SKP1
, SKP2
SKp1
PKP1
PKP2
Key generation:
Figure 4.2: A model of key management using cloud-based re-encryption.
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Re-Encryption
If a new user Charlie, or C, joins the group and the manager authorizes him, then the
present partition key PKP0 is invalidated; it becomes obsolete, and a new version of the
key must be generated. M first authorizes C, approving membership. The manager then
creates a new random salt, with value h1, and adds it to the key SKP0 ; it then hashes the
result through a secure hash such as SHA-2, to generate the new (version 1) key SKP1 . In
general:
SKPv = pv = f(SKPv−1 , hv)
for version v = 1, . . . , n, random hv ∈ Z and secure hash function f . The public key PKPv
is then derived from the secret key SKPv , as before: PKPv = g
pv .
The hash value used to generate the new key is then shared with all current authorized
users in the group. The entire hash chain H = {hx|x ∈ N, x ≤ y}, where y is the current
version number corresponding to the most recently created key, can be stored in the cloud
and shared with authorized users in UP ; the random hash input values themselves are
insufficient for the cloud provider to determine the key. The newly joined user C will be
unable to decrypt the message already stored by A; it was encrypted with an older key,
with a value less than y.
The accessibility of the ciphertext by C may be dependent on the default policy, or an
optional custom policy originally attached to the data by A. By default, it may require
that the data Ep0(m) presently stored in the cloud partition be re-encrypted with the new
partition key. If the policy rule requires permission from A to accomplish this, then C
will be unable to decode the data until it is given. The re-encryption need not necessarily
occur at the time of C’s admission into the group; it may be triggered at the time of his
data access attempt. It may also be requested by the manager or any other authorized
user at any time, i.e. when that data is next accessed. If the data is re-encrypted by the
cloud provider using h1 to form ciphertext Ep1(m), then it can be decoded by C using the
new key SKP1 , where y = 1.
To re-encrypt the message, the cloud provider requires knowledge of the re-encryption
key that is based on the latest version of the private partition key; this re-encryption key is
generated and provided by the manager as soon as the key is updated. The re-encryption
key RKP0→P1 is a transformation from SKP0 to SKP1 :
SKP1 = p1 = f(SKP0 , h1) = f(p0, h1)
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RKP0→P1 = g
SKP1
SKP0 = g
p1
p0
During re-encryption, ciphertext Ep0(m) is transformed into Ep1(m):
From Ep0(m) = (Z
r ·m, gp0r),
Compute: e(gp0r, RKP0→P1) = e(g
p0r, g
p1
p0 ) = Zp1r
Publish: Ep1(m) = (Z
r ·m,Zp1r)
C can now proceed to download and decrypt the message:
m =
Zr ·m
(Zp1r)
1
p1
The cloud provider stores a history of the key versions, including the version number
of each key, the public partition key itself, the corresponding re-encryption key required
to re-encrypt the original uploaded ciphertext to the corresponding new version, and the
hash value used to create the re-encryption key, as illustrated in the following versioning
array: 
0 PKP0 − −
1 PKP1 RKP0→P1 = g
p1
p0 h1
2 PKP2 RKP0→P2 = g
p2
p0 h2
...
...
...
...
y PKPy RKP0→Py = g
py
p0 hy

Note once again that the cloud provider can never decrypt and view the original contents
of the message, as the original key SKP0 in the chain is unknown. Each new re-encryption
corresponds to a new and higher version number. Each new key is traceable to a version
number, so that any user may determine whether the key required to decrypt the ciphertext
is in his or her possession. If not, when the client requests the ciphertext from the cloud
provider, he or she can request that it be re-encrypted to the same version of the key that
is actually in the user’s possession, if the ciphertext is encoded with an earlier version and
backward secrecy is not enforced. On the other hand, if the ciphertext version is more
recent, then the user can re-assemble the correct private key using the hash value chain
history H that can be downloaded at any time from the cloud; the user must then perform
only a single decryption; multiple decryptions are not required.
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At the latest, the stored data needs to be re-encrypted when access to it is attempted;
the effect of this is that re-encryption will only occur on the most frequently-accessed data.
Whenever a fetch request for cloud data is made, the cloud provider first checks whether
the message version matches the version of its most recent key in possession, and performs
re-encryption if it does not.
If C leaves the group, then the manager will increment the key version, re-generate
the partition key, and inform the server that re-encryption is required. C will not be
issued any further key updates; he will no longer be authorized to access the key hashes
stored within the key hash directory on the cloud, or request them from the manager. To
guarantee that the cloud cannot collude with C and reveal the hash history even when C
fails authentication, the hash history may either be published by the manager only, or the
manager may periodically reset the hash history and designate a new starting key version 0
while still allowing the history to reside in the cloud.
Data Flow
To summarize, the flow of ciphertext in the system between two users is as follows, with
the manager no longer playing the role of an intermediary in the communication:
A Ep(m)−−−−→ P Ep(m)−−−−→ B
The cryptographic operations described in this section are summarized in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: A summary of operations in cloud-based re-
encryption.
Step Alice (A) Cloud (P ) Manager (M) Bob (B) Charlie (C)
1 Obtains
PKP0 = g
p0
from the cloud
provider, picks
random r,
encrypts m
as Ep0(m) =
(Zr · m, gp0r),
and sends it to
the cloud.
2 Stores Ep0(m)
and its associ-
ated version 0.
3 Downloads
Ep0(m).
Receives
SKP0 = p0
from M
and uses it
to decode
m = Z
r·m
(Zp0r)
1
p0
.
4 Authorizes
new member
C. Computes
RKP0→P1 =
g
p1
p0 and sends
it to P . Sends
SKP1 =
f(p0, h1) = p1
to C.
Receives SKP1
from M .
68
CHAPTER 4. RE-ENCRYPTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
Table 4.4: (continued)
Step Alice (A) Cloud (P ) Manager (M) Bob (B) Charlie (C)
5 Re-encrypts
Ep0(m) as
Ep1(m) =
(Zr · m,Zp1r)
using
RKP0→P1 ,
and updates
version to 1.
6 Downloads
Ep1(m)
and decodes
m = Z
r·m
(Zp1r)
1
p1
using SKP1 .
4.4.3 Discussion
The cloud-based re-encryption model off-loads the processor-intensive task of re-encryption
to the cloud provider. It is consistent with the underlying assumption behind a cloud
computing system: that it can scale to a much greater degree than its client can in terms
of computational ability. Crucially, unlike in the scheme described in the previous section,
the manager is not involved in each data fetch operation; it is only occasionally involved
in creating new keys when new users join. Another advantage is that the re-encryption
task may be executed only when necessary; it is only required at most once for each data
record whenever group membership changes. The re-encryption tasks may be batched and
executed during off-peak hours, or may be done only when a new fetch of the record is
made, at the latest. This model permits more direct access to the cloud while allowing all
security requirements to continue to be satisfied. Any authorized user can write and read
encrypted data directly to and from the cloud without involvement of the manager or any
other proxy, resulting in fast access on a regular basis. Data confidentiality is preserved in
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this model even when changes to group membership occur. Since a new user is only given
the latest iteration of a key and cannot decrypt messages encrypted earlier with older keys,
backward secrecy is preserved (however, if this security feature is deemed unimportant, then
re-encryption is not necessary in the case where user membership increases). The reciprocal
is that a user that leaves the group is no longer issued key updates. Since re-encryption
occurs prior to a new data fetch request, the user is no longer able to decrypt data; forward
secrecy is preserved. User memberships tend to increase in practice, however.
The use of hashes as public key material makes it unnecessary to distribute a new
version of the partition key to all users when it becomes re-generated by the manager. The
history of re-encryption keys can be stored with the encrypted data and made available to
all users by the cloud provider; it can be downloaded along with the ciphertext. An existing
user will be able to generate the partition key by knowing the hash value history; the cost
of re-distribution of keys on every change in membership is avoided. Storage requirements
for each user are modest; it is unnecessary to store the original key and the entire history
of hash values. On a key re-generation, each user can use his or her hash values to arrive
at the latest key, and discard all of its history. Thus, only one secret key must be locally
stored for each partition that the user interacts with.
Note that the original re-encryption protocol based on BBS [18] allowed the same
encrypted content to be re-encrypted multiple times by the cloud provider; the cost of this
in the proposed protocol is that it would allow transitivity of delegations. For example, it
would allow the cloud provider to derive its own re-encryption key RK ′Px→Px+2 based on
public key PKx to PKx+2 as follows:
RK ′PKx→PKx+2 = RK
′
PKx→PKx+1 ×RK ′PKx+1→PKx+2 =
px+2
px
This flexibility would allow the cloud provider to retain only the most recent re-encryption
from the newest available key, and to keep re-encrypting it multiple times as the key evolved
through a process of delegation. In this case, Epx+1(m) would be re-encrypted directly to
Epx+2(m), rather than from the original Epx(m). The cost is that it would allow a newly
joined user to collude with the holder of SKx+1 and the provider by sharing its private key
SKx+2; the cloud provider could deduce RK
′
PKx+1→PKx+2 , as shown, and re-encrypt data
for the new user that was not actually intended to be accessed by him. In contrast, the
re-encryption protocol based on bilinear maps, as described here, is not transitive, and thus
such delegation to new users is not allowed without arbitration from the manager. The
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protocol is collusion-safe, as discussed in [8]; a user that knows SKp1 = p1 cannot collude
with the cloud provider, which knows RKPKp0→PKp1 = g
p1
p0 , and recover SKp0 = p0. This
protection is at the expense of having to retain the original ciphertext Ep0(m) in the cloud
for use in all future re-encryptions, and to incur a storage cost. The provider may still
cache the ciphertext resulting from the most recent re-encryption for immediate access.
The main drawback with this approach is the re-encryption task required whenever
group membership changes, which is a relatively expensive operation. Unlike the previous
model, it is performed within the cloud, however, which has the ability to instantly scale to
meet the processing demand. Also, there still exists the risk of the key being illegitimately
shared by a misbehaving (yet authorized) user with that of an unauthorized one. All users
are inherently entrusted with the secret partition key, unlike in the previous manager-based
re-encryption scheme. The cloud provider can perform user authentication against its ACL
as a fallback mechanism, however.
4.4.4 Variant
User-Generated Keys
It is possible to restrict the scope of trust of the manager for highly-sensitive user data.
In a variant of this model, as opposed to employing a manager-generated initial partition
key P0, A herself may generate the key pair PKP0 and SKP0 . These keys may then be used
for the first encryption of a data record that is uploaded to the cloud. The advantage of this
approach is that A can then completely control access to that data record by creating new
re-encryption keys based on the manager-created hashes. The manager will never be able
to read the data, and thus does not have to be trusted to the same degree as in the standard
case described above. The manager will only generate and issue new re-encryption keys to
all authorized users for subsequent versions; the manager will never obtain a copy of the
first-version key so that it can reconstruct the key history and be in a position to decrypt
all data in the partition uploaded by A. For instance, A can simply share the component
g
1
P0 with M , and M will then exponentiate it with P1, which it generated, to obtain the
re-encryption key RKP0→P1 = g
P1
P0 .
The granularity of access control may be controlled by the user; A may generate a
secret key pair for each new data record created, or the same key pair for all records. The
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cost of this approach is that A must share her keys with all users who require read access
to the data. In a mobile scenario, this may be accomplished by A pairing with another
user via Bluetooth in peer-to-peer fashion to avoid the cost of wireless 3G or 4G transfer,
as only a small one-time transfer of key material is needed.
4.5 Evaluation and Implementation of Models
4.5.1 Qualitative Cost Comparison
The processing, storage, and communication costs of the transactions in the two proposed
re-encryption models are shown in Table 4.5. The main advantage of these models is that
constant key re-generation need not occur between the cloud (or a proxy) and the user set.
Considering that the user base will largely comprise mobile device users, the conservation
of wireless communication exchanges is significant and valuable. The trade-off is in the
automatic and continuous re-encryption necessary as user memberships naturally evolve.
In the cloud-based re-encryption model, the partition key is generated by the manager, but
the re-encryption itself is carried out by the cloud provider; importantly, fetching data from
the cloud does not involve the manager as an intermediary in each data fetch session. The
proxy re-encryption model requires the manager to perform re-encryption on each client
request, however, and so it is not as scalable in a cloud context; it still has reasonable
potential if the manager is situated inside of a private cloud.
4.5.2 Performance Measurement
In order to understand the execution cost of the protocol on real hardware, the cloud-
based re-encryption algorithm described in the previous section was implemented in Java
using jPBC (Java Pairing-Based Cryptography Library) version 1.2.1 [33], a porting of
the PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography Library) in C [76]. The encryption, re-encryption,
and decryption tasks, as described earlier, were timed on different platforms; portability
was provided by Java 6 Standard Edition. The desktop platform consisted of an Apple
iMac with a quad-core 64-bit 3.4 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM, running
Mac OS X 10.8.2 (Mountain Lion). The smartphone platform consisted of a Google Nexus
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Computational complexity
Description Proxy-based re-encryption Cloud-based re-encryption
Key generation (manager) BP + E BP + E
Key generation (user) - -
Encryption (user) 2 · E +M 2 · E +M
Decryption (user) E +M E +M
Key re-generation (manager) - H + E
Key re-generation (user) - -
Re-encryption (server) - BP
Re-encryption (manager) BP + E E
Computational costs
Description Proxy-based re-encryption Cloud-based re-encryption
Key generation (none) (none)
Re-encryption 1 per join/leave 1 per join/leave
(operation done by proxy) (operation done by cloud)
Access model
Description Proxy-based re-encryption Cloud-based re-encryption
Data fetch Via proxy Direct-from-cloud
Storage costs
Description Proxy-based re-encryption Cloud-based re-encryption
Key storage All stored in manager All stored in manager
Table 4.5: The processing, storage, and communication costs of the re-encryption mod-
els. The cryptographic operations include: Hashing (H), Exponentiation (E), Bilinear
pairing (BP ), and Multiplication (M).
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One phone with a single-core 1 GHz Qualcomm QSD 8250 Snapdragon ARM processor
and 512 MB of memory, running Android OS 2.3.6 Gingerbread.
The cloud platform consisted of a single Google App Engine (GAE) web application
instance. The reference for billing is a front-end instance comprising a 1.2 GHz Intel x86
processor with 128 MB RAM, billed at 10¢ per hour; the actual number of CPU cycles
used is internal to the App Engine and not exposed. The cloud servlet application posted
responses to HTTP requests.
For the purpose of experimentation, Google allows a free test account for use with up
to 500 MB of storage and up to 5 million page views per month. The Google App Engine
SDK supports the URL Fetch service only; it does not support sockets for communication,
for security reasons. It also constrains some aspects of OS functionality by disallowing
processes, threads, dynamic library loading, and writing to the data store. Nevertheless,
it is a highly popular cloud development platform.
A Type A pairing was utilized in the algorithm, which is the default curve in the PBC
library’s included test code; the group order was 160 bits long, and the base field order
was 512 bits long, which is suitable for cryptographic use. The aggregate timing results
obtained from experiments on each of the three platforms are shown in Table 4.6.
Overall, the re-encryption task was found to be much more feasible on a cloud instance
or a fast desktop computer; in the latter case, it was over 50 times faster than on the
smartphone. Although the re-encryption task may be performed on a scalable server, the
advantage of off-loading it to the cloud is that it can scale almost without bound. Addition-
ally, GAE provides faster back-end instances with up to a 4.8 GHz CPU and 1 GB memory.
The performance attained on the smartphone was reasonable; the encryption task by the
data owner was accomplished in approximately 1.5 seconds, which is a one-time cost, and
the decryption task by the recipient in only approximately 0.1 seconds. The presented
benchmark results were achieved using libraries that are not yet highly mature and opti-
mized for a mobile platform. However, they serve to validate the comparative strengths of
mobile devices and clouds, as described, which the re-encryption model leverages.
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Platform Task Timings (in ms)
µ σ s LB UB
Smartphone (Nexus One)
Encryption by A 1,505.2 40.5 1,636.9 1,425.9 1584.5
Re-encryption 979.8 37.3 1,393.2 906.6 1,052.9
Decryption by B 107.4 28.1 790.1 52.3 162.5
Desktop (iMac)
Encryption by A 32.9 2.1 4.3 28.9 37.0
Re-encryption 19.1 1.1 1.1 17.1 21.2
Decryption by B 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.7 1.5
Cloud (Google App Engine)
Encryption by A 426.6 49.1 2414.6 330.3 522.9
Re-encryption 260.8 42.8 1828.8 177.0 344.6
Decryption by B 13.7 23.9 570.3 0 60.5
Table 4.6: The performance results obtained from the re-encryption implementation. The
following symbols are used: µ is the sample mean, σ is the sample standard deviation, s
is the sample variance, and LB and UB are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of
the 95% confidence interval, for each set of runs on each platform. 100 runs were executed
on each of the smartphone and desktop platforms, and 50 runs were executed on the cloud
platform (so as not to trigger a request timeout). The three consecutive operations shown
for each platform are: encryption time by A using the P0 key, re-encryption time from
P0 to P1 keys with pairing, and decryption by B using the P1 key. All operations were
performed on a 48-bit data block.
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4.6 Summary
Cryptographic protocols based on data re-encryption have been adapted to a cloud comput-
ing system model in order to gauge their viability in improving communication security and
supporting highly scaleable and secure cloud computing applications serving an extremely
large mobile device user population. Appropriate modifications have been proposed to
support both public and private clouds, and standard 3G or 4G wireless as well as peer-to-
peer links, in order to reduce the cost of communication for mobile users securely accessing
and storing data in a cloud for dissemination purposes to a large reader population.
The manager-based re-encryption scheme addresses the cost of re-keying operations in
a cloud-based key management protocol by having a trusted authority, independent of the
cloud provider, perform re-encryption before delivering a request to the client. The author-
ity becomes the gateway for data access to the cloud; in doing so, it does not necessitate
any key updates over time. It is particularly suitable for a private cloud environment, but
entails a considerable computational load. A novel protocol based on data re-encryption
has been proposed to offer higher scalability and to support an extremely large mobile
device user population. This is achieved by leveraging the cloud provider’s scalability to
perform the required re-encryption tasks inside the cloud itself, rather than inside the man-
ager; at the same time, this occurs without granting the cloud provider access to sufficient
key material to decode the user data. The manager, as a trusted authority is only respon-
sible for key re-generation; the evolving key material to construct iterations of secret keys
can be securely shared through the cloud provider itself, resulting in a more efficient and
scalable security protocol. The scheme ensures that the cloud provider can never read user
data, but can nevertheless transform it through re-encryption to efficiently manage access
for users that continuously join and leave the system.
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Chapter 5
Hybrid Attribute- and
Re-Encryption-Based
Key Management
5.1 Introduction
A hybrid scheme entailing attribute-based encryption and optional group keying tech-niques is proposed in this chapter, such that computationally-intensive work is per-
formed by the cloud provider or a trusted manager rather than the mobile data owner.
The re-encryption system model described in Section 3.1.5 on page 37 and the adversary
and threat model described in Section 2.4.1 on page 19 are assumed.
Related work on attribute-based encryption is described in Section 5.2, beyond what is
presented in Chapter 3 on page 30. In Section 5.3, the proposed algorithm for attribute-
based encryption and re-encryption suitable for mobile users of the cloud is given. In
Section 5.4, optional features of the algorithm such as delegation are presented, for com-
pleteness. In Section 5.5, the algorithm is assessed for its usefulness in a mobile cloud com-
puting system. In Section 5.6, the results of an implementation of the proposed scheme on
actual mobile devices and an operational cloud system are presented and discussed; a sim-
ulation is then used to demonstrate its scalability potential. Finally, Section 5.7 provides
concluding remarks.
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The content of this chapter is based on work that has been published [111].
5.2 Related Work on Attribute-Based Encryption
The technique of Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [17] offers nu-
merous advantages in the envisioned target environment. It allows a user to obtain access
to encrypted data in the cloud based on the possession of certain attributes that satisfy an
access structure defined in the cloud, rather than the possession of a particular individual
or group key that must be disseminated to all interested parties in advance. The requisite
attributes may be determined by a data owner in advance; this owner is responsible for
generating the user data to be shared, encrypting it, and uploading it to the cloud. Unau-
thorized access to stored data is not in itself an issue due to the protection afforded by
CP-ABE. Furthermore, the data owner is not required in every data transaction involving
other users, which is advantageous in the case where always-on connectivity cannot be
guaranteed. It is impossible for any two users to collude by combining their individual at-
tributes to gain access that would otherwise not have been individually granted. Normally,
a scheme based on CP-ABE relies upon the data owner granting access permission through
an access tree, which requires his or her constant availability. Some works have modified
CP-ABE so that key material is distributed among multiple parties; for instance, a data
owner and a trusted authorizer may function in concert to grant access permission to other
users, building on the OAuth standard [106]; the solution, however, is not tailored for a
mobile environment due to its computational demands, the required constant availability
of the data owner, and time-based expiration of access leading to frequent key retrieval.
Revocation of an authorized user is particularly difficult to accomplish efficiently in
CP-ABE and is usually addressed by extending attributes with expiration dates or by an
authority distributing keys with expiration dates [17]. In some cases, a tree of revocable
attributes may need to be maintained and a trusted party assigned to validate the revo-
cation statuses of users; the access control may be system-wide or more fine-grained. A
revocation mechanism using linear secret sharing and binary tree techniques, where each
user is associated with an identifier on a revocation tree, is one example [73]. The difficulty
with this general approach in a mobile context is that it results in mobile users having to
incur the communication cost of continually requesting new keys, while wireless communi-
cation always remains expensive. Also, the data owner is typically a mobile user as well,
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and thus the owner cannot effectively manage access control on demand for other users
due to its transient connectivity. Revocation for data outsourcing purposes has been pro-
posed that relies on stateless key distribution and access control on the attribute level, but
requires a trusted authority and encumbers the data owner with a pairing operation [54],
a cryptographic function that is very computationally expensive.
As a next step in the evolution of such techniques, proxy re-encryption has been com-
bined with CP-ABE [74] such that re-encryption keys are computed by the cloud provider
based on a secret that is pre-shared between the data owner and the provider, as well as
the provider’s internal clock. The re-encryption keys must be computed for all attributes
in the access structure, which could be very numerous. Another idea is to securely embed
the data key within the header of the record stored in the cloud [37]; a privileged man-
ager group is responsible for generation of re-encryption keys, but it must also distribute
the secret header key to the recipient to complete the process. A different approach has
been suggested where attribute revocation events occur, and in response, an authority re-
defines master key components for the attributes, user secret keys are updated to a new
version, and data is re-encrypted by the proxy server [120]; the difficulty is that revo-
cation is dependent upon modifications to attributes, resulting in costly key updates on
each revocation, and the proxy server must be given access to user attribute information.
Finally, a technique that combines CP-ABE with proxy re-encryption [82] does not appear
highly efficient for mobile users: the decryption process requires processing two subtrees
instead of one, user revocation causes all user secret keys to be re-generated, and attribute
revocation results in private key regeneration, too.
5.3 Proposed Algorithm
The proposed algorithm for key generation, distribution, and usage is now described. It
consists of key management techniques that ensure highly secure data outsourcing to the
cloud in a highly scalable manner for mobile cloud computing applications. Table 5.1
summarizes the symbolic notation used throughout the description. In the discussion
that follows, improvements are proposed to the basic functions of the original CP-ABE
scheme [17]; the security proof for the underlying cryptography appears in this related
work and is relied upon here.
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Symbol Description
CSP Cloud service provider.
M Trusted manager.
T Access tree structure.
R Root node of T .
A Set of attributes that must be satisfied against T .
Uo Data owner.
Ur Restricted user group.
m Plaintext of user data.
CT Ciphertext of user data.
v Version of ciphertext.
PPK Public partition key.
PSK Secret partition key.
OPK Owner public key.
OSK Owner secret key.
DSK Data secret key.
GPK Public group key of Ur.
GSK Private group key of Ur.
DDSK Delegated data secret key.
RK0→x Re-encryption key from version 0 to x.
Table 5.1: A legend for the symbolic notation used in the attribute-based model.
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• A single authority does not generate all key material; the mobile data owner and
cloud entity co-operate to jointly compute keys. The cloud provider has insufficient
information to decode the user data that it permanently stores; yet, it assists in the
distribution of a portion of the whole key material to all authorized users to minimize
the communication cost for the data owner.
• The cloud has highly scalable computational ability, unlike a resource-constrained
mobile user; a trusted manager also has greater computational resources than does a
user. Pairing operations, which are the most expensive cryptographic operations that
are involved in the proposed protocol, are thus performed by the cloud or manager
to the maximum possible extent, relieving the burden on the mobile data owner.
• Proxy-based re-encryption has been integrated with CP-ABE so that the cloud
provider may perform automatic data re-encryption; this is an optional feature that
allows further control over revocation than is afforded by an attribute-based scheme
alone, and it also takes advantage of the cloud provider’s computational scalability.
This dual-encryption scheme is a hybrid approach that offers greater flexibility in
access control.
The proposed technique is now described as follows:
Preliminary:
Let G0 and G1 be cyclic bilinear groups of prime order p with generator g. Also defined
are random exponents α, β ∈ Z∗p. The bilinear map e is a map such that: e : G0×G0 → G1
with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀g0, g1 ∈ G0 : e(gα0 , gβ1 ) = e(g0, g1)αβ.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g0, g1) 6= 1.
• Computability: ∀g0, g1 ∈ G0, there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g0, g1).
A secure one-way hash function H : 0, 1∗ → G0 is used as a random oracle and maps
an attribute described as a binary string to a random group element.
Setup() → PPK,PSK,OSK:
Suppose that Alice is a mobile user that acts as the self-elected data owner Uo of
plaintext message m, which is user data that is desired to be encrypted and shared in
81
CHAPTER 5. HYBRID ATTRIBUTE- AND RE-ENCRYPTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
the cloud with other authorized users. If m exceeds the maximum allowed block length,
then two solutions are possible: segmentation of the message may be performed, and the
encryption applied to each individual segment; or, it is possible to first apply a symmetric
cipher such as 256-bit AES to the entire message, then to encrypt the AES key itself using
the proposed scheme, with the steps being reversed on decryption. Regardless, the length
of the message does not impact the size or number of encryption keys required. In the case
of message segmentation, the same pre-computed keys may be applied to all segments.
A manager M , acting as a trusted entity, chooses a random value α and computes gα
to form a private partition key PSK. It then performs a pairing operation to compute
component e(g, g)α, which becomes one of the components forming the public partition
key PPK. The public parameters G0 and g are also included in PPK. In the meantime,
Uo chooses a secret data owner key OSK equal to β. It then computes the components
gβ and g
1
β , the latter by first taking the inverse of OSK (i.e. 1
β
) in its possession; these
components are added to the public key PPK, which is then uploaded and published in
the public directory of the cloud. Uo does not divulge its secret OSK to any other party,
including M . The elements of PPK, PSK, and OSK are as follows:
PPK =
{
G0, g, gβ, g
1
β , e(g, g)α
}
PSK = {α, gα}, OSK = {β}
To provide an additional layer of security, the manager may create a shared secret group
key GSK for an individual user or a restricted subset of users Ur, equal to a random value
u0 ∈ Z∗p, and a public key GPK as follows:
GPK = {gu0} , GSK = {u0}
This group key is uploaded to the public directory as well. The secret key is not shared
with the cloud; it may, however, be shared with the manager for the purpose of distribution
to all authorized users. The initial version number of the secret key is initially referred to
as 0, and will increase monotonically.
Encrypt(PPK,GPK,m, T ) → CT :
Any user may access the public partition key PPK, by downloading it from the public
directory in the cloud, to perform an encryption; it need not necessarily be the data owner.
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The encryption algorithm takes as input the key PPK and encrypts a message m under
the tree access structure T with root R as described in [17]. It chooses a polynomial qx
for each node x in T , and a random value s ∈ Z∗p that is applied to the PPK parameters.
It sets qR(0) = s for the root node R, while Y denotes the set of leaf nodes in T . The
function γ(y) extracts the binary attribute string from a leaf node y in Y .
In order to protect highly sensitive data, the encryptor may wish to restrict user mem-
bership requirements beyond possession of the required attributes A. To do so, an ad-
ditional key component may be incorporated consisting of e(g, g)u0s, computed from gu0 ,
which is the public key GPK of a restricted user group Ur belonging to the entire popula-
tion of users. The group consists of one or more members, and the GPK is available from
the public directory in the cloud. The absence of this component, where u0 is presumed
to be nil, will allow decryption based on satisfaction of the access tree only. The pairing
operation e(g, g)u0 may be performed by the cloud or manager to assist the data owner.
The intermediate ciphertext CTown is constructed as follows by the data owner Uo and
uploaded to the cloud:
CTown =
{
v = 0, T, C0msg = m · e(g, g)αs, C0grp = gu0s, C ′ = gβs,
∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0), C ′y = H(γ(y))qy(0)
} (5.1)
Next, the CSP performs a pairing operation on the C0grp component in CTown to obtain
the result Cˆ0grp = e(g, g)
u0s. The final ciphertext CT0, denoting the initial version v of 0,
is constructed as follows and published in the permanent data store of the cloud:
C˜0 = C0msg · Cˆ0grp = m · e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)u0s = m · e(g, g)αs+u0s
CT0 =
{
v = 0, T, C˜0, C0msg , C
′ = gβs,∀y ∈ Y : Cy, C ′y
} (5.2)
Re-Encrypt(CT0, RK0→x) → CTx:
Whenever a user leaves the authorized membership of Ur, the user’s access rights to
the ciphertext must be revoked. When this occurs, a new version of the secret group
key GSK is normally distributed by the manager to the remaining authorized users in
Ur immediately, or distributed to each user on-demand through a secure off-line channel
whenever data access is required. The CSP is then requested to perform a re-encryption
operation on-demand so that its stored ciphertext can no longer be decoded using the prior
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version of the key. The ciphertext is re-encrypted from version 0 to version x, given a re-
encryption key RK0→x from a user holding secret group key GSKx assigned to version x;
or, RK0→x may be transmitted by the manager which is entrusted with the safekeeping
of the key GSKx. The re-encryption key is computed from the secret group key values u0
and ux corresponding to versions 0 and x of the ciphertext:
RK0→x =
{
g
ux
u0
}
The cloud provider computes the new ciphertext CTx corresponding to version x (that
is newer than the original version 0 uploaded by the encryptor), as follows, utilizing the
component C0msg found in CT0 in Equation 5.2:
C˜x = C0msg · e(C0grp , RK0→x) = m · e(g, g)αs · e(gu0s, g
ux
u0 ) = m · e(g, g)αs+uxs
CTx =
{
v = x, T, C˜x, C0msg , Cxbase = g
uxs, C ′,∀y ∈ Y : Cy, C ′y
}
The CSP is unable to decode the ciphertext during the re-encryption process as it has no
knowledge of the old key u0 and the new key ux. The cloud provider retains the components
C0msg and Cxbase in the ciphertext CTx so that it may perform a future re-encryption from
version x to y, where y > x.
KeyGen(PPK,PSK,A) → DSK:
Irrespective of which party performed the encryption, the manager executes a data
secret key generation algorithm which takes as input the private key PSK and a set of
attributes A that are deemed sufficient to decrypt the ciphertext. Specifically, the manager
chooses a random r ∈ Z∗p and computes (α + r); it then exponentiates the component g
1
β
in the PPK by this sum to obtain the result g
(α+r)
β = (g
1
β )α+r. In this way, during the
collaboration, the manager and data owner do not need to reveal their private keys PSK
and OSK to one another. The data owner is not involved in the key generation and need
not remain available.
To generate the additional required sub-parts of the data key, the manager chooses
random rj ∈ Zp for each attribute in A. It computes the data secret key DSK that
identifies with the attributes A as follows:
DSK =
(
D = g
(α+r)
β ,∀j ∈ A : Dj = gr ·H(j)rj , D′j = grj
)
(5.3)
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The manager distributes a DSK based on a unique r value to each authorized user holding
the required attributes A, without requiring the participation of the data owner. The
manager may also provide the DSK to the data owner for peer-to-peer distribution at its
discretion to the intended recipients of the encrypted message.
Decrypt(CT,DSK,PPK,GSK) → m:
Any user that is authorized, by virtue of holding the required attributes A, may down-
load the ciphertext CT from the cloud and decrypt it, as the recipient. The decryption rou-
tine takes as input the ciphertext CT and data secret key DSK obtained earlier either from
the manager M or data owner Uo. The recursive decryption algorithm DecryptNode
is applied to the root node R of the tree T that is publicly available on the cloud for
download. If the node x is a leaf node, then let i = γ(x), where the function γ denotes
the attribute associated with the node x in T . If i ∈ A, then the DecryptNode function
is defined as follows, using components Di and D
′
i derived from the DSK, as found in
Equation 5.3, and Cx and C
′
x derived from CTown, as found in Equation 5.1:
DecryptNode(CTown, DSK, x) =
e(Di, Cx)
e(D′i, C ′x)
=
e(gr ·H(i)ri , gqx(0))
e(gri , H(i)qx(0))
=
e(gr · gδri , gqx(0))
e(gri , gδqx(0))
= e(g, g)rqx(0)
The recursive case, when x is a non-leaf node, is described in detail in [17]. If the access
tree is satisfied by attributes A (that determined the data secret key DSK), observe that
the DecryptNode function gives the following result:
DecryptNode(CTown, DSK,R) = e(g, g)
rqR(0) = e(g, g)rs
If the ciphertext is optionally encoded with the public key of the restricted user group Ur,
then the recipient may utilize the secret key GSK = ux in conjunction with the g
1
β com-
ponent in the PPK to compute the required decryption component g
ux
β .
The message m can then be decrypted as follows, assuming one round of re-encryption:
m =
C˜x · e(g, g)rs
e(gβs, D) · e(gβs, g uxβ ) =
m · e(g, g)αs+uxs · e(g, g)rs
e(gβs, g
(α+r)
β ) · e(gβs, g uxβ )
=
m ·(((((((
(
e(g, g)(α+r+ux)s
((((
((((e(g, g)(α+r+ux)s
Note that the component e(gβs, g
(α+r)
β ) in the above equation is pre-computed by the
manager, so that the user must perform only one pairing operation on decryption.
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A summary of the key material in possession within the system is given in Table 5.2.
The cryptographic operations described in this section, applied to a typical encryption and
decryption transaction, are summarized in Table 5.3.
Entity Key material
Data owner (Uo) Chooses random β. Computes: OSK = {β}, OPK = {gβ, g
1
β }
Chooses random uo. Computes: GSK = {u0}, GPK = {gu0}
Shares GSK with user B.
Chooses random s. Computes CTown based on the PPK and GPK, and
uploads it to CSP .
Manager (M) Chooses random α. Computes: PSK = {α, gα},
PPK =
{
G0, g, gβ, g
1
β , e(g, g)α
}
Chooses random r.
Computes: D = g
(α+r)
β , and DSK based on attributes A.
Distributes DSK to user B.
Cloud (CSP ) Publishes PPK and GPK in a public directory.
Optionally performs a pairing and computes CT0 from CTown and GPK.
Stores CT0 in the permanent data store.
Recipient (B) Downloads CT0 and decrypts it using the DSK and GSK.
Table 5.2: A summary of the key material in the attribute-based model.
5.4 Optional Features
The original CP-ABE scheme defined delegation, where following the generation of the
data secret key DSK, the manager may choose to delegate access to a user possessing
a particular subset of the required attributes. For completeness, the integration of this
optional operation with the proposed technique is shown:
Delegate(DSK,S ′) → DDSK:
The delegation algorithm first takes as input a data secret key for a set of attributes
A, and a subset A′ ⊆ A. The manager chooses a new random r′ ∈ Z∗p and computes the
result:
D′ = D · (g 1β )r′
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The manager then chooses a new random r′k for each attribute k in the subset S
′ to form
the next sub-part, and creates a new secret delegation data key DDSK for S ′:
DDSK =
(
D′ = D · (g 1β )r′ ,∀k ∈ A′ : D′k = Dk · gr
′ ·H(k)r′k , D′′k = D′k · grk
)
Since the delegation key is randomized with the value r′, it is equivalent in its level of secu-
rity to the original key DSK. Note that the data owner is not involved in this operation.
5.5 Discussion
The proposed scheme offers a dual layer of security through attribute-based encryption and
also public key encryption which may be optionally applied. If the secret group key GSK is
compromised, the data is still safeguarded; only the users that have the required attributes
will be able to decrypt it. The interception of any key components over the network,
including the re-encryption key, will not yield useful information to the attacker, as no
private keys are transmitted in the clear. Furthermore, the algorithm achieves collusion
resistance because the e(g, g)αs term of the ciphertext cannot be recovered by an attacker
even if the manager’s or a user’s private keys are compromised.
Any user may encrypt data using the public partition key PPK stored in the cloud.
However, the cloud provider is unable to decrypt any user data stored on its premises as it
cannot access the secret owner and data keys OSK and DSK. Nor is useful information
revealed to the CSP during the re-encryption process. The encryptor of a message may
restrict its eligible readership by not only selecting a required set of attributes, but also
through the optional use of a public group key which may be shared by a group or simply
possessed by a single user; the trade-off made is the required distribution of the group key
and the extra pairing operation required during the encryption phase, but it is advanta-
geously computed by the cloud provider. The manager can also assist with distribution.
Critically, the performance implications are modest for the mobile users. The data
owner must only perform exponentiation operations during its key generation phases, while
the manager performs the more expensive pairing operation during partition key generation
in the Setup algorithm. Also, with the assistance of the manager, the user performs only
a single pairing operation on decryption.
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Alice (Uo) Cloud (CSP ) Manager (M) Bob (∈ Ur)
1 Generates private
owner key OSK
and sends public
component OPK to
M to form partition
key PPK. Gen-
erates private and
public group keys
GSK and GPK to
share with trusted
users and CSP ,
respectively.
Stores partition key
PPK obtained from
M in a public direc-
tory for dissemina-
tion to all authorized
users. Also stores
the public group key
GPK that it obtains
from Alice.
Generates private
and public partition
keys PSK and
PPK, the latter
with assistance from
Alice, and uploads
PPK to CSP .
Obtains GSK from
Alice as a trusted
user.
2 Assuming that Alice
is also the encryp-
tor, encrypts mes-
sage m, with PPK
and under tree T ,
as CTown, and up-
loads it to CSP for
storage. Also gener-
ates a component for
data key DSK from
OSK.
May assist the en-
cryptor with gener-
ation of ciphertext
CTown. Computes
CTo from CTown and
GPK, and stores
it as ciphertext ver-
sion 0 in permanent
storage, for dissemi-
nation to all autho-
rized users.
Generates data
key DSK from its
private partition
key PSK based
on attributes A,
with assistance from
Alice. Distributes
the DSK to all
authorized users.
Obtains the DSK
from Alice or M .
3 Downloads CTo
from CSP and
decrypts it to yield
the plaintext m.
Table 5.3: A summary of operations in attribute-based re-encryption, with participating
user actors shown, and assuming no additional re-encryption occurs.
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5.6 Implementation
The proposed protocol was implemented and profiled to gauge its performance. It was
realized on popular existing commercial platforms, including the Google Android mobile
and the Google App Engine cloud platforms. A simulation calibrated to the performance
benchmarks was then run to examine the scalability of the proposed algorithm.
5.6.1 Performance Measurement
An existing implementation in Java [114] that relies upon the original CP-ABE scheme [17]
served as the baseline implementation. From this starting point, the implementation was
significantly rebuilt to reflect the proposed protocol described herein. The implementation
uses the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (jPBC) version 1.2.1 [33], a port of the
PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography Library) in C [76]. The use of Java 6 Standard Edition
permits the protocol to be ported to a wide range of computing environments.
The implementation was run on different computing hosts to assess their relative perfor-
mance. Refer to the implementation model in Figure 5.1. On the client end, a simulation
was run on a desktop platform consisting of an Apple iMac with a quad-core 64-bit 3.4 GHz
Intel Core i7 processor with 16 GB of RAM, running Mac OS X 10.8.2 (Mountain Lion).
Additionally, it was run on an older Google Nexus One smartphone with a 1 GHz Qual-
comm Scorpion processor with 512 MB memory running Android OS 2.3.6 (Gingerbread),
and a new Samsung Galaxy Note II smartphone with a quad-core 1.6 GHz ARM Cortex-A9
processor with 2 GB of RAM, running Android OS 4.1.1 (Jelly Bean). On the server end, a
lowest-class F1 front-end instance was run as a Java servlet application on the Google App
Engine (GAE) cloud, configured at the equivalent of a 600 MHz processor with 128 MB of
RAM. A connection was established between the desktop or mobile Android client and an
instance running on the GAE cloud via HTTP requests, using JSON for data interchange
and the Google Gson library for marshalling between Java objects (used by the Java client
and server implementations) and the JSON representation. Note that the security model of
GAE does not allow direct network connections and native code execution. Only a subset
of the Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) SDK 1.6 classes are whitelisted on Android and
GAE; fortunately, the required Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) classes are supported.
The simulation consisted of multiple iterations of encryption and decryption using the
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Android Nexus phone
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HTTP requests Java 
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Figure 5.1: A high-level model of the implementation of attribute-based re-encryption.
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proposed functions defined in Section 5.3, using a single-attribute policy to configure an
environment that ran at the fastest possible speed. A Type A pairing was utilized in the
algorithm with a group order size of 160 bits and a base field order size of 512 bits, which
is the default curve configuration in the jPBC library test code, and is suitable for crypto-
graphic use. Performance benchmark results are shown in Table 5.4, showing the average
execution times of all main cryptographic operations calculated from simulation runs on
the same iMac desktop computer platform to permit direct comparison. Simulations from
the original BSW algorithm [17] as well as the proposed algorithms are shown; in the lat-
ter case, one set of runs was made using an optional group key to additionally secure the
plaintext, with a round of re-encryption included, and one set of runs was made without
the benefit of a group key, to permit comparison.
Next, operations were repeated on the appropriate platform (desktop, mobile, or cloud)
for each operation, to ascertain realistic timings in a mobile cloud computing system. A
user interface was built for the Android app to allow execution of all algorithms locally
or on a Google App Engine instance in the cloud, as depicted in Figure 5.2. The results
are summarized in Table 5.5, with the appropriate platform chosen to represent a typical
device executing each operation in question. Note that the underlying jPBC library is not
optimized for a constrained mobile operating environment; such optimizations may often
yield very significant performance improvements in practice. For instance, careful memory
allocation and maintenance of a small footprint may reduce the expensive garbage collection
events observed in the Android device system logs during execution. The comparative
benchmarking results are shown visually in Figure 5.3, with the following observations:
• In comparison to the baseline implementation, the key setup activity in the proposed
protocol is approximately evenly split between the data owner and the manager,
which is of high benefit given that the owner is presumed to be a resource-constrained
mobile user.
• The key generation and encryption activities are approximately equal in terms of
computational requirements. The utilization of a group key only applies an approxi-
mately 30% penalty to encryption, which is borne by the CSP because it is responsible
for the pairing operation, not the data owner.
• Crucially, the data owner does not participate in the data secret key generation
activity in the proposed protocol; the manager does so instead.
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Algorithm Task Timings (in ms)
µ σ s LB UB
Baseline (BSW)
Owner setup 47.5 28.1 787.0 0 102.5
Keygen 70.0 3.7 13.6 62.8 77.2
Owner encryption 61.3 2.9 8.2 55.7 66.9
Decryption 23.9 1.5 2.3 20.9 26.8
Proposed (no group key)
Owner setup 29.8 45.3 2,053.5 0 118.6
Manager setup 19.8 2.1 4.2 15.7 23.8
Keygen 74.6 5.4 28.7 64.1 85.1
Owner encryption 65.0 4.9 24.2 55.3 74.6
Decryption 24.5 2.5 6.1 19.6 29.3
Proposed (with group key)
Owner setup 37.6 26.7 710.4 0 89.8
Manager setup 18.8 1.2 1.5 16.4 21.2
Keygen 70.0 3.6 12.7 63.0 77.0
Owner encryption 60.8 2.3 5.2 56.3 65.2
Cloud encryption 18.6 1.0 1.0 16.6 20.5
Decryption 42.8 2.1 4.6 38.6 47.0
Reencryption setup 21.6 1.0 0.9 19.7 23.5
Reencryption 7.5 0.6 0.4 6.2 8.8
Table 5.4: The performance results obtained from the attribute-based implementation
running on an iMac desktop computer. The following symbols are used: µ is the sample
mean, σ is the sample standard deviation, s is the sample variance, and LB and UB are
the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the 95% confidence interval, for each set of
runs using each of the baseline and proposed algorithms. 100 runs were executed using
each technique, and all operations were performed using a single-attribute policy. The data
owner performed a pairing operation on encryption in all cases, without assistance, which
accounts for its slower operation.
• Furthermore, the data owner is not required to perform costly pairing operations,
including in the generation of ciphertext (although it does so in the implementation).
• The optional re-encryption operation is only a fraction, approximately 40%, of the
total encryption operation in terms of the period of computation, and is also per-
formed by the CSP without burdening the data owner; also, it has the potential to
be scaled by allocating additional cloud instances as required.
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Figure 5.2: The user interface of the mobile client app in attribute-based re-encryption.
Cryptographic function Device Baseline Proposed Proposed
(BSW) (no GK) (with GK)
Setup by data owner. Note II 1157 396 586
Setup by manager. GAE n/a 278 219
KeyGen. GAE 791 749 786
Encrypt by data owner. Note II 1273 1250 1239
Encrypt by CSP. GAE n/a n/a 657
Decrypt. Note II 1364 1391 2043
Re-Encrypt setup. GAE n/a n/a 247
Re-Encrypt. GAE n/a n/a 130
Table 5.5: The performance benchmarks used for calibration of the attribute-based simu-
lation. All timings are in ms, with “Note II” denoting the Galaxy Note II mobile phone,
and “GAE” denoting an F1 instance running on a GAE cloud servlet.
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5.6.2 Simulation
A custom simulation program was developed that permits an assessment of the scalability
potential of the proposed scheme. The simulation program was executed on a desktop
computer but was calibrated with the function timing results from the benchmarks obtained
as described in the previous section; that is, the timings served as the basis for calculating
the accumulated processing workload of the various entities in the system as a result of
performing the various defined cryptographic operations in response to simulated user
actions. Various parameters may be adjusted in the simulation to highlight the differences
in the algorithms discussed, including the original CP-ABE and the proposed schemes.
An initial unauthorized user population is modelled, and in each round of the simu-
lation, users randomly join or leave a user set that is authorized to access a particular
data record. A single data owner responsible for data encryption is modelled. Each user
randomly takes an action each round, with some predefined probability; actions include
accessing the encrypted data and performing a decryption, or joining or leaving the au-
thorized user set and thus triggering appropriate key generation activities. The encrypted
data record stored in the cloud may also be replaced in a round by the data owner, once
it has outlived its usefulness, with more recent data; this initiates a new key setup phase.
In Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7, the simulation results for one typical simulation run of
each algorithm are shown, with the processing workload shown over time for each entity
(the data owner, the manager, the CSP, and the total set of users involved in accessing the
data record stored in the cloud). The workloads are directly based on the cryptographic
function profiling results found in Section 5.6.1 so that calibration was done with real-world
data obtained from the practical implementation. The simulation was run with values for
adjustable parameters as specified in Table 5.6. The irregularities found in the plots are
due to the probabilistic nature of the events executed in one sample simulation execution.
The following observations may be made with respect to the results of the illustrated
runs showing various dominant roles in the system:
1. In the original BSW algorithm [17], the dominant workload is undertaken by the
data owner, which participates in not only the encryption of the user data, but also
in the data secret key generation for each new user, as shown in Figure 5.4. The
owner must also re-generate keys for all users whenever a revocation occurs, without
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Figure 5.4: The processing workload for the data owner in the attribute-based model.
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Figure 5.5: The processing workload for the manager in the attribute-based model.
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Figure 5.6: The processing workload for the cloud provider in the attribute-based model.
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Figure 5.7: The processing workload for the user population in the attribute-based model.
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Parameter Value
Initial unauthorized user population 10,000 users
Length of each round 1 hour
Total length of all rounds simulated 1 year
Probability of a user joining the authorized set 0.5%
Probability of a user leaving the authorized set 0.5%
Probability of a user downloading the cloud data 5%
Probability of the cloud data being replaced 5%
Total joins in simulation run 397,000
Total accesses in simulation run 396,000
Total leaves in simulation run 40,000
Total data replacements in simulation run 419
Table 5.6: The parameters used for the attribute-based simulation.
assistance of any other network entity, based on the assumption that revocation is
only possible through modification of attributes for the user in question. Since the
data owner is presumed to be a mobile device in the assumed system model, the
scalability potential appears inadequate.
2. In the proposed algorithm without the use of a group key, the manager becomes
responsible for the main workload of the key re-generation activity, which entails
a pairing operation, as shown in Figure 5.5. The manager is expected to be able
to scale accordingly to meet the processing demands, but requires sufficient client
infrastructure to do so, which may be uneconomical.
3. In the proposed algorithm with the use of a group key, the manager is still responsi-
ble for most of the key re-generation activity, but revocation is now handled through
re-encryption of the group key, a task performed mainly by the cloud provider, as
shown in Figure 5.6; this results in a much lower overall workload in the system. The
additional decryption cost for the reader population is significant but acceptable, as
shown in Figure 5.7. In practice, a decryption will only occur if data has been mod-
ified and has to be fetched from the cloud again. Hence, this algorithm is considered
the best candidate for a highly scalable mobile cloud computing application within
the system model described.
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5.7 Summary
A key management system has been proposed for secure data outsourcing applications,
whereby attribute-based encryption effectively permits authorized users to access secure
content in the cloud based on the satisfaction of an attribute-based policy. The scheme has
been modified so that a data owner and a trusted authority co-operate in the key generation
and encryption processes such that computationally-intensive cryptographic operations and
requests are minimized for the data owner; this is of importance to a population of mobile
users that must conserve their consumption of battery and usage of wireless communication.
In particular, the user is not required to perform costly pairing operations; instead, they are
delegated to the manager and cloud provider. Also, the manager computes the decryption
key, not the data owner, and it assists with key distribution on behalf of the owner.
Furthermore, a hybrid protocol is proposed that optionally allows message encryption
based on a group key, allowing the user membership to be further refined for highly sensitive
data. Additionally, it allows re-encryption to occur, and thus revocation to become efficient
without necessitating existing common remedies and their limitations; an example is the
expiration of attributes specified in the attribute-based policy that leads to constant key
updates as time elapses. The proposed protocol is similar in overall performance to the
original ciphertext-policy attribute-based-encryption idea, while significantly lessening the
computational and traffic burden on the mobile data owner in a system where data updates
and encryption activities are frequent and dominant. Thus, the proposal is useful for
securing mobile cloud computing with very large user populations.
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Cloud-Hosted Key Sharing
6.1 Introduction
The key management schemes proposed thus far have involved performing compu-tationally intensive key re-generation operations within the cloud to take advantage of
its scalability; these computations, however, may prove too costly in certain cloud systems
where such processing overhead cannot be justified. This chapter suggests utilizing the
principle of key sharing and thus concentrating on the utility of another highly economical
asset of a cloud system: its permanent replicated storage, which can scale according to
client demand, and is typically billed at a small fraction of a dollar per GB of data per
month [6]. The key design factors for a cloud-based secure storage system that motivate
this chapter include: no additional server-side logic being required on the cloud provider
end to support cryptographic functions; fine-grained data access; highly scalable sharing
among multiple readers and writers; minimal computation required by mobile users; mini-
mal communication required with the cloud provider; and no inherent trust of the provider
existing, in terms of the administrator having unrestricted access to stored user data. The
system model described in Section 2.2.2 on page 14 and the adversary and threat model
described in Section 2.4.1 on page 19 are assumed.
In this chapter, related work on key sharing is presented in Section 6.2. Next, a key
management scheme based on cloud-hosted key sharing is proposed in Section 6.3. Options
applicable to various additional use cases and cloud variants are presented in Section 6.4. A
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practical implementation with benchmarking results, as well as an additional simulation to
assess scalability, are discussed in Section 6.5. Concluding remarks are made in Section 6.6.
The content of this chapter is based on work that has been published [110].
6.2 Related Work on Key Sharing
NIST, in its Electronic Authentication Guideline [21], recommends secret sharing to protect
long-term credentials in its level 3 security definition for a CSP. Secret key sharing allows a
secret such as key information to be divided into multiple shares [98]; these shares may be
distributed among key generators using the concept of threshold decryption [19], or portions
of a private key are distributed among users [10]. The challenge is that the client must
assemble a key from multiple sources, potentially resulting in expensive communication
overhead. Rather than key shares being distributed on-demand by some authority, it has
been proposed that they be distributed across a network of nodes whose accessibility is
subject to degradation over time. The Vanish system [41] distributes shares onto a DHT
(Distributed Hash Table) that underlies a peer-to-peer file sharing network. It suggests
the concept of self-destructing data, where copies of data become unreadable over time
due to the effect of user churn on the index. The problem with adapting the scheme to a
cloud-based context is that it relies upon the availability of the shares among the nodes,
which cannot be guaranteed. It requires that each user obtain key shares from multiple
other nodes that form the index, which is an expensive proposition if the user is operating
a mobile device. In the DepSky storage system [16], shares are necessarily distributed
across multiple clouds to form distributed trust and to restrict access. Each cloud provider
has access to a single share and thus cannot decode the stored data; this requires support
for a cloud-of-clouds. Also, because the data shares are unencrypted, each cloud must
be independent and collusion assumed to be impossible. SafeVanish is a system for self-
destructing data in the cloud that prevents a sybil attack to which the original Vanish
system is vulnerable [121]; however, it is still reliant upon a DHT implementation; whether
the DHT is publicly or privately hosted, the process of key destruction is never under the
direct control of the client in such a system, thus limiting its flexibility.
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6.3 Proposed Algorithm
The following algorithm is based on the principle of limiting access to encrypted data in
the cloud through the process of storing and removing encrypted key shares in the cloud.
Additional variants are also presented, such as the usage of a cloud-of-clouds to distribute
the key shares, and a trusted manager to perform key rotation and remove this burden
from the data owner. Table 6.1 provides the meaning of symbols used in the discussion.
6.3.1 Main Technique
Key Generation and Encryption
Consider a technique based on Shamir’s secret sharing [98]. U is the set of users accessing
the cloud, and an access structure ΓU is a list of subsets of U such that each subset is
trusted. Any trusted subset Utr of parties, where Utr ∈ ΓU , can recover the secret from
the set KS of shares stored in the cloud. Any untrusted subset, however, cannot obtain
information about the secret. The access control structure can be defined such that any
(t + 1) or more parties in U can recover the secret, while any t or less cannot do so; this
secret sharing scheme is threshold-based (as defined in [98]).
Refer to Algorithm 6.3.1. In the Encrypt operation, Alice, or user A, proceeds to
generate key shares and encrypt a message m to be stored in the cloud and identified
with a unique identifier mid. User A generates a symmetric key K (such as an AES, or
Advanced Encryption Standard, key) and divides it into multiple shares KS[1] to KS[n],
where n is the current total number of shares; a minimum of t+ 1 shares are required for
decryption, where t+ 1 ≤ n. Parameter t may be decreased or increased in value to adjust
the level of security, while parameter n determines the number of users supported and the
storage requirements for the shares. Each share KS[i] is encrypted as EKS[i], using a
symmetric encryption key AK[i] (such as an AES key) belonging to user A, known as an
access key; it is also possible for the same access key AK[i] to protect multiple shares to
conserve storage and communication costs. The encrypted shares are stored in a public key
database in the cloud and cannot be read in plaintext form by the provider, although they
remain accessible for download by users. A requests sufficient storage in the cloud to hold
n shares, which represents an upper bound; as described later, a replacement strategy will
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Symbol Description
Utr Authorized user set.
M Trusted manager.
A,B,C Users Alice, Bob, and Charlie in Utr.
GenKey() Function to generate a random key of some predetermined length.
K Symmetric data key.
KS[i] Share i of key K.
v[i] Version associated with a key share KS[i].
EKS[i] Encrypted key share i.
EKS[i]hdr Metadata header for key share KS[i].
Partition(K, i, n) Function to generate share i of key K, where n is the total number of
shares.
EncryptSymy(x) Function to encrypt data x using symmetric key y (such as AES).
DecryptSymy(x) Function to decrypt data x using symmetric key y (such as AES).
Hash(x) Compute the digest of message x.
Reconstruct([z]) Function to reconstruct secret key from shares in array z[].
AK[i] Access key to unlock share KS[i].
m Plaintext of user data.
mid Unique plaintext record identifier.
c Ciphertext of user data.
t The threshold number of key shares KS, above which (at t+1 or greater),
there is a sufficient number to compute K.
n The total number of key shares KS generated for a particular data record.
L A description key identifying the set of key shares eligible to decrypt c.
PKX Public key of user X.
SKX Private (secret) key of user X.
Table 6.1: A legend for the symbolic notation used in the key-sharing model.
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replace older shares with newer ones while utilizing the same total capacity. The message
flow is summarized in Table 6.2, encompassing the usage of a single version of a data key.
A high-level data flow diagram appears in Figure 6.1 for reference in the discussion
that follows. As will be elaborated, a mobile data owner is responsible for generating and
uploading content intended for encrypted storage in the cloud; it also creates key material
that can be used to decrypt the cloud data, and this material is also securely deployed
in the cloud. Multiple mobile readers of the same content exist, and access portions of
the key material to carry out read operations on the cloud data that they download.
Concurrently, a cloud application manages access to the stored user data and performs
required maintenance activities on the key material that it holds on behalf of users. A
trusted intermediary is not required in the basic system model.
Algorithm 6.3.1: Encrypt(m,mid)
comment: Generate the encrypted data and access keys.
K ← GenKey()
for i← 1 to n
do

KS[i]← Partition(K, i, n)
AK[i]← GenKey()
EKS[i] = EncryptSymAK[i](KS[i])
EKS[i]hdr = {mid ‖ i ‖ v[i]}
comment: Encrypt the plaintext message.
c← EncryptSymK(m)
The plaintext user data m requiring protection is assigned a unique record identifier
of mid and encrypted by A as ciphertext c using K; it is uploaded to the provider and
is stored in the cloud. Since the cloud provider cannot unlock any share stored in the
key database, it is unable to decode c. To the ciphertext of the user data is appended a
description key L identifying the set of key shares eligible to decrypt the data, of which
only the threshold amount is required by any user.
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Figure 6.1: The high-level data flow in the key-sharing system.
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Metadata
A will create a metadata header EKS[i]hdr for each share i and upload it with the encrypted
share payload. The metadata will consist of the following fields: the record identifier mid,
the key share identifier i ∈ {1..n}, and the key share version v.
The assumed adversary model does not require integrity controls, as the cloud provider
is regarded as being honest-but-curious. However, if this assumption does not hold true,
and verifiability of the downloaded shares is required, then a digital signature of the key
share may be created. A mechanism for utilizing the header as a signature is proposed
in [110], such that tampering of c is detected through a comparison of message digests; the
signing operation requires a supporting public key infrastructure such as RSA.
Decryption
Refer to Algorithm 6.3.2. Bob, or user B, wishes to access c, and so he executes the
Decrypt operation. Suppose that B is an authorized member of Utr. B obtains symmetric
access keys AK[x] to AK[y] from A, where the range of keys is of at least size t + 1, the
required threshold; this assumes that each key AK[i] permits decryption of the key share
KS[i] stored in the cloud, where i is in the range 1 to n, such that all shares are in L.
Again, it is also possible to have one access key unlock multiple shares, instead. Regardless,
every user is given a random set of access keys in the initial allocation; each set satisfies
the threshold at a minimum.
Algorithm 6.3.2: Decrypt(c,mid)
comment: Reconstruct the data key.
for i← 1 to t+ 1
do
{
KS[i]← DecryptSymAK[i]EKS[i]
K ← Reconstruct(KS[1, .., (t+ 1)])
comment: Decrypt the plaintext message.
m← DecryptSymK(c)
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For instance, in one sample configuration, suppose that the total number of shares n
for a particular data record is 100, and that the number of shares required for decryption,
t + 1, is three. Refer to Figure 6.2. Data owner A will provide access key AK[1] to B,
which provides access to five shares stored in the cloud; only three are required. B may
download the ciphertext, as well as all three encrypted key shares, directly from the cloud
and within the same request. B will then be able to decrypt the required user data.
EKS[5] EKS[n]...
AK[1]
Encrypted key shares stored in cloud
Access keys
belonging 
to user B
EKS[1] EKS[2] EKS[3] EKS[4]
Threshold key set to compute K
Figure 6.2: An example of key assignment in the key-sharing model.
The entire user population may be significantly greater in number than the total number
of shares n; thus, the same key shares may be randomly assigned to multiple users. For
instance, Charlie, user C, is also an authorized member of Utr and is allowed to access the
ciphertext c. Owner A may issue the same access key AK[1] to C, to unlock the same key
shares in common with user B. Note that if an access key unlocks only a single key share,
instead, then finer-grained control is attained; in that case, user B can be given access keys
AK[1] to AK[5] to unlock shares EKS[1] to EKS[5], and user C can be given access keys
AK[3] to AK[7] to unlock partially overlapping shares EKS[3] to EKS[7]. However, this
flexibility is at the cost of additional storage for each user.
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Key Share Deletion
Over time, individual key shares in the cloud are independently deleted by the cloud
provider. This process can occur at regularly scheduled time intervals, such that a random
share is deleted every day, for instance. If user B had locally cached all decrypted key
shares, then B will continue to be able to decrypt data from the cloud until his cache
needs to be refreshed, or the entire key store expires.
Suppose that key share KS[1] is erased and that B needs to re-fetch key shares from the
cloud. B will find that EKS[1] (the encrypted version of KS[1]) is no longer available, and
so another key share must be randomly chosen from the available set. B will be required
to use an appropriate access key in the set AK[x] to AK[y] to access another available
key share outside of the initial three, such as KS[4]. Any users that hold the same deleted
share may also need to do the same. If three key shares of the initial set of five are deleted,
then user B cannot satisfy the threshold, and will be unable to decrypt the user data. If B
holds no other access keys, he may optionally obtain AK[z] from A, where z is an access
key that was not previously held, and which unlocks a valid remaining key share from the
cloud. B may obtain this key from A or from another user in Utr. Otherwise, B must wait
for the key store to expire and new valid key shares to become available.
Through the process of gradual share deletion in the cloud, users eventually lose access
to the cloud data as a consequence of falling below the share threshold. In this way, revoca-
tion is handled without the participation of the data owner. Authorized users may obtain
additional shares or wait for share re-generation in order to retain access; discontinuity of
access can therefore occur as a side effect for authorized users, but it is temporary.
Keys may be deleted according to different schedules, such as based on regular time
intervals, or based on the number of accesses of the user data, or the number of joins and
leaves of users in the user set. The size of the valid remaining key store in the cloud will
decrease from the initial maximum until the store is re-generated. Access keys must only
be re-generated for shares that belonged to users whose access rights were revoked from
the last time that shares were generated. In other words, if no user left the authorized user
membership Utr in the last round, then key shares will require replacement after deletion,
but the access keys held by users need not be updated. To effect control over access key
replacement, an expiration flag may be set by the data owner for each access key, if the
key unlocks a share that was assigned to a user whose access rights have been revoked; the
tradeoff made is between additional record-keeping and the computation of new keys.
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Key Share Replacement
Once the number of outstanding valid shares in the cloud subject to random replacement
decreases to t, it becomes impossible for all users to download sufficient valid shares to
replace those that are deleted, even if additional access keys are obtained from the data
owner or other users. The key stored in the cloud then expires; this event can also occur
at a prearranged point before the threshold is reached. The content owner A can then
proceed to replace the deleted shares in the cloud with newly-generated valid shares of a
new version of the symmetric key K ′. A new access key will also be generated for each
share, or set of shares, to protect them from the cloud provider, unless the corresponding
key share did not belong to a user revoked in the last round. Thus, for instance, key
AK ′[1] will protect the new key shares KS ′[1] to KS ′[5], from 1 to 5, and so on; a total of
n key shares are again stored in the cloud with headers reflecting the new version. In this
case, the user data that is stored in the cloud and encrypted with the older key K must
be replaced with a version that is encrypted with the new key K ′; this may be done by
user A, or by a trusted manager M . To avoid a key consistency issue, the ciphertext may
be appended with information on the key version required to decrypt it. A new cycle of
the interactions shown in Table 6.2 is repeated, for the new version of the data key. In the
special case where user data is time-sensitive in nature, such as a stock market transaction,
no replacement of key shares may be undertaken. Rather, all users eventually lose access
to the data due to share deletion, at which point it is made public or has no intrinsic value.
Revocation
Suppose that user A decides that B should no longer have access to the encrypted user data
stored in the cloud. B will be unable to obtain additional access keys from A to obtain
more shares, will be unable to obtain updated access keys once the key store expires,
and thus will be unable to decrypt shares of the new key K ′ from the cloud. B will not
immediately lose access rights to the originally given shares; he will eventually do so when
sufficient shares are deleted non-deterministically by the cloud provider and B’s key cache
cannot be refreshed. To conserve communication, it is unnecessary for B to poll the cloud
provider to discover a new key version to replace an expired one. B may issue a request
for new key shares when they become available, and have the cloud provider send them in
response in asynchronous push-based fashion, while B is still authorized.
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6.3.2 Discussion and Analysis
The main use envisioned with the proposed scheme is the management of continuous access
to encrypted user data in a highly scalable manner with minimal coordination, as users
join and leave the system. Another use is in allowing access to user data for a finite period
of time. In the latter case, once insufficient key shares remain, the encrypted data stored in
the cloud is no longer useful to the authorized user set. The data owner will not re-generate
a new data key, and the ciphertext c may simply be discarded at the end, as it cannot
be decrypted with the remaining shares; another possibility is to simply reveal the data
key to the cloud provider and allow global unrestricted access to the user data, as it is no
longer considered sensitive once enough time has passed.
The main advantages of the technique are summarized:
1. Expensive key re-generation and re-distribution does not occur every time a single
user’s access is revoked. The revocation process relies upon the gradual but pre-
dictable disappearance of key shares, incurring no cost for the data owner upon each
such occurrence.
2. Storage of key shares in the cloud takes advantage of the cloud provider’s high avail-
ability, which is not the case with techniques relying upon the distribution of shares
across a peer-to-peer network. The key shares may be replicated onto multiple cloud
providers, if available, to increase redundancy.
3. The key re-regeneration process is not required to be undertaken by the data owner
(user A in the example); once sufficient key shares have been depleted, a trusted
manager M may be employed to perform it, if such an entity exists within the
system, thus removing the communication burden from the data owner.
4. Since the key shares are securely stored in a centralized cloud location, the rate of
share deletion is deterministic. It may even be dynamically controlled by the data
owner through appropriate instructions to the cloud provider; key shares can also be
forced to expire at any time if a security breach occurs. Caching of key shares for a
mobile device user is limited by local storage, and thus it is expected that a user will
need to fetch shares from the cloud regularly. Regular back up of shares by a user to
another server for safekeeping would entail a prohibitive communication cost.
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Key shares are stored securely in the cloud. Even if the provider attempts to collude
with an authorized user, every key share is protected with a unique access key, and the
access keys are never shared with the cloud provider; the user is unable to glean any new
and useful information from the cloud provider. If a user shares an access key with the
cloud provider in an unauthorized manner, then only a limited number of key shares will
be temporarily accessible to the provider until they are deleted; even if the secret data
key K is decoded by the provider, it will eventually be rotated and the ciphertext will
be replaced. The same safeguard applies to key material stolen from a compromised user.
Also, because key shares are encrypted, then even if the provider is malicious, disobeying
deletion rules and retaining them in the cloud is uneconomical to the provider and confers
no benefit other than prolonging revocation until the next key update.
It is impossible to predict with certainty at what point a user will lose access to key
material such that the user will be unable to refresh his or her local copy of key shares from
the cloud, as the deletion of any particular share is normally non-deterministic. This is not
of great concern, however, as it is likewise impossible to know when a device user will need
to update his or her local cache of key shares. From basic probability theory, the chance
that any user will have access to a sufficient number of shares is given in Equation 6.1:( ∏
0≤i≤d
(
n− i− w
n− i
) ∣∣∣0 ≤ d ≤ (n− t)) (6.1)
where d is the total number of deletions thus far, and w is the amount of shares generated
for the user in question, assuming in this case that it is equivalent to the threshold t+ 1.
A compromise in the proposal is the cost of storage on the user’s device, not only of key
shares, but also of their corresponding access keys; the costs borne are shown in Table 6.3.
It is possible to configure the protocol such that an access key is required for each key
share, or an access key unlocks more than one share. The advantage of the latter method
is a lesser storage penalty; the disadvantage is that a user may continue to have access to
a threshold number of shares for longer, i.e. throughout a greater number of share deletion
events, adversely affecting the scheme’s revocation efficacy. In any case, the key material
storage cost is not high, and does not vary with the size of the data being protected.
If all key shares of a data key are stored in a single cloud provider’s data store, as
in the default scenario described, then the access keys are necessary to prevent the cloud
provider from reconstructing the data key itself from a threshold number of shares. Even
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Key material Size Assumption
Each access key. 16 bytes 128-bit AES.
Each key share. 16 bytes 128-bit equivalent.
Each encrypted key share. 16 bytes 128-bit AES.
Table 6.3: The cost of storage of key material in the key-sharing model.
if the shares were to be distributed across multiple cloud providers, then less than the
required threshold number would need to be stored on each if access keys were not used; in
addition, the cloud providers could not collude. As a disadvantage, the data owner bears a
significant cost in distributing access keys to recipients; however, this cost may be reduced
by storing the access keys in the cloud for dissemination, encrypted with the recipient’s
public key (if a supporting infrastructure such as RSA is available), so that only a one-time
upload of all access keys by the data owner is needed. Another possibility is to employ a
trusted intermediary, as in previous chapters, for the purpose of access key generation and
distribution. The initial key distribution costs are therefore no worse in this model. Also,
the data owner does not need to retain access keys after they are distributed.
A consideration is the communication overhead of recipients requesting multiple key
shares, the amount influenced by the threshold value; these requests are made directly
against the cloud, however, and the responses containing the shares may be bundled with
the downloaded user data to minimize overhead.
Continuous share expiration results in users undergoing access revocation at different
times; hence, resulting communication sessions are evenly distributed over time. If all
shares expired simultaneously, then users would make requests for additional shares all at
once, which could result in a flooding of the network or of the data owner.
An alternative to the proposed scheme is a coarser-grained approach where multiple
data keys are stored in whole in the cloud, rather than shares of these keys. Each such
key may be assigned to multiple users, and the keys may still self-erode. This modification
reduces the complexity of the overall scheme and does not require the expense of recon-
struction of the data key from shares by each recipient. However, such a scheme is less
flexible for the following reasons, which may make it unsuitable for some systems:
1. It does not permit different portions of key material (i.e. shares) to be stored in
different locations such as across multiple cloud providers; such a deployment may be
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useful in preventing a cloud provider from reconstructing the data key in case access
keys are compromised, because insufficient shares may be stored on its premises and
collusion with another cloud provider to obtain more shares is impossible.
2. It does not permit some users to be assigned a greater amount of key material initially,
which is useful in supporting prioritization of users, as is suggested in a variant below.
3. Authorization for a user depends on having access to a whole key, and re-gaining
access after deletion requires obtaining a new key. In the case of key shares, how-
ever, users may incrementally grow their key material through requests for additional
shares from the cloud provider, the data owner, or other users; permission for doing
so may be controlled dynamically. To achieve information-theoretic secrecy, the key
shares must be of length at least equal to the data key itself that is fragmented;
however, if computational secrecy is sufficient, then this restriction is relaxed and
significant storage cost savings are achieved: the size of the key share store grows
by a factor of the number of shares divided by the threshold [65]. Thus, the overall
amount of data transferred on key downloads when utilizing key shares may be less.
Even with the use of whole keys, the concept of self-eroding key material under the
control of the cloud provider remains a significant contribution of the proposed work.
6.4 Variants
The basic scheme presented may be optionally extended with the following variants if
additional network components are present, to improve its performance or reliability:
Priority Classes of Users
Shares need not be evenly distributed across all users. Higher-priority or more trustworthy
users could retain key shares for longer; one way to accomplish this is to assign a different
class of shares to these users such that the shares undergo a slower rate of deletion than
do regular shares assigned to the rest of the user population. Another way is to simply
assign a greater number of shares to priority users so that they are less likely to suffer
the effect of insufficient shares prior to share re-generation; furthermore, the lock-out of
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access due to insufficient shares in this case is shorter-lived. The relative priority of a user
class will dictate the rate of deletion of its shares, or the number initially assigned to each
represented user, depending on the variant chosen.
Distribution Across a Cloud-of-Clouds
Recently, cloud brokering has been introduced, permitting access to a cloud-of-clouds.
The advantage is that a client need not rely upon a single cloud infrastructure to provide
reliable and continuous service. A broker acts as an intermediary, arbitrating between
multiple providers. To take advantage of this concept, key shares may be distributed
across the repositories of different providers. Each user is given a range of access keys to
shares of a single provider to retain communication efficiency. However, other users will be
given access to shares stored in another provider; if one is adversely affected by an outage,
it need not disrupt service to all users, thus improving the reliability of the system.
Manager-Assisted Key Shares
The protocol described thus far relies on the data owner re-generating new key shares for
storage in the cloud. Although this permits the key management system to rely only on the
data owner and no additional network entity, the data owner may be subject to occasional
unavailability due to its mobility. A highly-available trusted manager could be a beneficial
addition to this scheme. For instance, suppose that key shares must be generated or re-
generated. User A, the data owner, would generate the ciphertext c and description key L;
the manager would then create the key shares and access keys that unlock them. The
manager would upload the key shares to the cloud, and the access keys to all users in Utr.
When the shares would expire and need to be re-generated, A would request the manager
to repeat the procedure with a new batch of key material; full trust in the manager is
required.
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6.5 Implementation
6.5.1 Performance Measurement
A prototype of the proposed scheme was implemented to assess its performance. The imple-
mentation was realized on popular existing commercial platforms: the Android mobile and
the Google App Engine (GAE) cloud platforms. Refer to the system model in Figure 6.3.
The Shamir Secret Sharing in Java (SSSJ) library [107] provided the implementation of
the underlying cryptographic algorithms; in particular, it implements the LaGrange In-
terpolating Polynomial Scheme [97]. The implementation was run on different clients to
assess their relative performance: an Apple iMac 3.4 GHz quad-core Intel Core i7 desktop
computer with 16 GB RAM, an Apple MacBook Pro 2.2 GHz dual-core Intel Core 2 Duo
with 4 GB RAM, and a Google Nexus One phone with a 1 GHz Qualcomm Scorpion pro-
cessor with 512 MB memory. The AES cryptographic algorithm was provided by the Java
Cryptography Extension (JCE) library. 128-bit AES keys were used as the access keys
used to encrypt and decrypt the shares of a 112-bit data key. Performance benchmark
results are shown in Table 6.4, for 100 key shares generated with a threshold number of 5.
On the server end, an F1-class front-end instance was run as a Java servlet on the GAE
cloud, configured at 600 MHz processing and 128 MB of RAM. A connection was estab-
lished between the desktop or mobile Android client and an instance running on the GAE
cloud via HTTP requests, using JSON for data interchange and the Google Gson library
for marshalling between Java objects (used by the Java client and server implementations)
and the JSON representation. Note that the security model of GAE does not allow direct
network connections and native code execution. Only a subset of the Java 2 Standard Edi-
tion (J2SE) SDK 1.6 classes are whitelisted on Android and GAE; fortunately, the required
JCE classes are supported. The performance data from the GAE server logs are shown in
Table 6.5. The benchmark results show that the processing demands on the mobile device
and cloud server are not onerous at all.
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Figure 6.3: A high-level model of the implementation of key-sharing.
6.5.2 Simulation
Through an additional custom simulation program written in Java, various parameters
were modified to understand their effect on performance. One effect studied was the rate
of share depletion on revocation. Starting with an initial population of 10,000 authorized
users, 100 total shares, and a minimum threshold (t+ 1) value of 5, shares were randomly
allocated to each user. The initial number of shares allocated was increased by a factor
of five across the trials. One random share deletion occurred per round of the simulation;
users were not allowed to request additional shares and a user became unauthorized once
his or her remaining shares fell below the threshold. The results are found in Figure 6.4.
Increasing the initial allocation of shares results in a delayed need for additional shares
from users at peril of becoming unauthorized, at the cost of delayed revocation and greater
up-front storage and communication for key exchange.
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Cryptographic operation Desktop Notebook Mobile
Generation of encrypted key shares. 42 ms 56 ms 617 ms
Decryption of encrypted key shares.
.
= 0 ms
.
= 0 ms 22 ms
Decryption of encrypted user message. 8 ms 46 ms 163 ms
Table 6.4: The client performance results obtained from the key-sharing implementation.
Cryptographic operation Response time CPU time Response size
Upload of encrypted key shares. 98 ms 38 ms -
Download of encrypted key shares. 36 ms 38 ms 11.6 kb
Table 6.5: The server performance results obtained from the key-sharing implementation.
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Figure 6.4: The rate of user deauthorization based on share allocation in key-sharing.
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Figure 6.5: The total share downloads based on the initial allocation in key-sharing.
It is also instructive to study the effect of allowing users to request additional shares so
that they meet the threshold, assuming that they remain authorized at all times. Keeping
the same starting parameters, the initial allocation of shares was varied across the trials
from a multiple of five of the threshold amount to a multiple of one; an unlimited number
of random shares was allowed to be requested by each user. Regardless of the initial
allocation of shares, a request was only made if the user fell below the threshold. The
results are shown in Figure 6.5; only the requests subsequent to the initial assignment
are shown. There is a trade-off between the amount of shares initially allocated, and the
amount of shares requested later to maintain the threshold. Assigning fewer initial shares
is more optimal in terms of the average shares requested per user at the end, due to the
replacements being randomly drawn from a pool consisting of shares that are still valid.
The rate of key re-generation affects the minimum number of valid users present at any
time in the system. Keeping the same starting parameters as in the first experiment, with
five shares initially allocated to all users, the number of rounds between key re-generation
(and re-population of all shares) was varied; the minimum number of valid remaining users
was observed as shares were randomly deleted. The results appear in Figure 6.6. When the
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Figure 6.6: The minimum valid users based on the re-generation frequency in key-sharing.
key shares lasted for 5 rounds until they were all re-generated (i.e. after 5% of all shares
were deleted), the number of valid users always remained above approximately 72%; when
the key shares lasted for 25 rounds, equivalent in number to the threshold share value times
five, the minimum number of valid users at times dropped to approximately 21%. Thus,
increasing the frequency of key re-generation results in fewer authorized users being locked
out, at the cost of more frequent downloads of valid key shares.
Refer now to Figure 6.7. In the case where key shares lasted for 5 rounds, each user
requested approximately 18 times the initial threshold amount of 5 shares over a run of
100 deletion events, compared to only approximately 5.1 times the amount of 5 shares
where key shares lasted for 25 rounds (i.e. five times longer). Although more frequent key
re-generation decreases access wait times for authorized users, it results in more frequent
share downloads, which are costly.
If the user population is segmented into multiple classes of different priorities, then the
relative rates of user de-authorization will vary. In one experiment, the population was
evenly distributed across five priority classes with various initial share allocations; users of
the highest priority level 5 were assigned five times the number of shares of users of priority
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Figure 6.7: The total share downloads based on the re-generation frequency in key-sharing.
level 1, and so on. The key and all shares of it were re-generated every 75 rounds, and
additional share requests were disallowed; the effect on the number of outstanding users
in the system is observed in Figure 6.8. In the lowest priority class, all users typically lost
authorization before the next re-generation round, while in the highest priority class, only
approximately 20% lost authorization. Thus, although higher priority classes incur higher
initial share downloads, they can retain near-constant authorization to the system and
less interruption to their service; because they tend to be of higher trust, it is appropriate
for their revocation to be delayed till the next key re-generation. Observe, however, that
even if an authorized user, irrespective of priority, loses access to shares initially assigned,
then it is permissible for that user to obtain additional access keys from the data owner
or a trusted manager to regain a threshold of shares and maintain continuous access to
encrypted data in the cloud; such requests were omitted from the experiment in question.
The various parameters discussed in the simulation results should be tweaked as ap-
propriate to fit the user application that is being secured.
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6.6 Summary
It has been demonstrated that scalable key management may be attained by leveraging the
inexpensive storage capacity and high accessibility offered by a cloud provider. Through
the use of self-eroding key shares in the cloud, efficient revocation is achieved for mobile
device users without requiring the involvement of a data owner or trusted intermediary.
The cloud provider does not have direct access to unencrypted data since it is unable to
generate decryption keys itself as the shares are protected through access keys. All key
material is stored securely and cheaply in the cloud, rather than among the user population
itself. Access by mobile users is accomplished through a direct connection to the cloud and
is enabled solely through the possession of appropriate access keys to unlock the shares.
One of the benefits of using centralized and reliable cloud storage for key shares is that
there is full control over share management; it is not subject to outside factors such as
user churn. Various heuristics may be implemented to control the timing and rate of share
deletions, to fit the mobile application being executed. Options exist for different cloud
usage scenarios including the case of different priority classes of users being present.
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Chapter 7
Query Privacy for
Location-Based Services
7.1 Introduction
Prior chapters were concerned with key management methods that guarantee thatdata outsourced to a cloud server is always kept confidential from the cloud provider.
This chapter considers the case where information stored in the cloud is public or permit-
ted to be shared with the provider. This scenario has numerous practical uses: the cloud
provider may continuously update its database from external sources, and perform various
work on it such as sorting, filtering, and transforming it as required by the application,
taking advantage of the cloud’s scalable means of computation. However, confidentiality
remains a concern for users. The specific information retrieved from the cloud can some-
times reveal much about a user to the cloud provider, beyond his or her identity, and to his
or her risk and detriment. Hence, a scheme that allows mobile users to retrieve information
in a confidential manner is presented in this chapter such that query privacy is assured.
The chosen application context is a location-based service, which is a highly popular cloud
application that enjoys significant network effects, where participating mobile users can
increase the value of the service to others, and effectively illustrates how the proposed
techniques may be applied in practice; other application contexts are possible, however.
The privacy requirements for location-based services are detailed in Section 7.2. Related
work on query privacy is described in Section 7.3. The proposed solution for private
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information retrieval is detailed in Section 7.4. An implementation on multiple platforms
is discussed in Section 7.5, and the work is summarized in Section 7.6.
The content of this chapter is based on work that has been published [88,89].
7.2 Privacy Requirements of Location-Based Services
Users of mobile devices frequently have a need to find POIs (Points Of Interest), such as
restaurants, hotels, or gas stations, in close proximity to their current locations. Collections
of these POIs are typically stored in databases administered by LBS (Location Based
Service) providers, and are accessed by the company’s own mobile client applications or
are licensed to third-party independent software vendors. A user first establishes his or her
current position on a smartphone through a positioning technology such as GPS (Global
Positioning System) or cell tower triangulation, and uses it as the origin for the search.
The problem is that if the user’s actual location is provided as the origin to the LBS
server, running in a cloud, which performs the lookup of the POIs, then the server will
learn of that location. In addition, a history of locations visited may be recorded and
could potentially be used to target the user with unexpected content such as local adver-
tisements, or worse, used to track him or her. The user’s identity may be divulged through
the inclusion of the originating dynamic IP address, e-mail address, or phone number in
requests to the LBS server so that the results of an LBS query can be routed back to the
correct user via a TCP data connection, e-mail reply, or SMS reply, respectively. If a lo-
cation can always be correlated to each request, then the user’s current pattern of activity
and even personal safety is being entrusted to a third-party, potentially of unknown origin
and intent. Although search engines routinely cache portions of previous queries in order
to deliver more relevant results in the future, concern occurs when the user’s exact location
history is tracked, and not just the key words used in the search. For many users, this
constitutes an unacceptable violation of privacy, and efforts should be made to avoid it.
As location technology becomes commonplace, users will become increasingly aware of
and become concerned about location privacy. Not only are privacy and personal safety
important considerations, but recent advances in mobile advertising have even opened up
the possibility of location-based spam. The challenge has been to design a system whereby
a user can retrieve useful POI information without having to disclose his or her exact
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location to a third-party such as the LBS server running in the cloud. The user should
also not have to reveal what particular POIs were searched for and found, as each POI
record typically includes precise location coordinates. Thus, the server should be unable
to infer the user’s current location or likely destination, or accumulate a history of requests
made for profiling purposes. Generally speaking, a user will typically be comfortable with
a certain degree of privacy, meaning that the user could be expected to be anywhere within
a certain geographic area, such as a city or neighbourhood, without fear of discovery.
Today’s smartphones have processors that are suitable for cryptographic operations that
can enable location privacy. However, these devices have limited memory and bandwidth.
For instance, typical 3G smartphone limits are 128 MB of dynamic RAM, 32 GB of flash
memory, and operation on 3G wireless networks no faster than the (theoretical) 7.2 Mbps
HSDPA network. Consider these data limits with respect to a typical commercial POI
database for the U.S. and Canada, which can contain 6 to 12 million entries and require
1 to 2 GB or more of flash data storage. Requiring that the smartphone download the entire
database for each request so as not to provide information about its current location is
clearly not practical [102]; nor is requiring that it periodically download just the updated
data to ensure accuracy of results, given practical bandwidth limits, data usage limits,
and associated overage charges (penalties for exceeding the limits) of smartphone data
plans. Thus, it is desirable to provide a cryptographic way for a mobile user to request
local information while preserving location privacy. Although extra server-side processing
demands must be anticipated on a privacy-enhanced LBS server in the cloud, they may
easily be scaled in a cloud computing system at a reasonable tradeoff.
The system model described in Section 2.2.2 on page 14 and the adversary and threat
model described in Section 2.4.1 on page 19 are assumed, with the exception that a trusted
intermediary is not present, and the cloud provider retains full access to data, which the
user does not consider confidential itself. In addition, the cloud provider may collect sensi-
tive personal information about a user, including the user’s identity and content of requests,
unbeknownst to the user; this may constitute a violation of privacy and is considered a
threat against the user, depending on the amount and accuracy of information gathered.
The LBS server and cloud provider are still considered generally honest-but-curious.
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7.2.1 Requirements and Assumptions
The basic scenario entails a mobile device user operating a smartphone with location tech-
nology and wireless data transfer capability. The user searches for nearby POIs (i.e. nearest
neighbours) by first constructing and sending a query to a known LBS server running as
a cloud application, over the wireless network. The server retrieves the query, performs a
search of its POI database, and returns a set of results to the user containing all POIs found
in the specified region. The proposed protocol should meet the following requirements:
1. The LBS server must not learn the user’s exact location. It may only identify a
general region that is large enough, in terms of area and the number of POIs it
contains, to confer a sufficient level of privacy to the user’s satisfaction.
2. There must be no third parties, trusted or otherwise, in the protocol between the
user and the server.
3. The implementation must be computationally efficient on hardware, such as a smart-
phone, which is resource-constrained. A user may be expected to tolerate a delay of
no more than several seconds for any kind of query.
4. The approach cannot rely on a secure processor that is not typically found on a
commercial smartphone.
Clearly, these requirements present the need for a mechanism to directly retrieve infor-
mation in a secure and private way without revealing the contents of the query results, and
without the need for an intermediary between the user and the database server to provide
some kind of a masking function. Fortunately, there is a branch of cryptography that is
associated with retrieving information from a database without revealing which item is
being retrieved; it is known as Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [25]. The proposed
solution in this chapter is sufficiently generic to allow an application to rely on any PIR
scheme. The same assumptions are made as those of the underlying PIR scheme where
retrieval is either by object index or keyword [27]. A server is described that can find the
relevant POI entries based on the user’s location of interest included in the request; this is
possible because the entries in the POI database are indexed by their location.
Although PIR satisfies the baseline privacy constraints described, current implemen-
tations of it fail to satisfy the third condition, which is usable performance on modern
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smartphone hardware. The challenge has been to complement PIR with a new algorith-
mic approach that effectively reduces the amount of computation without significantly
sacrificing the user’s location privacy.
Note that no effort is made to hide the user’s identity from the location-based service.
It is assumed that it is acceptable to reveal the user’s identity for the purpose of routing the
response to a location-based request, and for offering a customized LBS experience. A user
that also wishes to hide his or her identity to some extent may wish to make use of an onion
router, such as Tor [36]. However, it is noted that there are application domains where
the protection of a user’s location using the proposed technique is superior to anonymizing
the user’s identity. For example, it is easy to try to identify a user who made a query
with a particular geographical coordinate, simply by looking up the user who lives at the
corresponding residential address and assuming the request did not originate elsewhere.
On the other hand, the proposed technique hides query contents from the LBS, and leaves
no useful clues for determining the user’s current location.
When a typical mobile phone accesses a third-party LBS provider through a wireless
3G or 4G data connection, it is assumed that it reveals only its identity and the query
itself to the provider. Unavoidably, a mobile communications carrier is always aware of
the user’s location based on the cell towers in contact, and so it must not collude with
the LBS provider; this assumption relies on the LBS provider not being integrated into
the carrier’s infrastructure, such as a traffic reporting service using cell tower data that
discovers a user’s location passively. This assumption is valid for the vast majority of
LBS applications, which are unaffiliated with the carrier; these include search portals,
social applications, and travel guides. When communicating with such an application, the
mobile user’s IP address is of no help in determining the user’s physical location, as it is
dynamically assigned independent of location. Only a central gateway that is administered
by the telecommunications carrier will be identified. It is assumed that no other information
will be gleaned by the LBS provider. In the case where a mobile user utilizes Wi-Fi instead,
the user will be assigned an address that points to the nearby access point, however, and
may need to employ other techniques, such as Tor, to mask the address.
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7.3 Related Work on Location Privacy and PIR
A brief overview of cloaking- and PIR-based approaches for location privacy is provided. A
survey and classification of methods for location privacy in LBS can be found in [44,104].
7.3.1 Location Cloaking Techniques
Location cloaking seeks to prevent an attacker from being able to match queries to par-
ticular users and to thus compromise their privacy. The attacker may be able to observe
traffic flowing through the network or even be situated at the LBS provider endpoint.
One popular cloaking technique is based on the principle of k -anonymity, where a user
is hidden among k-1 other users. Queries from multiple users are typically aggregated at
an anonymity server which forms an intermediary between the user and the LBS provider.
This central anonymity server can provide spatial and temporal cloaking functions, so
that an attacker will encounter difficulty matching multiple queries that are observed with
users at particular locations and at particular points in time. Many cloaking solutions for
location privacy suggest either a central anonymity server as described [51, 117], or other
means such as decentralized trusted peers [29] or distributed k -anonymity [124].
The chief problem is that the anonymity server must normally be part of the trusted
computing environment and represents a single point of vulnerability. If it is successfully
attacked, or collusion with the LBS server occurs, then the locations of all users may be
divulged. It is also observed that although a cloaking technique by itself is advantageous
in that it does not result in increased computational cost on the server, it can carry with
it a high communication cost from the LBS provider to the client. This can mean a large
and unacceptable penalty for mobile phone users. Finally, if a reduced sample population
results from the number of active users in a particular geographic area, it may not suffice
to satisfy the desired degree of anonymity. If the anonymity server delays execution of
a request until the k -anonymity condition is satisfied, then this delay may prove to be
unacceptable to the user from a feature interaction point of view.
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7.3.2 PIR-Based Techniques
A PIR technique can be used to ensure that queries and their results are kept private.
Specifically, PIR provides a user with a way to retrieve an item from a database, with-
out the database (or the database administrator) learning any information about which
particular item was retrieved. PIR satisfies the described requirements for privacy and
low communication cost. However, existing PIR techniques have drawbacks of high com-
putational cost for applications that require low latency. The PIR database is typically
organized as an n-bit string, broken up into r blocks, each n/r bits long. The user’s private
input or query is typically an index i ∈ {1, ..., r} representing the ith block of bits. A trivial
solution for PIR is for the database to send all r blocks to the user and have the user select
the desired block at index i, but this carries a maximum cost of communication and is
unsuitable in a resource-constrained environment such as a wireless network.
When the PIR problem was first introduced [25], it was proven that a single-database
solution with information-theoretic privacy and a sub-linear communication complexity
(between the user and the database) is impossible to achieve. Information-theoretic pri-
vacy assures user privacy even for an adversary with unlimited computational capability.
Using at least two replicated databases, and some form of restrictions on how the databases
can communicate, PIR schemes with information theoretic privacy are possible [15,48]. The
first single-database PIR scheme [26] only assures privacy against an adversary with limited
computational capability (i.e. polynomially-bounded attackers). The type of privacy pro-
tection known as computational privacy, where computational capability is expected to be
limited, is a weaker notion of privacy compared to information-theoretic privacy. Nonethe-
less, computational PIR (CPIR) [26, 67] offers the benefit of fielding a single database.
Basic PIR schemes place no restriction on information leaked about other items in the
database that are not of interest to the user; however, an extension of PIR, known as Sym-
metric PIR (SPIR) [83], adds that restriction. The restriction is important in situations
where the database privacy is equally of concern. The only work in an LBS context that
attempts to address both user and database privacy is [45]. Although, not strictly an SPIR
scheme, it adopts a cryptographic technique to determine if a location is enclosed inside a
rectangular cloaking region; the goal was to reduce the amount of POIs returned to the user
by a query. Unlike the approach presented in this chapter, it fails to guarantee a constant
query result size which defeats correlation attacks, and it requires dynamic partitioning of
the search space which may be computationally intensive. It also requires two queries to
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be executed, whereas a single query-response pair is sufficient in the proposal herein.
PIR has been applied to solving the problem of keeping a user’s location private when
retrieving location-based content from a server database. This content typically consists
of POIs, with each entry consisting of a description of a place of interest as well as its
geographical location. A related work exists that does not utilize a third party [46], but it
differs from the PIR approach in this chapter in three important ways: first, the approach
is based on a dated computational PIR scheme [67] that is less efficient than more recent
schemes; second, it has a linear computational cost for a large number of entries, which is
too costly for low-bandwidth devices, without allowing users to specify a desired level of
privacy; third, it does not consider a privacy-preserving partitioning approach for the data
set. In contrast, the work in this chapter will be shown to use partitioning of POI data to
permit cloaking, and offers privacy protection when used in conjunction with PIR.
Most of the PIR-based approaches for location privacy rely on hardware-based tech-
niques, which typically utilize a secure coprocessor (SC) at the LBS server host [4, 53]
to realize query privacy; a major drawback is that it requires the acquisition of special-
ized tamperproof hardware and it usually requires periodic reshuﬄing of the POIs in the
database, which is a computationally-expensive operation [4, 56].
7.3.3 Hybrid Techniques
Hybrid techniques [44] permit privacy-efficiency tradeoff decisions to be made by combin-
ing the benefits of cloaking and PIR-based techniques. A tradeoff between privacy and
computational overhead has been conjectured [28] as a means of reducing the high compu-
tational overhead for some application areas of PIR. This chapter validates this conjecture
in the context of LBS, and shows how to reduce the performance overhead of current PIR
techniques. In particular, this chapter answers the open question of how to reduce the
processing cost of PIR without requiring the use of multiple CPUs to take advantage of
parallelization, as discrete parallel processors are not typically found on smartphones.
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7.4 Proposed Solution
A hybrid solution was developed that utilizes PIR to achieve query privacy in the context
of a location-based service, and a cloaking technique to reduce the computational cost of
PIR to a feasible level. The proposed technique essentially describes how the user creates a
cloaking region around his or her true location, and performs a PIR query on the contents
of the cloaking region only. The benefits are numerous: the user’s location is kept hidden
from the cloud server to an acceptable degree regardless of the number of other users in
the area; there is no intermediary server that is responsible for cloaking and that would
need to be trusted; and the computational cost of the cryptographic algorithms employed
is still practical. It is ensured that the user downloads only the POIs that are of interest
to the smartphone, keeping wireless traffic to a minimum to reduce costs and conserve the
battery. The proposed solution is described in this section.
The approach that is proposed entails two phases. First, there is a pre-processing phase
in which the system is set up for use. The pre-processing operation must be carried out
whenever significant changes are made to the POI database on the server. In practice, it
can occur every few months during a period of low usage on the server such as nighttime
maintenance activities. Second, there is an execution phase, in which the LBS server
responds to queries for POIs. The pre-processing phase consists of the following steps:
1. A geographic region is projected onto a two-dimensional plane.
2. A suitable grid is formed on the plane.
3. A POI collection is saved in a database in the cloud such that each row corresponds
to one POI.
4. Each cell of the grid is mapped to a portion of the database, i.e., a particular set of
database rows (each containing a POI).
5. The grid structure is transmitted and saved on the client device in a local mapping
database so that it can be referenced in a subsequent query.
The execution phase, in which a query is made for a set of nearby POIs, consists of the
following steps:
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1. The user determines the area of interest, either based on the current physical position
as determined through GPS, or some other arbitrary area of interest that the user
may be traveling to in the future.
2. The user chooses a desirable level of privacy.
3. The client creates a cloaking region corresponding to this level of privacy, which will
enclose the area of interest.
4. The client sends the cloaking region to the cloud server and identifies which portion
of the cloaking region contains the area of interest, in a way that is hidden from the
server itself.
5. The server receives the request, and finds the database portion corresponding to the
cloaking region. A block of rows is retrieved from this portion based on the user’s
specified location of interest. The POIs present in these rows are transmitted back
to the mobile client.
6. The client decodes the result, and automatically finds the nearest neighbour POI, or
presents the full list of POIs returned to the user to choose amongst.
7.4.1 Level of Privacy
To defeat a server’s ability to narrow down the search space for the item of interest to the
user, PIR protocols typically process every item, or POI, in the PIR database. This results
in a computational complexity that is linear in n (where n is the number of items in the
PIR database). This is the main hindrance to practical PIR deployment [102].
A tradeoff is proposed to make the PIR-based solution practical: users are given the
choice of trading off privacy for better query performance, by specifying the levels of privacy
that they want for their queries. A level of privacy for the query indirectly determines the
number of items that the PIR server must process in order to provide a response. Setting
levels of privacy is a common practice in several domains where privacy is important,
such as web browsing. In the specific case of location privacy, it is argued that resource-
constrained device users are willing to trade off privacy to obtain reasonable performance,
i.e. to trade off some levels of performance to gain some levels of privacy support.
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A user sets the desired privacy level by specifying a subset of the entire database to be
queried. The privacy level can be specified in terms of cities or towns (i.e. city level), states
or provinces (i.e. provincial level), and so on, to enhance user-friendliness. The ratio of the
number of POIs inside this subregion to the number of POIs in the entire POI database
defines a privacy parameter ρ; a value of 1 indicates that the user desires query privacy
at the same level as that offered by a typical PIR protocol, which is maximum privacy at
maximum performance cost. Similarly, if a user sets the query privacy level to 0.25, for
example, then the PIR query will execute faster as the server only needs to process one
quarter of the entire database. Although the cost is still linear in the number of items in
terms of computational complexity, the constant term is modified (i.e. in terms of Big-O
notation), leading to significant performance gains. In this case, the server can only infer
that some portion of one-quarter of the entire database is of interest to the user. At the
same time, it will be disclosed to the server that three quarters of all items in this case
are not of interest; depending on the geographical coverage of the database, this leakage
of information will not necessarily constitute a significant breach of location privacy.
The cloaking region is thus identified as a subset of the entire world described by the
database. If it is imagined that the world is mapped as a grid of so-called geographic
grid cells that are equally distributed, then one of these cells will be chosen to comprise
the cloaking region. If a higher privacy level is desired, then the cloaking region may be
expanded to include multiple geographic grid cells, and thus a larger portion of the database
that describes the world. It is sufficient to identify each grid cell by its cell number if the
mapping is static and published. The process of mapping the world to a geographic grid
occurs during the pre-processing phase, described next.
7.4.2 Pre-Processing and Location Cloaking
The first step in the pre-processing phase is to represent a geographic area such as the
United States and Canada on a two-dimensional plane using a map projection method
such as the commonly-used Miller cylindrical projection [103]. Once that is done, the
user’s location of interest may be found on this plane. It is necessary to obscure the user’s
location by creating a cloaking area around the user’s true position or area of interest.
POIs will be found anywhere by the LBS server within this cloaking region. The cloaking
region must be sufficiently large in order to achieve sufficient privacy for the user, but at
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the same time it must be sufficiently small to minimize the amount of computation required
on the cloud server to process the query results, and to achieve quicker response from it.
Several techniques allow POIs to be mapped to a cloaking region. One technique
is quad-tree mapping [51], but it has the disadvantage (from its use in Casper [84]) of
forming an unnecessarily large cloaking region which can impair performance [12]. Another
technique is called VHC (Various-size-grid Hilbert Curve) mapping [91], which suits the
purpose here. In particular, it solves the problem of the density of POIs varying by
geographic area. If the density of POIs is significantly higher for a given region (such as
a city), then a higher data traffic cost will result if the geographic size of the enclosing
cell that is retrieved is always constant, and the query will be slower, as a result. If on
the other hand, the density becomes significantly lower (such as in a sparsely populated
region like the countryside), then the result size for the queried region may be so minimal
that the server may guess the user’s likely destination with a high degree of confidence,
leading to loss of privacy. VHC solves this problem by creating variable-sized cells from
which a cloaking region is built; the boundaries of each cell are established according to
the density of the POIs in the geographic area that it encloses. Essentially, in VHC, the
two-dimensional geographic grid is mapped to a one-dimensional space such that there is
equal POI density in each VHC cell, or subspace, as shown in Figure 7.1 (a). Assume that
a typical POI database that covers the regions of Canada and the U.S. will have 6 million
POIs. If each VHC cell must contain the same number of POIs, such as 60, then there will
be a total of 100,000 VHC cells that will cover this geographic region. Suppose that the
lowest POI density found in the database is 60 POIs per 40,000 km2. Thus, the maximum
size of a VHC cell will be 40,000 km2. Now, a geographic grid is created overlaying the U.S.
and Canada regions with fixed-size square cells that are 200 km in length (the area of each
is 40,000 km2). Each such geographic grid cell corresponds to the maximum possible size
of a single VHC cell as described above. Each geographic grid cell, however, may contain
any number of smaller-sized VHC cells if the POI density of the region inside the grid cell
is greater, as shown in Figure 7.1 (b). The decomposition continues until all POIs present
within a geographic grid cell are mapped to VHC cells of various sizes and boundaries; each
VHC cell will contain the same number of POIs, with empty results padded if necessary.
During normal operation, the client determines a cloaking region based on a particular
privacy level by determining the number of geographic grid cells to include inside the
cloaking region queried by the user. Suppose that the client chooses a privacy level such
that the cloaking region consists of four geographic grid cells. The user’s true location is
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.1: (a) An example of VHC mapping with uniform POI density. (b) A user’s true
position inside VHC cell 25 (shaded) and within a cloaking region bounded by the single
geo (geographical) grid cell 2. Only the POI results for VHC cell 25 will be returned in a
query. If a larger cloaking region consisting of geographic grid cells 1 to 4 was specified,
for greater privacy, then the same POI results would still be returned, but at the cost of
greater server-side computation and a longer transaction.
in one of these grid cells. Inside of the geographic grid cell, there is a set of variable-sized
VHC cells according to the distribution of the POIs in the geographic grid cell. The user’s
area of interest, for which POIs will be retrieved, will be the single current VHC cell found
inside one of the geographic grid cells. The number of POIs per VHC cell is known, and
in this case, it is 60. Thus, the user will initiate a request that will reference the cloaking
region, as well as the specific VHC cell in which the user is located or interested in. The
user will receive a set of 60 POIs that are found in his or her current VHC cell only. The
server will only know that the location of interest is somewhere within the cloaking region
defined by the four geographic grid cells.
The geographic grid is useful in specifying the size of the cloaking region and for iden-
tifying which VHC cells will comprise the cloaking region. The desired level of privacy
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POI 1 POI 2 POI 60...
POI 61 POI 62 POI 120...
POI 180...
POI 240...
POI 300...
POI 360...
POI 420...
POI 480...
POI 121
POI 181
POI 241
POI 301
POI 361
POI 421
POI 122
POI 182
POI 242
POI 302
POI 362
POI 422
VHC cell 1
VHC cell 2
VHC cell 3
VHC cell 4
VHC cell 5
VHC cell 6
VHC cell 7
VHC cell 8
...
Geo cell 1
Geo cell 2
Figure 7.2: An example of POI database mapping in PIR, showing the relationship between
geographical grid cells, VHC cells, and POIs as stored in database rows in the cloud.
establishes the size of the cloaking region. The client then sends this cloaking region to
the server, by identifying the bounding coordinates (i.e., the longitude and latitude of the
top-left and bottom-right corners). The server will then be able to identify which VHC
cells belong to this cloaking region, and therefore which portion of the database must be
read. The client must also encode the identifier of the VHC cell containing the area of
interest inside the PIR query. (Each VHC cell in the system is uniquely identified by a
numeric value.) Figure 7.2 further illustrates the relationships among a geographical grid,
VHC cells and POIs.
Thus, the proposed cloaking technique provides a way of reducing the search space of
the POI database by employing multiple levels of database segmentation. The cloaking
region itself is described as a single, or multiple, geographic grid cell or cells. Inside each
geographic grid cell are found one or multiple VHC cells, the number depending on the
amount and distribution of POIs inside the geographic grid cell. The user’s true location
is inside one of these VHC cells, and the user retrieves POI’s corresponding to that VHC
cell only. As far as the LBS server is concerned, the user could be located anywhere within
the larger geographic grid cell, or multiple grid cells, that comprise the cloaking region.
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The geographic grid is fixed. The initial grid cell dimensions are configured based on
the maximum size of each VHC cell, but once established, will not need to change. Both
the client and server must have the same knowledge of the geographic grid. It can be
distributed oﬄine, along with the software for the user’s smartphone, or stored in a public
directory in the cloud. A simple approach to determining grid cell dimensions is to use a
geographic coordinate system such as Degrees-Minutes-Seconds (DMS) [62]. For instance,
each grid cell may be two latitude degrees in length, which roughly equates to 200 km at
the 30 degree latitude. A population of tens of thousands to millions of users may typically
inhabit and stay within the bounds of a grid cell that is 200 km2 in size, leading to excellent
privacy. Cells of larger size will afford province- and state-level privacy if desired.
Both the client and server must agree on the same VHC mapping, and this mapping
must be done off-line in advance. Because it is dependent on population density, it will
remain relatively static over time even as the population grows, and can be dynamically
updated on the client if necessary. In order to contain knowledge of the mapping to define
the cloaking region, the user may make use of a pre-computed map file that is stored locally
on the device. This mapping technique is an improvement over a cloaking region that is
simply based on cells of constant size, and ensures that a constant and predictable number
of results are returned for the user’s grid cell, so as not to leak information to the cloud.
The idea of using VHC to address the general problem of location privacy was proposed
in [91], but in a way that is very different from that of this chapter. Specifically, VHC was
used to map the user’s current location to a 1-dimensional space. Random perturbation
was then applied on the 1-dimensional value, which was then mapped back to 2-dimensional
space according to the VHC mapping, to represent the user’s true location. In essence, the
random perturbation was applied to create confusion for an attacker about the user’s true
location. The technique proposed here differs in that VHC is used for a different purpose;
it defines the storage of POI entries of interest within a geographic cell, which comprises
the cloaking region, in a way that allows proximate POIs to be stored as adjacent database
entries. This cloaking region is then utilized within the context of a privacy-preserving PIR
protocol. Perturbation of the location is not performed; it is argued that this would result in
decreased privacy. Indeed, a non-stationary user whose true location is randomly perturbed
is still subject to correlation attack. In the proposed approach, it is demonstrated that the
cost of computational and communication overhead through the use of PIR is acceptable,
as a method is provided for retrieving only a subset of entries of the entire POI database
for each query. The proposed technique is also impervious to correlation attacks.
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The device must store a copy of the VHC map in local non-volatile memory, but the
storage requirements are very reasonable. The current geographic grid cell encapsulating
the user can be derived from the user’s current latitude and longitude coordinates, if the
mapping convention is known. A single coordinate for the intersection point of each VHC
cell inside (i.e. one of its corners) can then be recorded. Hence, a single coordinate would
suffice to store each VHC cell in device memory. For quick lookup and to minimize storage
requirements, the coordinates of all VHC cells only in the current geographic cell could be
stored. Assuming that the smallest VHC cell size is 1 km2 in size, then the worst case is
that 40,000 coordinates will need to be stored to account for all VHC’s. Two bytes will
be sufficient to store each VHC coordinate, because the origin of the geographic grid cell
is known, so that the total cost will be approximately 80,000 bytes to store all VHC cells.
This is the worst theoretical case; in practice, small VHC cells will only be encountered in
very dense metropolitan areas, and they will not occupy an entire geographic cell.
7.4.3 Variable Level of Privacy
The size of the cloaking region chosen and the subsequent performance of a query depend
on the user’s desired level of privacy. If the user wishes to obtain a higher level of privacy,
then the size of the cloaking region can be defined to be larger, and to encompass a larger
number of geographic grid cells (and thus VHC cells found inside), but the amount of
computation on the server will increase accordingly, delaying the response. Nevertheless,
the chief benefit is that the processing time of the query on the server is predictable,
because each VHC cell in each request contains the same number of POIs. The key fact
is that the amount of data transmitted will be roughly proportional to the number of
POIs in a single VHC cell (depending on the implementation details of the PIR scheme
being employed), but the server will only learn the client’s location to the resolution of the
cloaking region. The amount of variation allowed in the size of the cloaking region should
be kept to a minimum, as this variable may be used to form part of a fingerprint of a target
in a correlation attack. Allowing a one-cell or two-by-two-cell region only may be a good
compromise. The latter could be employed by the user on a permanent basis to avoid the
threat of inter-cell movement being discovered.
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7.4.4 Algorithm
In this section, the algorithms that implement the proposal to allow a user to set his or
her level of query privacy (equivalent to the size of the cloaking region) are presented:
Let PIR = {PIREncode, PIRProcess, PIRDecode} be some PIR protocol where
PIREncode, PIRProcess, and PIRDecode are the query encoding, response processing,
and response decoding protocols, respectively. The following generic algorithms implement
the proposal for introducing levels of privacy in the PIR query.
Query Generation (By PIR Client)
Let n be the total number of items (or POIs) in the PIR database or databases (in the
case of a PIR protocol with replicated databases), σ be the number of VHC grid cells in
the map where each grid cell has n/σ items. Let i be the index of the database block that
the user wishes to retrieve, and ρ ∈ [0, 1] be a privacy parameter preset by the user that
determines the size of the cloaking region.
i. Compute l = dρne and set R = {r1, r2, r3, ..., rl} to be the set of indexes for the items
corresponding to the single or multiple geographical grid cells of the cloaking region.
For a standard PIR query, it will be the indexes of items in the database.
ii. Compute q = PIREncodeR(i) as the PIR query encoding for i, using only the item
indexes in R (i.e. not all the indexes in all geographical grid locations in the entire
map are required).
iii. Send {q, R} to the database (or PIR server). Instead of sending R, it may be more
efficient to send only the top left and bottom right coordinates of the bounding
rectangle that covers the cloaking region, or the range of identifiers (or numbers) for
the VHC grid cells that are within the cloaking region, or for the geographic cells that
contain them; in any of these cases, the PIR server can use the provided information
to determine R.
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Response Encoding (By PIR Server)
i. Retrieve a database portion D = {d1, d2, d3, ..., dn}, where D[rj] = dj∀j, 0 ≤ j ≤ l,
from the database. Each item may consist of one (or more POIs) and each POI is a
data structure with attributes of longitude, latitude, name, address, phone, category,
web site address, and so on.
ii. Execute PIRProcessD′(q) to obtain response r, which is the block of POIs in the
user’s VHC grid cell, and return it back to the client.
Response Decoding (By PIR Client)
i Execute PIRDecodeR(i, r) to obtain a database response to the query. The response
should be the set of POIs that the query requested.
ii The client can locally compute the nearest neighbour using the set of POIs returned.
7.5 Implementation
7.5.1 Performance Measurement and Simulation
C++ and Java prototypes were developed using two available implementations of the PIR
protocol. The evaluation of the proposed approach in terms of feasibility and scalability
is based on the C++ prototype. The purpose of the Java prototype is to demonstrate
the successful porting of the implementation to a smartphone platform. It was not the
intention to compare these implementations or run them with the same set of parameters.
The C++ prototype is based on Percy++, an open source PIR protocol written in
C++ [47, 48]. The Percy implementation offers computational, information-theoretic and
hybrid (a mix of both) PIR. Percy++ was modified to support the proposal for allowing
PIR queries to be based on a database portion defined by the cloaking region. The com-
putational performance of the PIR algorithm is measured, taking into account different
levels of privacy and corresponding sizes of cloaking regions. The PIR implementation
was run against a database of 6 million synthetic POIs, the typical number of POIs in a
commercial POI database for the U.S. and Canada. It is noted that a similar experiment
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in [46] considers a much smaller database consisting of only 10,000 and 100,000 POIs;
a head-to-head comparison with [46] is infeasible because different PIR implementations
and test data were used. Each POI consists of 256 bytes that were generated randomly;
this size is a conservative representation of practical POI sizes. In comparison, the POIs
from [46] are only 64 bits in length. The location coordinates are stored with each POI.
The Java prototype is based on a computational SPIR protocol implementation [96];
this SPIR protocol was derived from an oblivious transfer protocol [85] and appeared to
be the only publicly available Java implementation at the time of writing. This second
prototype development consists of both a server component and a client component that
was deployed on a smartphone platform. Specifically, the implementation from [96] was
ported to Google’s Android smartphone platform, which supports the Java programming
language. The only aspect of the implementation that could not be adapted without light
modification was the RMI mechanism, which was replaced with HTTP socket commu-
nication between the Android client process and a server process running on a desktop
computer.
7.5.2 Discussion
The query roundtrip times were measured for the C++ prototype on a machine with
a 2.91 GHz dual-core AMD CPU, 3 GB RAM, and running Ubuntu Linux. Since the
Percy++ PIR uses replicated databases, the number of databases was set to 2 [48]. Fig-
ure 7.3 shows query roundtrip times for varying sizes of cloaking regions and POI result
sizes. The number of POIs returned for each query is equivalent to the number of POIs
configured in a VHC cell. Similarly, the number of POIs returned by a query is equivalent
to the number of blocks (in bytes) that a traditional PIR query returns. For instance, a
block of 10 POIs is equivalent to 2560 bytes of data, as each POI consists of 256 bytes. The
query roundtrip or response times for block sizes 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500, where the
cloaking region is as large as the entire database itself for maximum privacy, are between
approximately 20 and 70 seconds; this is because each PIR request runs against the entire
database of 6 million synthetic POIs. However, the query roundtrip time improves with
lower levels of privacy. For example, the query response times for the above block sizes
with a privacy parameter of ρ = 0.17, and thus a smaller cloaking region, are between
approximately 4 and 12 seconds. One must observe that setting ρ to 0.17 is equivalent
to privately querying a block of POIs from a portion of the database consisting of 1.02
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million POIs. If it is assumed that there are equal number of POIs in all the provinces
and states of Canada and US, this implies a cloaking region that covers approximately 10
provinces and/or states. Under a similar assumption, a user who intends to hide his query
in a cloaking region consisting of one province or state will simply set his query privacy
parameter ρ to a much lower value of 0.02. The query response time for this level of privacy
is approximately 0.3 seconds for an optimal block size, which in the testing configuration
consists of 256 POIs.
It is easy to observe from the graph that the block that consists of 250 POIs gives the
best performance. Furthermore, the worst performing block size is the one consisting of
5 POIs, the reason being that smaller block sizes require more rounds of computation to
process the individual blocks, compared to larger block sizes. On the other hand, large
block sizes, such as 500, carry performance penalties and overheads which depend on the
characteristics of the underlying PIR scheme, and also on the resource constraints of the
runtime hardware (e.g., RAM, disk and memory cache sizes, and network bandwidth). The
network cost was negligible since the measurements were taken on a LAN.
The client for the Java prototype was also installed on a G1 Android smartphone
that features a Qualcomm ARM processor running at 528 MHz, and includes 192 MB of
DDR SDRAM, and 256 MB of flash memory. Although the locked smartphone was capable
of running on T-Mobile’s 3G network in the U.S., it did not support the 3G frequency bands
in operation in Canada; hence, the tests were run using the Rogers EDGE network, which
is slower by up to a factor of ten. An Android application was created with a user interface,
shown in Figure 7.4, that allows the user to specify the server address and query parameters
such as the size of the cloaking region and the size of the portion of the cloaking region to
fetch. It was observed that when the cloaking region was reduced to a quarter of its original
size (i.e. a quarter of the POIs were returned), the query generation became 2.15 times
slower, but the roundtrip time became 3.32 times quicker. Overall, the implementation
was usable even though it had not been originally designed and optimized for the Android
platform, and it was restricted to a non-3G network.
The proposed solution preserves the privacy of the user’s location irrespective of the
number of other users initiating queries for the same location. The server can infer the
user’s location based on the cloaking region only. The user may adjust the size of the
cloaking region based on his or her personal preferences (i.e. the desired level of privacy,
query performance, and cost), because a larger region will entail more computation. The
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Figure 7.3: The query roundtrip performance results obtained for different sizes of cloaking
regions, as determined by the privacy parameter ρ, and for different block sizes of POIs
returned per query. A single measurement was taken per data point.
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Figure 7.4: The user interface of the mobile client app in PIR.
size of the cloaking region is based on a particular size of geographic area and does not
need to be adjusted based on the known distribution of POIs within the region. The user
only establishes a reasonable level of privacy based on the number of geographic grid cells
that define a geographic area. The boundary of the cloaking region utilized in a request
is established by the user and is based on the geographic cell map contained on the user’s
end as well as the privacy parameter. The size of the cloaking region and its boundaries
are dynamically adjustable and are not controlled by the server.
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7.6 Summary
In this chapter, an algorithm has been proposed for private information retrieval from a
cloud server that achieves a good compromise between user location privacy and com-
putational efficiency. The proposed algorithm has been implemented and evaluated and
shown to be practical on resource-constrained hardware. The proposed approach of using
a variable-sized cloaking region divided into VHC cells results in greater location privacy
than the traditional approach of a single cloaking region, while at the same time decreas-
ing wireless data traffic usage from an amount proportional to the size of the cloaking
region to an amount proportional to the size of a smaller VHC cell. It also allows the
user to dynamically choose from various levels of privacy. Although increasing the size
of the cloaking region does result in higher computation in processing the query on the
cloud server, it is maintained that this tradeoff is very reasonable, given that the cloud
provider is highly scalable; furthermore, only relevant results are transmitted over a rel-
atively slow and expensive wireless network, and the processing overhead for the mobile
user is negligible.
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Conclusions
The works in this thesis represent progress towards securing mobile cloud comput-ing systems in a highly scalable manner. Confidentiality of sensitive and private user
data is ensured when exchanged between a cloud application and an authorized user, and
also when it is in storage. The cloud provider is conservatively considered largely untrusted.
Scarce resources for mobile device users are conserved, by delegating responsibilities to the
cloud provider, so that high scalability and economy can be achieved even in the context
of a dynamic user population. The proposed solutions are not implementation-dependent
and are applicable towards commercial cloud systems that are in operation today. In ad-
dition to key management, solutions have also been proposed for confidential information
retrieval of public data from clouds. The significance of the research conducted is ex-
plained in Section 8.1; a summary of contributions, referencing each major work, is given
in Section 8.2; finally, future directions of study for each are provided in Section 8.3.
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8.1 Significance of Research
Although cloud computing systems have garnered significant interest from industry and
the academic community from the perspective of their computation and storage capabil-
ities, the area of security is still in early and active development; yet, security concerns
have proved to be high barriers to adoption. The literature has yet to fully appreciate
the unique challenges posed by a massively scalable cloud computing system, and how
they invalidate traditional client-server encryption schemes. Solutions thus far have been
unable to cope with the efficiency demands of a user population primarily composed of
mobile devices, which is an evident trend in the marketplace. In a survey of work on
secure mobile cloud computing, it was concluded that most security frameworks examined
overlooked the tradeoff required between improved energy consumption on the mobile de-
vice, when oﬄoading work to the cloud provider, and the increased expense of incurring
communication with the cloud as a result of having to use the cloud’s resources [63].
The work in this thesis proposes key management techniques that significantly reduce
computation and communication costs for mobile users, while conservatively considering
the cloud server to be untrusted. The mobile cloud applications being supported are
forward-looking in that they are highly collaborative in nature, and depend upon data
outsourcing and sharing; such applications differ from existing web-based systems that
utilize a trusted server and entail one-to-one exchange of information. Furthermore, the
thesis proposes how to deal effectively with additional important facets of cloud usage such
as privacy of information retrieved from public databases in cloud systems. Many optional
variants are presented throughout to support different cloud architectures, capabilities and
classifications of users, as well as security attributes of data. In all cases, algorithms have
been validated and benchmarked on popular smartphones and cloud systems in use today,
which is often not the case with other existing works. It is imperative to conduct tests on
actual device hardware, as performance factors such as throughput are difficult to simulate
accurately, and for sound conclusions to be drawn as a result. Furthermore, scalability
simulations have been run that extrapolate and help assess the viability of some of the
techniques beyond a small testbed of devices. Thus, the thesis presents viable and realistic
solutions for a significant amount of important use cases in mobile cloud computing.
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8.2 Review of Contributions
The following contributions have been made in this thesis, with reference to the proposals
and results detailed in previous chapters:
1. In Chapter 4, a novel solution is proposed that entails a key management scheme
based on re-encryption that effectively utilizes the cloud for the most intensive cryp-
tographic computation while preserving the confidentiality of data; other solutions
rely upon a less scalable trusted third-party that acts as an intermediary in requests.
Novel aspects are introduced to support a scalable and dynamic user population, such
as a versioning array, key material sharing tactics by users, and intelligent timing of
re-encryptions. A cloud-based prototype has been built to provide real world data
and demonstrate the viability of the approach.
2. In Chapter 5, a protocol for outsourcing data storage to a cloud provider in secure
fashion is provided. Authorized users qualify for access through possession of the
right attributes without arbitration by the data owner. Unlike other attribute-based
techniques, the protocol delegates computation and requests to a cloud provider
or trusted authority. Responsibility over key generation is divided between a mobile
data owner and a trusted authority; the owner is relieved of the highest computational
burden. Additional security is provided through a group keying mechanism where the
data owner controls access based on the distribution of an additional secret key; this
additional security measure is an optional variant applicable to highly sensitive data
subject to frequent access, resulting in a unique hybrid approach. Re-encryption
permits efficient revocation of users; it does not require removal of attributes and
subsequent key regeneration, and may be administered by a trusted authority without
involvement of the data owner. Real-world benchmarks have been measured on a
popular smartphone and cloud system, and calibrated simulations have been run to
assess the scalability potential of the scheme.
3. In Chapter 6, the cloud’s centralized data storage facility is used in novel fashion to
store encryption key material as shares such that the provider cannot use them to
decode user data also stored in the cloud. Unlike other key sharing techniques, the
proposal makes use of the cloud’s economical storage cost to maintain key material,
and to degrade it over time, so that the cost of key re-generation is minimized. The
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protocol uniquely exploits self-eroding key material in the cloud to achieve highly
scalable access management for mobile users. The protocol has been implemented
on a mobile cloud prototype, and a separate simulation program has demonstrated
the effects of various key allocation and removal strategies in a realistic environment
in which a large and dynamic mobile user population is modelled.
4. In Chapter 7, a novel hybrid technique is proposed that integrates location cloak-
ing and private information retrieval in the context of a location-based service that
leverages public data stored in the cloud. The proposal has been implemented on
a client-server as well as mobile device hardware to determine its practicality in a
resource-constrained environment. Users can achieve a good compromise between
privacy and computational efficiency with the proposed technique unlike other ex-
isting location-based service proposals that seek to provide privacy guarantees. In
particular, a trusted third-party is not needed to provide a cloaking function.
8.3 Future Work
Significant opportunities exist for advancing the research described in this thesis. Some
suggested directions are presented, with reference to the work already described:
1. In the proposed scheme in Chapter 4, although the focus of the protocol is on data
confidentiality, data integrity may be provided through the use of digital signaures or
a similar mechanism to achieve a holistic security solution in case the cloud provider
is deemed less trustworthy. Also, a hierarchical access control mechanism could be
found to support different user classes and privileges. Furthermore, the appropriate
timing of re-encryption activity in the cloud could be studied.
2. In the proposed scheme in Chapter 5, if a secret group key is utilized, it may be advan-
tageous for a trusted manager to compute new key versions and re-encryption keys,
and manage their storage and distribution. A suitable key versioning mechanism is
suggested for this purpose, such as the one found in Chapter 4.
3. In the proposed scheme in Chapter 6, various additional heuristics for key share
deletion may be explored, such as performing key re-generation functions in the
149
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS
cloud during cheaper off-peak hours. Additionally, key shares may be deleted not
based on the passage of time, but rather, based on the number of users that have
left the authorized user set since the last deletion event; this practice may be more
applicable for smaller populations.
4. In the proposed scheme in Chapter 7, the general scenario where the user retrieves
all of the POIs that belong to the VHC cell of interest could be modified. The user
could be allowed expand the search for POIs by searching in a broader geographical
area through an additional query, or the user could request POIs for all of the VHC
cells within a geographic grid cell to obtain useful results. Applicability of the scheme
to other application domains such as multimedia content could also be studied.
Although the use of data encryption appears to counteract the economic advantages
of running applications in an open and scalable manner in the cloud, it is a concession
made to prevent an untrusted cloud provider from learning any confidential information.
Operations by cloud applications on encrypted data, such as indexing and searching, is
an open research problem. Fully homomorphic encryption schemes have been proposed
that seemingly make this possible [43]; although they are still largely impractical, they
show promise. Furthermore, there is recent work on practical means of searching through
encrypted data stored in clouds based on fuzzy keyword search techniques [72, 95].
Finally, it would be interesting to apply the techniques proposed in this thesis to various
real-world mobile cloud applications to gauge their performance on realistic workloads and
user populations.
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Mobile and Cloud Computing Costs
Introduction
The techniques presented in this thesis strive to minimize energy consumption formobile device users; the importance of doing so is demonstrated in Section A.1. An-
other goal is conserving computation on a cloud computing server; although it is scalable,
its computational workload may be substantial and incur expenses for the client, as shown
in Section A.2. This appendix provides justification for optimizing these factors.
A.1 Mobile Device Energy Consumption
A useful consideration in security cost estimation is energy usage from the exchange of com-
munications. Smartphones consume considerable energy when transmitting and receiving,
as compared to their idle states. In the case of a mobile device operating in the 3G network
mode, current draw is approximately 100 mA in idle state, as measured on an HP iPAQ
smartphone [99]. The same study also found that when transmitting, current draw peaks
at approximately 300 mA on ramp-up, with an energy tail of approximately an average of
200 mA sustained for an additional 16 seconds, resulting in a considerable aggregate drain.
This is due to the fact that a 3G wireless radio is maintained in high-power active state
by the network to maximize responsiveness and minimize the signalling costs of additional
transmissions. Similarly, another study of energy consumption was conducted on Nokia
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N95 phones, capable of HSDPA/UMTS and also operating in 3G mode [11]. It was found
that nearly 60% of energy, the so-called tail energy, is wasted in high-power states after
completing a transfer, while the initial ramp energy is small; the design motivation is to
reduce ramp-up delay in subsequent transfers. In comparison, the older and slower GSM
network operating mode is characterized by a tail time that is half that of the 3G mode.
Uploads were found to consume more energy than downloads; for example, the transfer
energy for uploads is nearly 30% greater, for 100 KB transfers [11].
Equation A.1 describes the energy consumption in a single upload request from a 3G
mobile device:
Etotal = R ·
[
S(M)
T
· tpeak · Cpeak + ttail · Ctail
]
(A.1)
where R is the number of requests, S(M) is the size of each wireless request, T is the
throughput, tpeak and ttail are the ramp-up and high-power state durations, respectively,
and Cpeak and Ctail are the peak and tail current draws, respectively. Figure A.1 illustrates
the components of energy consumption described.
Consider an example of the energy consumption of a mobile device with a typical
throughput of 1200 kbps on an HSDPA 3G network; this rate represents a realistic through-
put as determined in a mobile driving test of HSDPA downloads on a real network, per-
formed by Ericsson [34,99]. Assume an average capacity of 1200 mAh for a typical smart-
phone battery. For instance, the Apple iPhone 3GS includes an internal battery with a
capacity of 1219 mAh. Therefore, total battery consumption in mAh for a transfer request
is as follows:
Etotal = R ·
[
S(M) · 300mA
1200kb
s
· 3600 s
h
+
16s · 200mA
3600 s
h
]
Etotal = R ·
[
S(M) · 6.94 · 10−5 + 8.89 · 10−1]mAh
If the user initiates 100 requests of 1 MB each per day, such that:
R = 100, S(M) = 1MB
then the daily energy consumption is:
Etotal = 100 ·
[
1 · 103 · 6.94 · 10−5 + 8.89 · 10−1]mAh = 95.83mAh = 345C
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Figure A.1: The energy consumption of a single transmission on a mobile device, in C
h
over a span of time (where 3.6C = 1mAh), illustrating the initial energy ramp-up during
packet transmission, followed by the tail of the high-energy state.
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If this energy consumption is doubled to account for the receipt of responses or messages
from the cloud, then the total resultant energy consumption for radio communication alone
represents a significant 16.0% of a typical smartphone battery; this figure does not include
the energy cost of processing messages and storing them to flash memory. Given these
characteristics of energy consumption, it is advantageous to limit the number of small
transfers on mobile phones, each of which incur high overhead, in any security protocol.
In [11], it is suggested that scheduling changes can occur. For instance, transmissions
may be scheduled together in delay-tolerant applications so that the time spent in the high
power state is minimized. In addition, applications may prefetch data to minimize the
total number of transactions. Reduction of message traffic is a key goal in this work.
A.2 Cloud Server Cryptographic Workload
Another factor in cost estimation is the amount of cryptographic processing. To determine
the workload on the server for a cloud application serving a large user population, assume
a homogeneous stochastic Poisson process defined in Equation A.2:
P [(N(t+ τ)−N(t)) = k] = (λτ)
ke−λτ
k!
for k = 0, 1, ..., (A.2)
where λ is the expected number of elements, k is the number of events in the time interval
(t, t + τ ] and λ is the expected number of elements per unit time. In the context of this
study, the elements are the number of users of the cloud application, and the events are
the requests that they initiate against the cloud application.
Consider an example of a workload calculation for an authentication server deployed
in the cloud; assume appropriate values for the parameters in the cloud usage scenario
as found in Table A.1. The usage frequency is hypothetical and intended to resemble an
active cloud application user. The encryption rates are derived from published results of
Crypto++, an open-source cryptographic library [31]. Benchmark tests were conducted on
random data blocks on an Intel dual-core 1.83 GHz desktop, using the Microsoft Vista OS.
The RSA operations are based on a key length of 2048 bits, and it is assumed that blocks
of 245 bytes (256 bytes less 11 for user data) are encrypted at a time, using PKSC #1
padding. The AES operations are based on CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode. The tests
omit memory operations; it is expected that slower times would be achieved in practice.
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Symbol Definition Assumed values in
large-scale system
U Users accessing authentication server 1 million
Accesses per user per day 10
λ Expected event rate per server 1 million requests per day
τ Time interval (maximum wait tolerated
by mobile user)
10 s
msize Average message size 1 MB
renc RSA Encryption rate using RSA 0.0787 s per MB
renc AES Encryption rate using AES 0.0092 s per MB
rdec RSA Decryption rate using RSA 2.9921 s per MB
rdec AES Decryption rate using AES 0.0092 s per MB
µ Service rate 0.5
Table A.1: The parameters for the arrivals in a cloud application.
Suppose that a single authentication server can handle up to
[
60s
renc or rdec
· µ
]
requests
per minute, assuming a maximum sustained server utilization of 0.5, to maintain respon-
siveness. Choose an interval with a duration of 10 seconds, which is assumed to be the
maximum delay tolerated by a mobile user. With an average sustainable performance of
approximately 2 s
MB
on a cryptographic operation, this equates to a rate of 2.5 requests
per interval.
Assume a global population of users U accessing a set of authentication servers A with
frequency λ, further assuming an even distribution of requests. Given Equation A.2, the
estimated probability of exceeding an authentication server’s capacity is:
P (k > 2, τ) = 97.9% for 2000 servers,
= 88.9% for 1000 servers,
= 59.2% for 500 servers
The probability mass function is shown in Figure A.2. Thus, approximately one authen-
tication server per 500 users is required to handle cryptographic operations for the entire
user population. With a more conservative allocation, the cloud will be unable to meet
the desired throughput of user requests.
If the assumption about an evenly distributed workload is modified, and it is discovered
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Figure A.2: A cloud server arrival model, where a Poisson probability mass function shows
the probability of a user request against an authentication server within an acceptable
delay interval.
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that requests substantially increase at peak times, then even greater capacity in the au-
thentication centre will be needed at additional expense. In fact, it has been demonstrated
that to achieve a high degree of on-demand availability in a cloud computing system, at
least twice the number of nodes in the largest collection of nodes under study in the system
(such as the servers responsible for authentication in this example), must be made available
during a busy period [52]; this analysis is based on the modelling, using a classic Erlang
loss model, of multiple resource classes in a cloud; these classes contain different numbers
of computational nodes that can be assigned to user tasks in a cloud system. Recall that
in cloud computing, a user will pay for the use of different classes of resources to achieve a
compromise between total processing time and cost. If such an allocation of servers cannot
be achieved, then the detrimental effect of blocking can occur; an incoming authentication
request from a user will be denied or simply dropped. Note that this behaviour is unlike
that of a grid computing system, in which immediate access to the system’s computational
resources are not generally expected, and therefore requests may be queued during times
of peak processing.
There is little question that authentication operations incur a considerable computa-
tional penalty on a server. In one test, Microsoft measured the performance implications
of client authentication on ProLiant web servers [35]. The throughput, in responses per
second given a 50 user load, was approximately 10 times worse when using basic SSL au-
thentication over non-authenticated anonymous requests. As well, the response time was
approximately four times worse.
Rather than attempting to expand the capacity of the authentication centre to achieve
a cloud system with highly scalable and available security, the option exists to reduce
the number of cryptographic requests through a different user authentication and data
encryption model, such as a co-operative one that off-loads cryptographic operations from
the cloud to a trusted manager entity at increased but manageable cost to the user.
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